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ABSTRACT
A computable general equilibrium model with eight productive sectors is
built, and calibrated using data of 1960 Japan as the base. The sector
division reflects the intraurban modern-traditional dichotomy. Intraurban
unskilled wage differentials are assumed to be caused by the employers'
labor cost minimization behavior when there exist sector-specific training
costs and quit rates. These quit rates are function of all nominal wages
and consumers' price levels.
Three different methods of closing the model are employed. The first is
the neo-Keynesian type (FI) where unemployed resources exist and the
investment in new capital stocks is determined only by investors'
expectations on user costs of factors of production and on future demands.
The second closure is of the neoclassical type (NC). In this closure all
factors are fully employed and the investment is passively determined by
the total savings available in the economy. The third closure (IX) is a
hybrid of the former two closures: factors are fully employed as in NC,
and the investment is determined by the "animal spirits" of the investors
as in FI.
It is observed through ten-year simulations that the FI closure replicates
the economic history of Japan during the 1960s fairly well. It also
replicates the qualitative relationship between growth and distribution
during the most of the 1960s, although toward the end of the 1960s, there
are some signs that the IX closure may do better. The neoclassical closure
behaves poorly throughout the simulation period. In all three closures,
higher growth rates of the economy tend to benefit capital and skill owners
more than unskilled labor classes, although who actually benefits by how
much differs substantially by closures and by the kinds of sensitivity
experiments performed. Especially there is a marked distinction between
the distributional outcomes of export-led growth and simple investment
spurts.
Some relevant policy implications for dualistic, rapidly growing and labor
abundant economies and a summary of model behavior of different closures
appear as conclusions. Warnings against use of the neoclassical closure
without caution are emphasized.
Thesis Supervisor: Dr. Richard S. Eckaus
Title: Professor of Economics
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION
This study attempts to gain better insights into the process of economic
growth and the accompanying changes of income distribution. Japan's recent
history is the chosen site for this study with the assumption that the de-
struction of capital stocks during World War II and the repatriation of six
million people back into Japan after the war created a situation akin to the
problems faced by many contemporary developing countries today. These prob-
lems include scarce capital stocks and an excess in the supply of labor (as
seen in the amount of un- and underemployed). It would, of course, be a
mistake to conclude from this that the case of post-war Japan can be directly
applied to tackling the problems facing contemporary developing countries, but
with a certain abstraction it is hoped that some aspects of Japan's experi-
ences of economic growth are relevant to the problems faced in the develop-
ment process.
The tool chosen for this "abstraction" is A computable general equilib-
rium model, relying heavily on thetexistence of consistent national accounting
data, and on the assumption that the market mechanism plays an important role*.
Much of this kind of modeling has been developed since Johanson (1960) did
his pioneering work on the Norwegian economy, and with the rapid development
of computers numerous general equilibrium model exercises have been performed
in the-recent past. This would be an appropriate place for reviewing
*This model, with some behavioral assumptions, is also compatible with
centrally planned economies whose planning is naturally based on the national
accounting consistency. See Zalai (1982).
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some of them*.
The most appropriate starting point for a review of this sort may be the
Kelley and Williamson (1974) study of the economic history of Japan. They
apply a two-sector, two-factor general equilibrium model to the early phase
(1887-1915) of Japan's economic development. Their model is surprisingly
neoclassical considering the inevitable market imperfections expected during
such an early phase of economic development. What is even more amazing is
that it works in the sense that it can replicate Japan's history fairly well.
Their sector division is industry and agriculture, and they ignore services
due to the lack of plausible data. Factors are completely mobile with full
information, so that both wage rates and profit rates on capital are equal
across sectors. No intermediate demands exist and there is no foreign trade.
Investment is determined by the savings available in the economy and adds to
the "pool" of putty-putty capital stock. Their model is, therefore, better
suited for such a long-term analysis as the one they actually did.
Some of the results Kelley and Williamson derive from this modeling and
counterfactual exercise are: they argue that the Japanese economic perfor-
mance between 1887 and 1915, in particular long swings are supply oriented,
i.e., the supply of savings varied in accordance with the extent of the
country's military adventurism; they also argue that a demographic factor,
i.e., low population growth, is not likely to have significantly accounted
for Japan's growth; and they give more credit to the magnitudes and directions
of technical progress in both industry and agricultural sectors. These re-
sults are sometimes counter to what other students of Japanese economic his-
tory have almost taken for granted, i.e., the exogenously determined investment
*This review, however, is biased towards those models intended towards
studying economic history and issues of development.
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spurts, and are quite stimulating, although one could naturally argue these
results come directly from their assumptions in the model building.
Williamson (1974) also built a model and successfully examined the late
19th century American history with a similar framework as the Kelley-
Williamson model above, but using two regions (Midwest and Northeast).
Karlstram (1982) also studies mainly the 19th century history of Sweden.
His model emphasizes Sweden's relationship with the rest of the world through
emigration and trade. His is a five-sector, two factor model; the sector
division is based on how export- or homemarket-oriented sector goods are.
Capital and labor are completely mobile within the urban region. Interregional
mobility of factors, however, is limited. He examines the effects of emigra-
tion and rural-urban migration on the economic development of Sweden between
1871 and 1890, and comes up with the conclusion that the effect of the absence
of emigration opportunities would not have affected the Swedish economy so
much, and that the rural-urban migration had much larger impacts on the pat-
tern of economic growth. The first is akin to the conclusion of Kelley and
Williamson with regard to the population experiment in Japan. The supply and
demand effects almost cancel each other out under the assumption of full em-
ployment. The second conclusion shows the cost'of having immobile factors
of production.
We shall now turn to models emphasizing economic development and struc-
tural change in developing countries as opposed to historical counterfactual
analyses. Many of these models have been built at or in association with the
World Bank. In particular, I. Adelman, S. Robinson, K. Dervis, and J. de
Melo have produced a number of models with some common features* and are usu-
ally interested in the issue of trade policies of developing countries. They
*A summary of these works appears in Dervis et al. (1982).
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set the aggregate price level as the numeraire, i.e., they assume appropriate
monetary and fiscal policies for price stabilization-whether such a set of
policies is available and feasible is, understandably, beyond their immediate
interest. One exception to this is Adelman and Robinson (1978). In this
large model they include money balance demand equations and the price level
that equates the total money balance demand with the exogenous money supply
becomes the price level used as the numeraire*.
Adelman and Robinson have also detailed financial markets that determine
the nominal amount of investment for each size of firm in each sector. The
rest of their model is more straightforward. Nonagricultural sectors (ex-
cept for service sectors) have Cobb-Douglas specifications where different
kinds of skills are also combined in Cobb-Douglas forms. Their major con-
clusions are that size-distribution of income is quite stable over different
external shocks, and that price and wage adjustments are much more powerful
than quantity adjustments. These might at least be partly attributed to the
specific neoclassical structure of the model (e.g., many exogenous log-normal
variances assumed in within-group income distribution), but as a pioneering
work of large scale general equilibrium modeling, these lessons, together
with the lesson that "larger is not necessarily better" (which the author's
themselves admit), have given other modelers and students of economic devel-
opment much deeper insights.
All other studies by Dervis, Melo and Robinson (either all together or
as subsets of the three) ignore the money and financial aspects. Melo and
Dervis (1977) use a stylized three-sector model to examine the effects of
protection by tariff over 40 years. They use different closures and labor
*Although, as Sanderson (1980) points out, there is some puzzling inde-
pendence between money holding and savings behavior.
market specifications. They argue that the higher the factor (labor) mobil-
ity, the less desirable the protection is. Thus, in such a case where the
Harris-Todaro type of rural-urban migration is assumed (Harris and Todaro
1970), the protection can become quite effective and efficient for develop-
ing "infant industries". Melo and Robinson (1 9 80a) examine which trade policy
(from among free trade, protective tariff, export subsidy and general sub-
sidy) would be most suitable for such a primary exporting country as Columbia,
and conclude that a more open development strategy (i.e., export subsidy)
can worsen the distribution of income. In essence, they argue that the
structure of the economy with regard to trade determines which policy might
be better in terms of income distribution*.
In Dervis, Melo and Robinson (1981) they now study the effects of mea-
sures for curing foreign exchange shortage, and conclude that although there
is no easy way out of the exchange shortage problem, export-oriented consumer
goods'industries benefit from devaluation whereas domestic capital goods and
intermediate goods' industries benefit from rationing of foreign exchange.
This conclusion naturally leads to yet another study by them (Melo and Robin-
son 1980b), where they examine three sterotyped archetype economies (closed,
primary exporting and manufacture exporting), and study what kind of policy
choice tends to emerge depending on which class is more economically and
politically powerful, In the more recent works they have used the Armington
assumption almost exclusively for trade specification, i.e., that domestic
products are substitutes for the imported commodities of the same sector with
finite elasticities of substitution (Armington 1969). They usually assume
full employment of all factors, and a zero trade deficit.
*They also use an export-supply function rather than demand. The im-
plication of this choice is not discussed in their paper.
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Lysy and Taylor (1980) use another general equilibrium model for ex-
amining growth and distribution in Brazil. Some major differences from the
models described above are easily noticeable: their trade account is not
closed; their numeraire is the income of self-employed proprietors; and their
labor aggregates are formed by constant elasticities of substitution (CES)
functions with rather high elasticities. The first of these means that the
trade deficit is endogenous, and adds (or subtracts from in the case of trade
surplus), to the savings pool. Imports are all noncompetitive and real exports
are exogenous. The second fact means that some classes of society receive
nominally fixed income. This clearly opens the way for forced savings*,
which is exactly what they intended to show: that forced savings are quite
important. The effect of the third specification above, is that it enables
the model to simulate changing shares of income of different kinds of labor.
(The Cobb-Douglas specification used in works by Dervis, Melo and Robinson
has fixed shares of course.) Lysy and Taylor's conclusion is that their
model, like many other general equilibrium models, is rather unresponsive to
policy shifts in general, although when the model responses are compared in
magnitude with the shocks imposed, they can be fairly large. In a simplified
one-sector version of their model (Taylor and Lysy 1979) they also examine
the cause of the model's stability. They argue that if the money wage changes
can affect the prices, the changes in cost can be passed on to the price
level, and the effects on output and distribution of such wage changes can be
quite small. This effect does not occur when the price level is fixed (by
world price or by macro policy), As the neoclassical theory predicts, factor
substitution then becomes important.
*Adelman and Robinson (1980) also have this mechanism built into their
model. They call it "real balance effects".
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Eckaus et al. (1979) and McCarthy and Taylor (1980) examine the policy
impacts in Egypt and Pakistan respectively. Relatively speaking, these
models have some similarities with the Lysy and Taylor model described above.
Although these models do not have the explicit mechanism of dynamics and
their analyses are limited to comparative statics, they are capable of show-
ing how difficult it is to change the distribution of income and/or improve
the lot of the poor by a single policy measure. Similar results are also
shown in de Melo's model for Sri Lanka .(M. de Melo 1979 and 1982).
Another model, which uses a similar closure as the Lysy and Taylor model,
has been built for Mexico using a dualistic framework (Heroles 1980).
Heroles's traditional sectors are poverty-farming, with a price-inelastic
supply curve, and traditional service sectors who are the pool of underem-
ployed. Although no equation mentions emigration, it is quite visible in
the model by the assumption of the existence of the minimum "acceptance"
wage level. At this level the traditional workers reach a subjective in-
difference point between staying in the sector or leaving for the USA. The
modern sectors are quite conventional except for the fact that they are con-
strained by legal minimum wage levels.
The models reviewed so far purport to examine the patterns of structural
changes and the-possible policy responses of developing countries. To the
extent that there is an implicit belief that physical variables and their
growth are more important for developing countries in the medium-run, general
equilibrium models can prove to be quite useful. Many general equilibrium
models such as reviewed above concentrate only on the real aspects of econo-
mies*.
*There are, of course, models that incorporate monetary and financial
aspects (for a simple example, see Clements 1978). Adelman and Robinson
(1978), however, only include money to determine the aggregate price level,
and neither money nor financial aspects are really consistent with the core
of their general equilibrium model.
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There are also general equilibrium models concerned with (often theo-
retical) issues common to both developed and developing countries, with a
slight tilt towards developed economies. Some are interested in trade,
othersin tax incidence, and still others in energy policies. Bergman's
Swedish model (Bergman 1981, Bergman and P6r 1980) is one example of an
energy policy model. It studies the impact of nuclear power discontinuation
in Sweden in the long run (until the year 2000). His long time span enables
him, therefore,to use a neoclassical, resource-mobile, full employment model.
For the tax incidence analysis, there are the classical models of Harberger
(1962), and more recently, Whalley (1977), Shoven and Whalley (1972) and
Pleskovic (1982). These models are quite simple in structure and the
authors are interested in examining where hypothetical equilibria would
occur under different assumptions of distortion or fiscal actions. There
are also models emphasizing the issues of trade. In fact, many of the works
by Dervis, Melo and Robinson actually come under this category, as well as
under the developing-country model category. Evans (1972) is also primarily
interested in protection effects in Australia.
One example of a large scale, multi-purpose, multi-region model is the
*
ORANI model for Australia (Dixon et al. 1981).. The authors, however, use
across the board tariff increases to test how the model works. Another ex-
ample of a large scale model used to test trade issues is Whalley,(1977
1980). He studies trade distorting and liberalizing policies, and their im-
pacts with a 4-trading region model. These regions are the USA, Japan, the
EEC and the rest of the world. The basic structure of the model within any
region is essentially the same as in more conventional one-nation models.
*A notable feature of the ORANI model is that multi-product transfor-
mation possibility functions that are empirically estimated are introduced.
Their method for solving the model (a modified Johanson method) is also of
particular interest.
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Whalley, however, further imposes the conditions that all commodities clear
in the interregional market, that all factors clear in their respective
intraregional markets, and that the total external balance in all trading
regions be zero. The model is so large and demanding in computer time and
data, however, that the author himself admits that the findings are still at
a preliminary stage and a lot depends on future work.
As we have mentioned one multi-region model* that is more interested in
developed economies, we should add one more set of models to this brief
review. Chichilnisky (1981a, 1981b, 1981c) uses two-region models in these
three works. Her two regions are usually North and South or the developed
and developing world. While she uses extremely simple and highly abstrat
models: linear Leontief production functions, two commodities, two (or three
when energy is an issue) production factors, and no government, she draws
some powerful conclusions. For example, she concludes that with the South
exporting basic consumption goods and the North investment/luxury goods,
the export-led growth strategy can, under certain conditions, worsen the
South's termof trade, reducing its domestic employment.and consumption, and
increasing the inequality of factor prices across regions**. Even to casual
observers these conditions are actually fairly common in contemporary devel-
oping economies; namely that the South has dualistic technology with abundant
labor so that the labor supply is quite elastic. This result is essentially
derived due to the relatively large income effects on the part of the South.
Similar results are shown in Chickilnisky (1981c) where the South is the
monopolistic oil exporter. In Chickilnisky (1981b) she further shows that
the oil importing region would have oscillating profit rates and overall
*There are, of course, more multi-country models, e.g., Deardorff and
Stern (1978), Ginsburg and Waelbroeck (1978).
**Similar conclusions have been derived by many so-called structural
economists (e.g., Bacha (1978), Diaz-Alejandro (1965) and Taylor (1974).
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output, so that the real revenues of oil exporters also oscillate as oil
prices increase.
We now turn to the present study and ask what is the point of adding
yet another general equilibrium model to this body of existing models. For
one thing, it is always worthwhile to do an empirical historical study of a
developed country with new perspectives. Kelley and Williamson (1974)
started this, and the present study can be viewed as an extension to their
efforts. The extensions are manifold in size, complicatedness and issues of
interest. Unfortunately, limitations in data and time delineate this study
to focus only on the post-World War II period. But the spirit is still the
same. We can still see why Kelley and Williamson came to certain conclusions
on specific questions and perhaps, even more, because of the richness of
our specification.
One other feature of this study is the comparison made between the out-
comes of different ways to close the same model. Comparing different macro
closures has been done but only sporadically (Melo and Dervis 1977) or more
theoretically by Taylor and Lysy (1979) and Bell (1979), but nobody has
done this on a consistent basis with an empirical general equilibrium model.
The differences in model responses with the sante external shocks but under
different closure rules are shown to be often quite substantial. Most of
the results seem to favor the views taken by structuralists rather than neo-
classicists, although naturally it is not possible to say that this conclu-
sion applies to all developing countries at any time. (It does, after all,
depend on the "structure" of the economy.)
Thirdly, there are more micro features used in this model specification
than have been used in any general equilibrium models before. The assump-
tions that skilled workers compliment equipment and machinery to form one
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nest of the production function, and that unskilled workers are substitutes
of composite capital (of skilled workers, equipment and buildings), for ex-
ample, have a profound influence on the welfare of the labor force in general.
The wage determination mechanism held in the model also merits attention.
The whole urban wage structure is determined by the employer's labor cost
minimization behavior with hypothetical (or employer's perceived) quit func-
tions and hiring costs. This makes any urban sector's unskilled wage a
function of average agricultural income and consumer price indices of both
urban and rural areas. Investment is determined by the investor's expecta-
tions on factor and commodity prices and the commodity demand rather than
on the exogenously desired growth rates of the sectoral capital stocks. The
strengths and weaknesses of each specification will be shown as we proceed.
The next chapter briefly reviews the relevant aspects of Japan's econ-
omic history. It is brief because a huge literature already exits on this
subject and there is no need to repeat it here. Chapter 3 describes the
model, the data base and the way the parameters were estimated. Chapter 4
describes the "base" solutions from the different closures used and examines
how well each "fits" to the actual history of post-War War II Japan. Chapter
5 goes on with a lengthy description of the different dynamic comparative
analyses (or counterfactuals) under different closure rules. Finally, con-
cluding remarks appear in Chapter 6.
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CHAPTER 2: JAPAN'S ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT
This chapter attempts to review the history of Japan's modern economic
development. However, because there have already been many excellent works
on this subject (e.g., Ohkawa 1972, Ohkawa and Rosovsky 1973, T. Nakamura
1971, and Patrick and Rosovsky, eds., 1976, to mention just a few), I will
keep this one simple and brief.
In the past there have been many controversial issues in interpreting
the Japanese economic experience; one only has to remember the debates on
agricultural growth rates, factor pricing, factor intensities, timing of
"turning points", savings rates, total factor productivity growth, and wage
differentials*. I shall not, however, go into great detail regarding these
arguments, I intend only to review those aspects that are relevent to the
present study, namely:
1. The overall long term growth performance and distribution of
income,
*For agricultural growth rate issues, see J, Nakamura (1965, 1966, 1968),
Ohkawa and Rosovsky (1960, 1961, 1965), and Rosovsky (1968). For factor
pricing, see Fei and Ranis (1964a), Ranis and Fei (1961), Jorgenson (1966),
Dixit (1970), Kelley and Williamson (1974). For factor intensities, see
Ranis (1957), Fei and Ranis (1964a, 1964b, 1971, 1981), Choo (1971), Blumen-
thal (1980, 1981). For the turning point, see Fei and Ranis (1964a), and
Minami (1973). For savings rates, see Shinohara (1959, 1970), Williamson and
de Bever (1978), Yoshihara (1972), Shiba (1979), and Odaka (1944). For total
factor productivity -growth, see Denison and Chung (1976), Nishimizu and
Hulten (1978), and Watanabe and Egaitsu (1968). For wage differentials, see
Ohkawa (1972), Ohkawa and Rosovsky (1973), Yasuba (1976), and T. Nakamura
(1971). This list is, of course, incomplete.
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2. A description of wage dualism and the hypothesis with regard to
the cause of its origin and continued existence.
3. A brief review of the post-World War II pattern of urbanization.
2. 1. OVERVIEW OF JAPANESE AGGREGATE GROW'TH PERFORMANCE
Between 1901 and 1969 real GNP in Japan grew at an average annual
rate of 4.68 percent. The population grew at 1.24 percent per annum*.
The post-World War II performance is even more amazing. The Japanese
economy (real GNP) grew at an average annual rate of 10 percent between
1953 and 1969. The population grew at 1.08 percent during the same
period. These, called by some, "spectacular" growth rates were not
achieved easily; there were repeated long swings, each cycle averaging
approximately 20 years. There is, at present, general agreement that
Japan first grew at a fairly moderate pace, the growth rate secularly
accelerating later**. Both the long swings and the secular trend of
growth acceleration (trend acceleration) are shown in Table 2.1. During
the upswing periods, the average annual growth rate of GNE was 3.21 per-
cent (1887-1897), 3.30 percent (1904-1919), 4.88 percent (1930-1938 and
9.56 percent (1953-1969). During the same time periods private fixed capital
formation also experienced trend acceleration: 6.03 percent, 7.03 percent,
10.95 percent, and 15.06 percent, respectively.
*Labor force grew at 2.19 percent per annum between 1901 and 1969, and
by 1.54 percent between 1953 and 1969,
**As already mentioned, this is the result of a famous debate between
Prof. Ohkawa, his associates, and Prof. Nakamura regarding the speed of early
agricultural growth in Japan.
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Table 2.1. Long-term pattern of aggregate growth rates, with a constant
price series: average annual growth rates (in percent),
(U) = upswing, (D) = downswing.
Total Per Capita
Period (length in years) GNE Population GNE
Long-swing phases
(U) 1887-1897 (10) 3.21 0.96 2.25
(D) 1897-1904 (7) 1.83 1.16 0.67
(U) 1904-1919 (15) 3.30 1.19 2.11
(D) 1919-1930 (11) 2.40 1.51 0.89
(U) 1930-1938 (8) 4.88 1.28 3.60
(D) 1938-1953 (15) 0.58 1.36 -0.78
(U) 1953-1969 (16) 9.56 1.03 8.53
Source: Ohkawa and Shinohara (1979), page 10.
In accordance with these long swings, fixed capital formation
shows much more obvious cyclical movement than does GNE, and its trend
acceleration is also more pronounced during the upswing periods. If
we look at the relative share of investment (inclusive of military and
residential investment) in total growth as calibrated by Ohkawa, it
increases during each successive upswing period; 19.9 percent (1887-
1897), 30.7 percent (1904-1919), 41.5 percent (1930-1938), and 46.4
percent (1953-1969). Other components of GNE do not show such con-
formity with the GNE growth pattern, revealing the increasing impor-
tance of fixed capital formation in determining Japan's economic growth
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pattern, especially in the 20th century. The major driving force behind
this growth pattern was non-residential and non-primary private invest-
ment that increased in the 1934-1936 prices 28.4 times between 1901 and
1940, whereas primary sector (agriculture, forestry, and fisheries) in-
vestment increased by a mere 1.9 times during the same period.
There have been several investment spurts characterized by private
non-primary investment in this century, and, as a matter of course, they
coincide with the long swings. Apart from a minor set-back between 1909
and 1912, the first major spurt appeared during 1903 and 1917 (see Figure
2.1). The second spurt occurred in the late 1930s and the third and most
recent immediately after World War II. These investment spurts accele-
rated and made more explicit the structural changes of the Japanese eco-
nomy, including urbanization and industrialization. Figure 2.2 shows
the share of the non-primary labor force from the total labor force, and
the share of non-primary products from total GDP. These changes natural-
ly occurred most rapidly during the three investment spurts and this
period, from around 1900 until the 1960s, is also well-known because
of one other strong feature of Japan's economic experience, namely, the
dualistic nature of Japan's development. The next section examines some
of the features of this development pattern.
2.2. DUALISTIC DEVELOPMENT
In the development literature the term "dualism" describes a
variety of characteristics observed in economically developing societies.
In general, it means a situation where heterogeneous factors co-exist in
one society simultaneously. For simplicity, these factors are often
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grouped into two dichotomous sets and described in a variety of ways:
modern and traditional, formal and informal, center and periphery, or
foreign and indigenous. It has been argued that these dichotomies
exist in social systems (Boeke 1953) or in various aspects of political
and economic situations. Production dualism is emphasized by Eckaus
(1955) and by many subequent students of development. The celebrated
works of Lewis (1954), Ranis and Fei (1961), and Fei and Ranis (1964a) charac-
terize the dualism between a traditional subsistent sector witha virtually
unlimited supply of labor, and a small but growing modern sector. In
this surplus labor model, dualism disappears when the supply of surplus
labor from the subsistence sector is exhausted and it consequently be-
comes "commercialized". They argue that until this commercialization
turning point the labor force in the subsistence sector has a wage rate
that equals the (institutionally determined) subsistence minimum, and
that, therefore, no marginal return argument holds for this sector.
This classical model, however celebrated, has not gone unchal-
lenged*. Neoclassical economists argue that the marginal principle
still works even in the very early stages of industrialization (Kelley
and Williamson 1974), This paper essentially avoids the problem, and
if anything, stands closer to Fei and Ranis and other classicists by
using average (rather than marginal) products of labor in agriculture
as a measure of the welfare of the people in this sector. The whole
debate, however, seems to be left open with no definite conclusions,
and I feel that the truth lies somewhere in between these two.
*Jorgenson's (1966) challenge did not prove very successful. See
Dixit (1970).
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As Ohkawa and Rosovaky (1973) point out, certain farmers were paid
for their marginal products, some more and others less. Especially with
family farming and share cropping known to distort this picture of perfect
competition and static profit maximization, it is not surprising that the
debate is inconclusive.
Other, mainly Japanese, scholars use the term "dualism" a little more
vaguely. Here it is often meant to express the wide range of average labor
productivity in different sectors or the wage differentials between modern
and traditional activities. Modern-traditional dichotomies are often re-
placed here with arguments in accordance with the differences in the size
of the operation, due partly to the fact that in Japan the size distribution
of firms coincides with modern-traditional divisions. A great deal of scho-
larly effort, therefore, has been made in order to shed more light on the
reasons for wage differentials among establishments of differing scales (in
terms of number of workers) within some sectors in Japan. Indeed, even
after adjusting for differences in age or schooling mixes, the relative
wages differ substantially even in 1960 (see Table 2.2).
Table 2.2. Adjusted nominal relative wages by firm size (males).
Size
Less than 100-999
100 workers workers 1000 workers
All male 68.3 81.7 100
Production workers 68.4 81.7 100
Managers 67.7 81.7 100
Source: Mizuno (1973).
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Yasuba (1976) made an intensive study of the evolution of intra-sector,
inter-firm wage differentials between 1909 and 1951. He found that wage
dualism appears in those sectors that borrowed foreign technologies and/or
where rapid technical progress was being made. Less dualistic phenomena
were observed in those "homogenous" sectors where only traditional techno-
logies were used (e.g., sake, soy sauce), those where only modern techno-
logies were used (e.g., beer, cars, electrical applicances), and those
where modern elements were completely diffused.
These findings are in corroboration with the findings of Tan (1980)
who tests a hypothesis that firm size and inter-industry wage differentials
reflect quasi-rents from the possession of technology-specific skills, and
that the quasi-rents depend on the rate of technical progress. Tan finds
strong empirical support for this hypothesis in the Japanese data of post-
World War II. His findings include inter alia that discounted specific
training wages* are positively and significantly correlated with the rate
of technical change, and that for production workers "...employment in
large firms or firms in high technology industries is associated with
significant increases in specific training wage profiles" (Tan 1980, p.153).
Another important aspect of Tan's study is that he finds no support
for institutional explanations of wage differentials. What Tan essentially
points out is that there is a bilateral monopoly relationship between the
owner of new technologies and the owner of skill specific to these techno-
logies (Becker 1964).
*This is roughly the size of coefficients of length of internal experi-
ence with a firm in wage equations.
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These technology-specific skills are not limited to Japan. They can
be observed all over the world. What makes the Japanese experience con-
spicuous and attract so much scholarly effort, however, is the extent of
the observed wage differentials and how long they have lasted. This, I
believe, is the fate of the industrial late-starter who has grown so fast.
When Japan started its modernization efforts, it had to depend on foreign
technologies, especially in those sectors which faced tough foreign com-
petition. As the economy grew, it required even more new technologies,
obtained either by importing them or by innovative activity (most likely
both). As long as the acquisition of new technologies proceeded faster
than the diffusion of yesterday's new technologies, somebody kept getting
the quasi-rents for the new technology-specific skills.
This dualism on wage differentials among sectors or among scales of,
operation emerged in Japan sometime during the early 1900s. Although the
exact timing differs in different studies, the essential fact is that fol-
lowing the first investment spurt around 1905, the modern sector surged
ahead leaving the traditional elements lagging behind (Ohkawa and Rosovsky
1965). During the recession after World War I (i.e., after the first in-
vestment spurt), wage differentials were firmly established. The recession
also hit the agricultural sector the hardest. Employment opportunities in
modern sectors were limited because of their high capital-labor ratio and
decreased turn-over rates. These sectors used borrowed technologies with
substantial technology-specific skill requirements and limited factor sub-
stitutabilities. Even during this period of general contraction, therefore,
employers would try to retain those workers who already had the required
skills and thus, wage rates in modern sectors did not decrease during the
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recession. At the same time, however, the agricultural sector was suffer-
ing from a long term structural stagnation, caused by a combination of the
world-wide agricultural crises, a shift in government policy*, and the tem-
porary exhaustion of scale-neutral technical progress**. Agriculture could
not absorb the growing labor force and the "push" pressure of rural areas
therefore increased. On the other hand, the "pull" factor in the modern
sectors was limited as stated above. The surplus labor force naturally
flowed into various urban traditional sectors forcing the wage levels down.
Hence the birth of urban wage dualism, which lasted until well after World
War II. That it lasted this long means, according to the technology-specific
skill hypothesis, that new technoglogies continued to be imported and/or
innovative efforts continued to exist through this period. However, Japan
was still experiencing high economic growth when wage dualism started to
disappear in the 1960s, and it is hardly plausible that innovative activi-
ties per se then ceased. What was exhausted in the 1960s was the surplus
labor in the traditional sectors.
In the early 1960s, the wage rate for young high school graduates
started to pick up relatively in traditional sectors, although overall wage
differentials still remained. It appears that it was not the case that
large modern firms were no longer innovative, but that firms in traditional
sectors started to use newer equipment with higher capital-labor ratios be-
cause a shortage of labor was expected to emerge in the near future. In
*After the rice riot in 1918, the government decided to appease the
urban workers rather than protect the farmers by importing cheap rice from
the colonies.
**Napier (1979) claims that this was not the case. He attributes the
low productivity to unusually bad weather.
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the 1950s, smaller firms mainly used second-hand equipment transferred from
larger firms. In the 1960s, however, the smaller firms themselves started
to import new technologies from the West and there was thus a drastic shift
in the direction of biased technical progress. Using cross-section data,
Sato (1973b) argues that the annual rate of labor-augmenting technical pro-
gress jumped from 1.25 percent between 1953 (the year when pre-war peak pro-
duction was passed) and 1958 to 17.94 percent during 1959 and 1969. During
the same period the similar rate for capital stock however, was 5.39 percent
and 0.14 percent, respectively. The capital augmenting rate actually con-
tracted after 1964, while the labor-augmenting rate showed an accelerated
increase.
There is also an argument that the smaller maufacturing firms (except
for the very smallest with less than 10 workers), showed the same efficiency
rates as the larger firms in terms of total factor productivity (Sato 1973c)*.
This implies that they all had a similar production function although facing
different wage-rental ratios. That smaller firms (and in the literature they
are almost synonymous to traditional sector firms) were as efficient as the
modern and /or larger firms does not say anything about equity or welfare.
The size income distribution is one good measure for examining the
aspects of equity and welfare in economic development, and there is an
abundance of relative size distribution data in Japan for the post-World
War II period. Mizoguchi (1975) and Mizoguchi et al (1980) find that Kuznet' s
U exists for post-World War II Japan, with the turning point in the early
1960s. For the pre-World War II period, however, the data base is, to say
*His studies are for 1957, 1962, 1967, 1969, and briefly for 1932.
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the least, limited. However, given this limitation, Otsuki and Takamatsu
(1978) have shown that there was an increasing inequality trend throughout
the pre-war period, and that the deterioration was most severe during the
two investment spurts of 1910-1915 and the 1930s. This also coincides with
the findings of Minami and Ono (1981) with regard to the functional distri-
bution of income. They show that the non-primary wage share had a decreas-
ing trend throughout the pre-war period covered in their study, starting at
68.2 percent (1896-1912), and ending at 48.7 percent (1934-1940). The two
periods mentioned above (1910-1915 and the 1930s) are also shown to be hard
times for wage earners in the Minami and Ono study. Although the post-war
fluctuation is less conspicuous one can still observe that the turning
point of the U-curve was in 1962. This also corresponds with the results
of Mizoguchi et al. Similar results are obtained in Ono and Watanabe (1976).
2.3. URBANIZATION TRENDS
Table 2.3 shows the urbanization trend measured by the ratio of popu-
lation living in cities to total population. These data have only been
available since 1920 but another index (the population share of the six
prefectures containing the six largest cities) shows that rural-urban mi-
gration became conspicuous around 1905, which coincides with the start of
the first investment spurt. The increase of the urbanization, however,
actually starts to accelerate around 1915, and then jumps very rapidly from
1930 onwards (the period of the second investment spurt and rapid growth).
War related incidents such as the evacuation of urban population, destruc-
tion of urban capital stocks, and the repatriation of six million people
from foreign colonies and battlefields lowered the urbanization rate in
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in 1945 to the, say, 1933 level. After 1945 the phenomenal recovery
started, and rural-urban migration accelerated accordingly until in 1955
the pre-war trend (extended linearly) was surpassed.
Table 2.3. Urbanization rates (ratio of population living in cities
to total population).
Year
1920
1925
1930
1935
1940
(1945
1950
1955
1960
1965
1970
Percent
18.1
21.7
24.1
22.9
37.9
27.8)
37.5
56.3
63.5
68.1
72.2
Source: Bureau of Statistics, Office of the Prime Minister,
lation Census of Japan (1971).
1970 Popu-
The definition used here for "cities' is in fact political jurisdiction*,
and does not exactly conform to the meaning of urbanization. The trend,
however, is clear. A polarization trend to major metropolitan areas was
also seen until 1970. During the catch-up phase with pre-war trends (until
1955), only four metropolitan areas (Tokyo, Nagoya, Osaka, and Fukuoka re-
gions) and Hokkaido had a net population inflow; all other areas lost their
*Political city boundaries were substantially enlarged in 1950 to 1955.
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population. This trend became more pronounced during the five years from
1955 to 1960 when only the three largest metropolitan areas (Tokyo, Osaka,
and Nagoya) gained population by migration. This trend more or less con-
tinued in the 1960s, but was more concentrated in the suburban area sur-
rounding the three centers. Polarization reversal (see Richardson 1977)
began in the 1970s when the metropolitan centers started to show net out-
flows of population.
This urban population increase occurred in a country where the total
area is less than that of California, where only 14 percent of the land
is flat and arable and whose population is more than 100 million people,
75 percent of which live in urban areas. Between 1952 and 1973 some land
prices soared 58 times and coupled with the insufficient supply of urban
housing has been the main problem issue for the country since the mid-1960s.
Despite these problems, housing conditions have slowly improved in
Japan. Floor space, in terms of "tatami's"* per dwelling increased by
2.5 percent per annum between 1948 and 1969 and the share of dwellings not
needing repairs increased from 68.9 percent in 1953 to 82.6 percent in 1969
in all cities. As is shown in Table 2.4, this is due mainly to the growing
amount of resources being invested in housing. Housing costs, however, are
also increasing. The data show an average increase of 13 percent between
1958 and 1968 in the contract rent per "tatami", with land values increasing
by 17 percent per annum and construction costs by 8 percent per annum.
*"Tatami" is a straw mat of usually 1.65m2 in size.
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Table 2.4. Housing investment as a percentage of gross capital
formation and GNP.
Year Gross Capital Formation GNP
1950 8.8 1.5
1960 12.4 4.3
1964 16.1 5.7
1968 17.7 6.7
1971 19.2 7.0
1972 20.8 7.6
Source: Annual Report on National Income Statistics (ARNIS) (1972).
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CHAPTER 3: DESCRIPTION OF THE MODEL
In this chapter, section I describes the model used and section 2 dis-
cusses the specifications in general and the parameter values used. The
Appendices describe the social accounting data, some of the econometric re-
sults of migration, an extended version of the model, and the method for
solving the model.
3.1. THE MODEL
3.1.1. Sector Divisions
The base model is an eight-sector model, and sector divisions are shown
in Table 3.1. The manufacturing sector is divided into three subsectors; the
first subsector includes what can be called the modern sectors, i.e., chemis-
try, non-ferrous metals, iron and steel, etc.; the second subsector includes
machinery and metal processing sections; and the third subsector includes the
consumption goods producing activities, e.g., processed foods, textiles,
clothes, leather, etc. The second subsector activities are peculiar in the
sense that together with the construction sector they contribute mostly to
the fixed capital formation, although the technology used is not as capital
intensive as in the first manufacturing subsector. This sector division dif-
fers slightly from that suggested by Motai and Ohkawa (1978), who stress the
distribution of technologies used by firms with different scales within a
sector.
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Table 3.1. Sector divisions of the model.
1. Modern manufacturing
2. Machinery manufacturing
3. Traditional manufacturing
4. Mining
5. Construction
6. Modern services
7. Traditional services
8. Agriculture
Chemistry, nonferrous, iron and steel,
pulp and paper, coal and petroleum pro-
ducts, etc.
Metal products. General machinery, elec-
tric machinery, transport machinery,
precision machinery.
Processed foods, tobacco, textiles and
clothes, wood, furniture, leather goods,
rubber, ceramics, other manufacturing.
Gas, electricity, telecommunications,
transportation, banking and finance, real
estate.
Retail and wholesale, all other services.
Agriculture, forestry and fishery
In Japan, economic historians have typically associated the scale of
firms with the degree of moderness of the technology employed (see, IDCJ
1977), and discussions on Japanese economic dualism have inevitably been
related to the differences between labor productivities or wages by firm
size. We may do well by employing sector divisions based on such criterion.
Experience shows, however, that in such a model we could have somewhat am-
biguous and, from time to time, misleading results by aggregating mainly con-
sumption and investment goods into a one-sector commodity. A policy that
increases investment in equipment and machinery could have an unjustifiably
large "direct" impact on consumption.
The fourth sector in this model is mining. This particular industry
has been singled out not only because of its potential importance to the
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economy as the supplier of raw materials and energy sources, but also be-
cause of its fundamentally different character compared with the other
sectors, i.e., its dependence on exhaustible natural resources.
The fifth sector is construction, which is the supplier of almost half
of all new fixed capital. This sector should be separated because of the
non-tradeability of its output and also because it employs a sizeable amount
of unskilled labor.
The next two sectors are service sectors: the sixth including modern
services, transport, communication, utilities, and banking and finance; and
the seventh all other services. Despite the fact that the latter includes
such services as medicine and education, it is called the "traditional ser-
vice" sector for convenience's sake. This was made necessary due to the
fact that there is no detailed data base available in which the amounts of
capital stock in these disaggregated activities are easily accessible.
Finally, the eighth sector is conveniently called the "agriculture"
sector, and includes agriculture, fisheries, and forestry.
3.1.2. Production Technologies
In this model we assume away joint production. Each sector produces
only one commodity that employs the services of equipment and machinery
(em), constructed structures (cs), and unskilled labor (ul). In most urban
sectors, skilled labor (sl) is also used. Amounts of em, cs, and sl in each
sector are fixed for each period. In the agriculture and mining sectors
land and natural resources (mineral deposits) are also included in their
respective production functions. We also assume constant returns to scale,
although this may be an incorrect assumption viewed from the qualitative
observation point of view (see opinions expressed by Ohkawa and Rosovsky
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1973). Empirical quantification, however, seems to lag behind and, especi-
ally at the level of aggregation employed here, the problem seems to be
little in favor of complying with the received theoretical framework. The
justification for our assumption is again, therefore, the insufficient de-
velopment of alternative specifications. Constant elasticities of substi-
tution (CES) functions are mainly used, and for sectors 1, 2, 3, 5, 6, and
7 take the form*
3 3 3a. a. I/a.
Q. = (CK.' + Y. ul.) 11 1 1 1
where
2 2 2a. a. 1/a.
CK. = (KS.' + . cs. )
1 1 1 1
and
1 1 1
KS. (a em. + ai sl. )1 1 1 1 1
Q. = supply of sector i goods
CK. = composite capital stock of sector i
KS. = composite of equipment and skilled labor
1 2
caa.,,y. = distributi'on parameters in sector i
1 2 3
.,a.,a.c = substitution parameters that relate to the elasticity of
factor substitution by a. = I - 1/sq where s is the jth
1 1 1
elasticity of substitution in sector i.
We have also assumed here the following substitutabilities among the
four factors:
*To allow for readability of expressions we ignore the factor augment-
ing technical progress here, although in the real model they are fully taken
account of.
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1. em and sl are complements with very limited substitutability, i.e.,
the more machines there are, the more skilled labor one needs to
operate them or to manage their operation.
2. The composite of em and sl, KS are also complements of cs but less
in degree than between em and sl.
3. ul is more or less a substitute of the composite of capital stock
(em, sl, and cs).
We also assume that the degree of substitutability is higher in the more
traditional sectors, and while this assumption may be debatable, it is, we
believe, a fairly well-accepted one. If the substitutability of an aggre-
gate production technology actually measures the diversity of the micro pro-
cesses available for producing the commodities in that sector, then even if
each micro process can be characterized by a Leontief production function, the
assumption that the traditional sectors have a wider spectrum of processes
to choose from (the assumption we employ here), may not be easy to refute.
It should suffice to mention the limited number of "processes" that produce
internationally competitive chemical products with the number of processes
that can produce clothing.
The fourth sector, mining, has an exhaustible resource in its production
function, i.e., 2
S = A (resource) U4  1 ema + S cs + Y ul
We exclude skilled labor here because of its small number in this sector.
Resource is defined as
RES19 60 * exp (det)
where
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RES = the mineral deposits of coal of standard quality or higher1960
in 1960 in Japan
t = the time
d = the rate of depletion of resources.
The rate of depletion takes account not only of the actual decrease of
minerable coal (which did not decrease very rapidly), but also of the fact
that imported oil was increasingly a substitute for domestic coal during
this period. The use of coal deposits for this purpose is based on the fact
that coal has a substantial share in the domestic mining sector products of
Japan.
The use of a Cobb-Douglas specification for the resource and the rest
of the factors is based on a simple theoretical argument put forward by
Dasgupta and Heal (1979). They argue that CES with less than unitary elas-
ticity of substitution has bounded-from-above average product per resource
in use, whereas CES with more than unitary elasticity could give corner
solutions. The former allows for the possibility of output to go to zero,
while the latter means the possibility of positive products with zero re-
sources. Both, according t.Dasgupta and Heal, are "uninteresting". Whether
or not they really are "uninteresting" in an emp'irical analysis with a
finite time horizon is another question. To answer it, however, would re-
quire more thorough scutiny than the scope of this paper.
The agricultural sector also has a Cobb-Douglas function:
1 2 3
~8 8 ~8S = A K L T
8 8 8 8 8
where
I 2 3
8+ 8+ 38
and
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/1 =8 2 8 3 8 8
K8  8 em8  + a8 8 + ap
ap = animal and plant stock
L8 = ul8
T8 = agricultural land
The CD specification is defended on the basis of a series of empirical work
completed by Hayami and associates (see Hayami 1975, and Hayami and Ruttan
1971), that failed to reject the hypothesis of unitary elasticity.
3.1.3. Urban Wage Determination
We assume that the cost of unskilled labor for sector i (1c.) is
lc. = w. + T. q.1 1 1 1
and
q = q.(w ,...,w ,ya; pciu, pciR
where
w. the nominal unskilled labor wage in sector i
T. = the labor training and hiring cost perceived by the employer of
sector i
q. = the quit rate that depends on all urban wage and rural income,
deflated by urban consumers' price index (pci u) and rural consum-
ers' price index (pci R), respectively
ya = the average income in the agricultural sector.
This formulation is also used by Stiglitz (1973) in his study of internal
labor migration. Employers then try to minimize their labor costs. The
first order condition is:
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31c. Bq.
1+T. = 0 i 1,..., now. 1 W.
11
It is assumed that the quit rates take a generalized Cobb-Douglas form,
i.e.,
q. = TC tya PRn
q i pci 
. pciR j=1 u
where n is the number of urban sectors and TC. is a sector specific constant.
Such equations are extremely difficult to estimate rigorously. Guesses
are made therefore on 3 coefficients utilizing the results of such works as
Shorey (1980) and Tan (1980).
We should emphasize one aspect of this specification: it is based on
the assumption that average agricultural income determines the urban wage
structure to a large extent. In the base version of the model, agricultural
factor endowments are fixed period by period, i.e., the supply is fixed. The
demand for the commodity, therefore, determines the price and thus, the agri-
cultural income. Agricultural income, via the first order condition equa-
tions above, determine the relative wage structure in the urban sectors. This
is not an unreasonable assumption, given Japanese economic historians' claim
that for a long time Japanese traditional sector wage rates were determined
at a level the same or slightly higher than agricultural income (Nakamura
1971, Ono 1973). Table 3.2 shows the comparison of nominal wages of female
workers in manufacturing and agriculture. Female workers' wage rates are
used here because the comparison is easier due to the relative homogeneity
in quality of female labor across different sectors. If we can safely assume
that women were the marginal labor force in both agriculture and manufactur-
ing during the period concerned, then the close tie between agricultural
labor and the traditional sector labor, which tends to be marginal, in the
labor market is hard to deny.
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Table 3.2. Female nominal wage rates in manufacturing and agriculture
(in yen per day).
Year
1952
1953
1954
1955
1956
1957
1958
1959
1960
1961
1962
1963
1964
1965
1966
1967
1968
1969
1970
Source: Ohkawa and Shinohara
Manufacturing
278
305
328
337
348
363
357
387
429
496
577
649
720
809
908
1004
1185
1248
1669
(1979).
The use of average total agricultural income in urban quit rate func-
tions actually sweeps some delicate issues under the rug. As already men-
tioned in the previous chapter, one of these issues is factor pricing in
agriculture. Fei and Ranis (1964) and many other Japanese scholars (e.g.,
Minami 1973), believe that agricultural real wage was determined at the sub-
sistance level and that the marginal productivity did not matter until "the
turning point" although, determination of the timing of this turning point
differs substantially between Fei and Ranis, and Minami, as is well docu-
mented. Proponents of neoclassical economics (e.g., Kelley and Williamson
1974), claim that marginal productivity factor pricing applied even during
the early phase of the modern economic growth of Japan. The approach taken
here denies neither of these theories because the issue becomes less decisive
Agriculture
243
270
298
305
314
328
340
358
387
464
563
661
744
812
851
956
1163
1286
1422
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when we look at post-World War II Japan. The land reform took place under
the occupation, giving Japanese farming communities a fundamental institu-
tional transformation and making landlords and landless tenants almost
negligible parts of the farming population*. The reform promoted a more
equal distribution of costs and income, making the behavior of the farming
population more homogenous. The use of average income here reflects this
institutional change where family farming or owner-occupied land is very
predominant.
One final point that should be made is that this wage determination
mechanism fixes the urban wage structure. We have another fixed price in
the model, the foreign exchange rate, and in those instances where either
the foreign exchange market or the unskilled labor market does clear, we
endogenize the urban wage level in the following way:
w. = W. W i
1 1
where
w. = the wage rate
. = a discrepancy parameter of urban wages. We use the solution of
the first order conditions of the wage determination mechanisms
above as w.s.
W= the endogenous urban wage level that clears the urban labor market.
3.1.4. Urban Labor Demand
Here we take faith with the marginal principle and assume that unskilled
labor demand is in accordance with the following:
*The ratio of farmland under tenancy declined from 45 percent in 1945
to 9 percent in 1955 (Hayami 1975).
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w. 9Q.1 _1
p for i = 1,2,3,5,6, and 7
For the mining sector (i = 4), however, some elements of arbitrariness appear
for distributing the rent of the natural resources. With no other alterna-
tive being more plausible we, therefore, assume that rent is distributed
among the management and unskilled labor in accordance with their real share
of the value added. That is, the demand for the unskilled labor in the min-
ing sector is derived from
4 ) W Q
pv4  Bul
3.1.5. Tradeable Commodities
The manufacturing, mining and agricultural sectors are tradeable com-
modity producing sectors. We assume that all imports are competitive* and
that domestically produced goods and imported goods in the same sector are
substitutes with finite elasticities following the tradition of Armington
(1969). People, therefore, consume hypothetical aggregate commodities of
imports and domestically produced goods. This aggregate is formed by CES
functions $i's:
/ n. nl. 1/nl.
$. = y. E. M. + (1 - E.) TD. I
1 1 1 1 1 1/
where
TD = the amount of goods produced and consumed domestically in sector
i
M. = the imports of the sector i goods
*Even crude oil at that time has a domestic production share of 1 per-
cent. The noncompetitiveness is, however, built into the model by declining
depositable resources in the production function for the mining sector.
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Y ,, ) T1= parameters
n. is related to the substitution elasticity in sector i (3.) by
e. = 1/(1 - ri.)
The purchaser's price (pp.) of this aggregate is the cost function of
$., i.e.,
11/1-6.('l.-S-. @. 16
pp. = - E.I (1 + tr.) e pm.i + (1 - .) p
where new notations are
tr. = ad valorem tariff rate of sector i imports
1
pm. = foreign currency price of imported goods of sector i
e = exchange rate (= yen/dollar)
p. = producers' price of sector i goods
The amount of imports of sector i is simply
6. 0.
M. = .. ) iiTD.
= ( -E) ((1 + tr.) e pm. I
and the domestic production ratio (TD. /$.) is
1 1
e.-i e. pp .i-
Y. (1 - C.) -
1 1 p.
Exports are similarly specified as
i pi\i
X. = a. WT.
1 1 1 e pw.
where
X. = the export demand for sector i goods1
WT.i = the index of the quantity of the world trade of sector i goods
pw. = the world market price of sector i goods
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are parameters.
If Armington's assumption is applied to the rest of the world vis-a-vis
Japan, then . 's should be unitary. But various econometric results show
that they are significantly higher than 1 for Japan (e.g., Matsukawa 1979;
see also the high world income elasticity of Japan's export estimated by
Goldstein and Kahn 1978). Zalai (1982) criticizes the careless use of ex-
port demand functions as opposed to supply functions in almost all models of
this kind. In this particular case, however, we may do well to interpret
our export specification as demand functions because as Krause and Sekiguch
(1976) state, Japan is
...heavily dependent on imported raw materials, economic growth
could not proceed without increases in imports, and exports are
needed to pay for them... export competitiveness became a goal
of government policy and private investment behavior (p. 348).
In such a situation it is more reasonable to assume that the export supply
is very elastic*, and that demand played a major role.
3.1.6. Nontradeable Commodities in Current Account
Services and construction sectors do not have trade, but both modern
and traditional servicesreceive "handling charges" for externally traded
commodities (storage, transportation, and insurance etc.), that are included
in the balance of current account payments.
3.1.7. Prices
There are five different prices defined in the model: domestic
*Goldstein and Khan (1978) also found that the Japanese supply elastic-
ity of exports is infinite.
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producers' prices (p ), purchasers' prices (pp.), consumers' prices (pc.),
value-added prices (pv.), import prices (pm.), and world market prices
(pw.). The last two are exogenous and assumed to coincide unless otherwise
stated. Producers' prices (p.'s) are the prices that clear the domestic
market, i.e.,
TD. + X. = S. for all i's
1 1 1
or
r. $. + X. = S.
1 1 1 1
where
TD.
r. =-
1 ip.1
Purchasers' prices (pp.'s) are already defined above as cost functions
of $-aggregation functions. For nontradeable commodities p. and pp. natur-
ally coincide. Value-added prices (pv.'s) are defined as follows:
pv. (1 - ti.) p. - a.. pp.1 1 . ]1  ]
where ti. is the rate of indirect tax. pc.. 's are the purchaserst prices
I. ii
(p1 akdu ytesco n yth rao osmto.Ti aku
creates additional demand for the traditional service goods, i.e., retail
and wholesale services. Thus the consumer price of goods of sector i in
region j (= urban, rural), pc.. iS
1]
pc.. = pp. + mu. p71j 1 3
where
mu.. = the mark-up rates of sector i in region j
p7 = the price for traditional services.
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3.1.7. Consumption Demand
Household consumption demands are expressed in a linear expenditure
system:
cdhi pch. (Eh - TCEh + yh-i h = 1,2,...,5
hei i = sectors
where
cdh i = per capita consumption demand of sector i goods in class h
h-i = marginal propensity to consume sector i goods in class h
Eh = total per capita expenditure in class h
Yh-i = per capita committed consumption (minimum subsistence demand)
of sector i goods in class h
TCE = total committed expenditure per capita in class h
n
= pch-i h-i
Government consumption demands are treated as exogenous and business
consumption demands are treated as intermediate input demands.
3.1.8. Fixed Capital Formation
Investors instigate investment through expectations on future prices
and demands. Expectation of all relevant values'are formed in the following
manner:
Xe -v(X -Xe)+X
t+1 x t t t
where
Xt+1= the expected value of the variable X for period t+1t+ 1
Xt = the expected value of the variable X for period t, the expec-
tation was formed in period t+1
X = the actual value of Xt
V= the adjustment parameter
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Investors are also assumed to know the production parameters, and the
amount of investment desired by them is:
e e
K ef 3C (w.,r )
I. = DD. = DD.
. i ei
wheer.
where
ef
e e
C. (w ,
= the efficient capital output ratio
r ) = the cost function underlying the technology. The arguments are
expected user cost of labor (w.) and capital (r.). The user
1 3.
cost of capital is assumed to be the interest rate on bank loans
plus the rate of depreciation of capital stock multiplied by
capital prices. The capital price is the weighted average of
purchasers' prices of commodities that consist capital stock.
DD. = the difference between the expected demand and present supply
capacity less the expected loss of capacity through depreciation.
The equality between (K/Q). and C (we,re)/3re comes from Shephard's
Lemma (Shephard 1953, Diewart 1974).
Depending on the assumptions of how the aggregate excess demand is
driven to zero (or, equivalently, how savings equal investment), these de-
sired investments may be the actual investments next year or they may be
scaled up or down by the amount of savings available in the economy. See
the section on Macro closure below.
3.1.9. Skill Investment
The skill owned by skilled labor is assumed to be completely specific,
i.e., the employers bear all the costs of skilled investment. We also as-
sume that skill is a quasi-fixed factor, so that employers assume that once
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a laborer is trained he will stay with the firm (or sector in this case),
until his time of retirement. This is once again the assumption of bilat-
eral monopoly between owners of skill and technology (Becker and Tan as
cited above).
The marginal return of "skill" to employers or capitalists is 9T/BS,
where 7, is the total return to capitalists, i.e.,
T = r em + r cs
e c
where r and r are
e c
3v Q
3em
and
pv Q
3cs
respectively (sector subscripts are suppressed). This return of skill to
capitalists, with elasticities of substitution less than I behave as shown
in Figure 3.1. It can be seen exactly by using a 2-factor CES function*.
We also assume that skill investment takes the form of on-the-job training
and the cost of training is, therefore, a decreased product of the sector
where "skill" is employed. It may be in the foirm of time taken away from
*If Q = (KP + S)1/P, where p = 1 - 1/p , then
rs = = (1 -p)(Kp + S )1-2p/p KP -
3rs 
_ 2 I = (- p)(KP + s )1-2p/p s p-2 - p I - + paS as2 1 + K) p
3rs > Kp <20 as ( ) = (1 - E)
This means that
Drs
a< 0 VS > 0 if > I1
and if E < 1, rs behaves as in Figure 3.1.
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Return
to
capitalists
Skill
Figure 3.1. Return to skill to capitalists with elasticity substitution (E)
less than 1.
the normal productive activities of supervisors or seniors while training un-
skilled workers, or simply as those lower quality products produced by the
people being trained that cannot be sold on the market. Skill investment
appears in the national accounting, therefore, as an element of final demand
of own-sector goods.
We also assume that the training costs increase as skill investment in-
creases, i.e., that the cost increases the more one would like to train be-
cause there will be fewer potential skilled labor of good quality. The cost,
therefore, of skill investment is:
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p CT a (-)
si
where
a = a monotone increasing function of the argument*
siv/sl = the ratio of skill investment to existing skilled labor force
CT = the base cost of training.
This is shown graphically in Figure 3.2. Skill investment takes place so
that the cost is equalized with the capitalized value of the marginal rate
of return of skill to capitalists, i.e.,
dTr
. = cost of training
where i is the assumed discount rate of interest on loans.
Cost
Skill
o investment
Figure 3.2. Cost of skill investment.
*An exponential function is used for a :
a = exp (C - )
sl
where C is a constant.
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3.1.10. Rural-to-Urban Migration
Migration here means the shift of the working population (with their
families) from primary to non-primary sectors. It does not necessarily mean
the spatial shift of the population. A two-step analysis is therefore in-
troduced here. The first step is to analyze how many workers decide to shift
from primary to non-primary sectors, and the second step to show how many of
those who do shift actually move to cities as opposed to commuting from rural
households,
The first step, i.e., to determine the share of people who shift from
primary to non-primary activities among the total primary employment is
specified in two ways. One specification considers this share as a function
of expected income ratios in non-primary and primary employment. In this
case the expected non-primary income is a weighted average of non-primary
sector wages, the weights are shares of job openings potentially available
to migrants through new investments and quits. The other specification as-
sumes that the share is a function of only the number of new jobs available
through investment in the non-primary sectors and quits, i.e.,
L.
shift = . I + q. * L.
snif t i K. i
where
shift = the number of workers who shift from pri-mary to non-primary
employment
ashift = parameter that shows the degree of responsiveness of rural
workers to newopportunities in non-primary activities
L.
the average observed labor-capital ratios of sector i
L. = the unskilled labor employment of sector i
q = quit rate of sector i.
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From a preliminary regression analysis (see Appendix 2), the latter
specification seems to be appropriate for the post-World War II period,
whereas the former seems to apply to the period before the War.
The second step is to determine the share of actual movers from among
the shifters. For this, we assume a logit type of specification. Given
that a person has already decided to obtain a non-agricultural job, the
probability that he moves or does not move depends on the utility differences
of the two choices, which in turn, depend on the differences of present value
of expected income for movers and non-movers. For simplicity, however, we
assume that utility levels of movers and non-movers have the following spe-
cifications:
M 1PC 2pR 3
= +NM 4 p 5+pR 6
where
UMU' = the utility levels of movers and non-movers, respectively
W ,W e= the expected wage levels of movers and non-movers, respectively
ya = the average value product of labor in the agricultural sector
pC'PR the consumer price indices in cities and rural areas, respec-
tively
= i = 1,...,6 are parameters
Here we assume and 4 > 0 and 2 <5 < 0. The second inequality
comes from the fact that movers lose agricultural income completely, whereas
non-movers can still contribute to agricultural production. We also assume
that W is the weighted average of all urban wages, the weights being the
Mv
-48-
the employment share in each sector, whereas We is the weighted average of
construction and traditional non-primary wages, the weights again being the
actual employment share of those two sectors in each period.
Thus, the conditional probability that a person stays in a rural area,
given that he has decided to change from an agricultural to a non-agricultural
job, is
e e
+ exp [ -- - R --- + ( 2 - ) -- + ( - 6)
IPC P R 5pR 3 6
Non-movers are assumed to retain their previous consumption and fertility be-
havior in the rural area. The employment sectors for non-moving shifts (i.e.,
those who shift to non-primary employment but do not actually move to cities),
are determined by taking the historical share of non-moving shifts employed
in each sector as an exogenous parameter.
3. 1. 1 1. Government
Government expenditures are largely exogenous. Government consumption,
investment and labor employment are given exogen6usly in real terms. Govern-
ment workers' wages are given exogenously in nominal terms. All are taken as
the historical values. Government revenue, on the other hand, is more endog-
enous:
5 8 8
GR = t Y. + pm. tr. e im. + p.*ti. Q.
i=1 1 j 1 3 3 3 j=1
where
GR = government revenue
t. = direct tax rate for income class i
Y. = nominal income of income class i1
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pm. = import price of sector j goods
tr. = tariff rate of sector j imports
e = exchange rate
im. = imports of sector j goods
J
P. = producers' price of sector j goods
ti. = indirect tax on sector j goods
Q. = output of sector j goods
Government expenditure is simply:
8
GE = Wg -Lg + I pp. gcd.
j=1 2 2
where
Wg = wage level for government employees
Lg = labor employed by the government
gcd. = government consumption demand from sector j
pp. = purchasers? price of sector j goods
All, except pp., are given exogenously.
3.1.12. Macro Closures
Three different closures of the model are employed. The first assumes
investment to be endogenous, while the sizes of the total urban and rural
labor forces are exogenous. The wage level, therefore, becomes endogenous.
This specification determins investment by the amount of savings available
in the economy (or in the model). This is the ordinary neoclassical way of
closure and is referred to as the NC model in this paper.
The second way of closing the model is to assume the physical value of
investments as predetermined by the expectations of investors in the previous
period. However, we still retain the neoclassical full-employment assumption.
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This is referred to as the IX model. The third closure is to assume, in
addition to the predetermined investment, that the urban unskilled labor has
infinitely elastic supply, i.e., a large pool of unemployed or underemployed
exists. The demand, therefore, becomes important a' la Keynes. Because we
assume that the unskilled labor market does not clear, the wage level becomes
exogenous, or rather the agricultural income and consumers' price levels in
urban and rural areas determine, for the solution, the absolute urban wage
structure. This closure is referred to as the FI model. These three closures
are summarized in Table 3.3.
Table 3.3. A summary of the differences between the three closures.
1. NC - Fixed total labor and capital available in each
of the urban and rural areas.
- Total amount of investment determined by total
available savings.
- W is endogenous.
2. IX - Fixed total labor and capital available in each
of the urban and rural areas.
- Physical amounts of investment are determined by
investors' expectations during the previous period.
- W is endogenous.
3. FI - Aggregate demand determines the level of urban
labor employment, i.e., unemployed labor exists.
- Physical amounts of investment are determined by
investors' expectations during the previous period.
- W is exogenous (= 1).
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3.1.13. Savings
Savings consist of private savings, government savings, and foreign sav-
ings. Private savings are derived by assuming exogenous saving pro-
pensities for each income class (described below). The constancy of saving
propensities is, however, a rigid assumption, despite the fact that it is
widely used. In the modification of the base model, therefore, saving pro-
pensities are assumed to be of the Metzler type (see Appendix 3).
Government savings are its revenues (direct, indirect taxes and tariff
revenue) less expenditure (government consumption plus wage payment to govern-
ment workers).
Foreign savings are changes in foreigner's claims in Japan. It is the
total value of imports minus the total value of exports. In a model version
where trade deficit is constrained to be zero, foreign savings are naturally
zero.
3.1.14. Income and Consumption Classes
The model described so far is able to generate the functional income
distribution. The total income is classified into five different income
groups. Roughly, they are as follows:
1. Unskilled urban labor of sectors 1, 2, and 6 (the modern sectors).
2. Unskilled urban labor in the rest of the sectors and the self-
employed.
3. Urban skilled labor.
4. Capital income receipients.
5. Rural workers (agricultural workers and non-agricultural workers
living with farming families).
Table 3.16 summarizes this classification.
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3.2. ESTIMATION, GUESSTLMATION, AND CALIBRATION
3.2.1. General Remarks
The model and its extensions exposited above is not a large general equi-
librium model in terms of size, number of sectors or factors of production
(see, for example, Adelman and Robinson 1978, or Lysy and Taylor 1980 for
examples of large models). It is, however, complicated enough in terms of
structure, and estimation of all the parameter values in the framework of a
system of simultaneous equations is impossible. We have to therefore depend
largely on a priori knowledge from both theories and past empirical works,
together with a consistent set of social accounting data for a base-year.
This section briefly describes how we proceeded with this rather time-
consuming yet still crude work. There are five different methods to determine
parameter values:
1. Parameters whose values have actually been econometrically
estimated.
2. Parameters whose values have been taken from other studies.
3. Parameters whose values have been calibrated from combinations
of theories, social accounting data and, (1) and (2).
4. Parameters whose values have been calibrated only from social
accounting data of the base year.
5. Parameters whose values have been guessed.
The first set of parameters include those in migration functions and
savings functions. The second set includes various elasticities of factor
substitutions, some elasticities in labor-quit functions, export and import
elasticities, marginal propensities to consume, rates of technical progress,
and rates of depreciation.
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The third set includes such important parameters as all production param-
eters except for substitution elasticities, subsistence minimum requirements
in consumption, and parameters in physical investment equations. The fourth
set includes saving propensities, various tax, subsidy, and tariff
rates, and shares of nonagricultural employment in the rural population, mark-
up rates in consumers' prices, origin vector of investment, and, of course,
input-output coefficients.
Finally, the fifth set includes parameters in expectation-formation func-
tions, the remaining quit function parameters, housing and land market param-
eters, and parameters in skill investment. These parameters can be claimed to
be of dubious reliability because they are simply guessed. But even then,
they are educated guesses with some theories or empirical works in the back-
ground determining at least rough upper and lower bounds on each parameter
value. Also, these guesses are made so that they can be consistent with the
base-year data set, and to the extent that the model simulates the overall
economy history of Japan during the period concerned, we are satisfied. Of
course, the system is under-identified in the sense that there are more param-
eters than number of values that can be tracked throughout the simulation
period. This method of "estimation by simulation", therefore, does not give
a unique solution. Improvements on this issue, however, are left for future
detailed works and are no longer discussed in this paper.
3.2.2. Base Data and Parameter Values
3.2.2.1. Base year data and parameter values for static solutions
For the major base year solution, the data base from 1960 in Japan has
been employed. This includes social accounting matrix (SAM)(reproduced in
Appendix 1), destination sectors of investment (origin sectors of investment
are given in SAM), existing capital stocks, rural and urban populations, and
sectoral employment levels.
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Table 3.4 shows base year sectoral outputs, unskilled employment, skilled
employment, and two different kinds of physical capital stocks. The sources
are as follows. Outputs are taken directly from the social accounting matrix
in the Appendix. Unskilled and skilled labor employments are taken mostly
from the Japan Statistical Yearbooks (produced by the Office of the Prime
Minister) supplemented by Kayo (1977). Capital stocks come from a combination
of Capital Stocks and Economic Growth and Gross Capital Stock of Private Enter-
prises produced by the Economic Planning Agency and the author's judgement.
Skilled labor is defined as that part of the labor force with any kind of col-
lege education, including junior college. This is a debateable definition,
Table 3.4. 1960 Japanese data on output and factor employment by sector.
Unskilled Skilled Equipment & Buildings &
Output labor labor machinery structures
(billion (thousand (thousand (billion (billion
Sector yen) a persons) persons) yen)a yen) a
1 5961.6 1198.2 151.2 1262.3 832.5
2 4947.0 2430.5 244.7 610.9 371.1
3 8474.5 4388.2 (747.2)b 898.0 691.1
4 371.0 520.0 0 124.4 132.7
5 3147.5 2068.6 (485.4)b 153.0 52.3
6 4222.8 2704.4 327.3 1799.5 2947.2
7 5378.8 10827.6 266.9 788.1 1250.6
8 3043.9 14247.2 0 452.8 487.1
aThe value terms are all in 1960 constant prices.
bThis includes self-employed proprietors.
This sector also has "animals and plants" as capital stock, whose value is
582.9, and land whose value is 5701.7 (thousand ha.).
Source: SAM, Japanese Statistical Yearbooks.
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because "skill" in Japan really depends very much on on-the-job training. It
might be argued that a better definition is one which uses the ages and years
of employment in addition to education levels. Computational disadvantages,
however, would be quite high, especially in dynamic analyses, if we have to
keep track of different ages and experience levels as well as educational
backgrounds with technical substitutabilities among them. For computational
purposes, and analytical tractability, the simple definition of skilled labor
is used here, It may not be so unrealistic if we consider that in most
Japanese business establishements a higher education is used as a means of
preselection for future sKilled employees. In other words, a completed
higher education is often taken as evidence that someone is more suitable for
receiving special "skill" training.
Wage levels for skilled labor are taken from the Japan Statistical Year-
book. Unskilled labor wage rates are the total sectoral labor income (from
SAM), less the skill wages divided by sectoral unskilled employment. These
levels differ somewhat from other wage data, but to keep consistency we need
to solve the model we use these wage rates (Table 3.5).
Table 3.5. 1960 Japanese wage levels (million yen/(worker year)).
Sector Skilled labor Unskilled labor
1 0.509 0.313
2 0.489 0.286
3 0.329 0.170
4 n.a. 0.318
5 0.376 0.209
6 0.510 0.348
7 0.268 0.151
8 n.a. 0.052a
a This is the value marginal products of labor in agriculture. In the
model, average income is actually used as a criterion of rural welfare.
Source: See text.
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Capital income is a residual here and includes depreciation allowances
besides the ordinary definition of capital income (profits) in SAM. Capital-
ists take this sum as their total income from which they consume, save, and
invest in the skill accumulation after income tax is netted out. Tax rates
are taken from different quotes of effective tax rates, and information avail-
able in SAM. The direct income tax rates are as shown in Table 3.6. As is
obvious from Table 3.6, the capitalists tax rate is calibrated after all other
tax rates are determined so that the model tax revenue equals the actual 1960
tax revenue. Consumption propensities are determined similarly (Table 3.7).
Table 3.6. Rates of direct income tax.
Income class Income tax rates %
5.0
2 3.5
3 6.0
4 15.9814
5 2.5
Source: SAM (see the text).
Table 3.7. Consumption propensities.
Income class Consumption propensities
1 0.84
2 0.87
3 0.85
4 0.34518
5 0.864
Source: SAM (see the text).
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Rates of indirect taxes and ad valorem tariffs are derived directly from
SAM (Table 3.8).
Table 3.8. Rates of indirect taxes and ad valorem tariffs.
Sector Indirect tax % Tariff %
1 2.975 5.514
2 1.856 8.887
3 5.992 36.473
4 0.644 1.807
5 0.235 n.a.
6 5.168 n.a.
7 1,679 n.a.
8 1.238 1.049
Production parameters are derived from the values stated above: outputs,
factors employed and factor returns. Because we assume constant elasticities
of substitution production function in most sectors, however, we still have
extra degrees of freedom that can be eliminated by choosing or estimating
values of the substitution elasticities. Unfortunately, the literature shows
only a confusion as to the reasonable values of these elasticities and appro-
priate methods for estimating them empirically. -Ever since the publication of
the pathbreaking article by Arrow, Chenery, Minhas and Salow (ACMS)(1961), the
conventional wisdom has been that elasticities of capital-labor substitution
are by and large less than unitary. A review by Caddy (1976), however, shows
that the empirical estimates are varied and not quite in agreement with con-
ventional knowledge. Indeed, Sato (1977) shows that the ACMS contention of
less than unitary substitutions elasticity is logically half true. The other
half of the logic, says Sato, shows that it is possible to have higher than
unitary elasticities, and that this would conform better to reality than lower
elasticities. Thursby (1980), however, contends that estimations of the
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elasticities of factor substitutions may not exist or, even if they do, can
be very unreliable due to extremely large variance. Also the famous impos-
sibility exists of estimating the elasticity of substitution from time series
data when there is biased technical progress (Diamond and McFadden 1965).
All these findings make it very difficult to obtain a plausible set of
values for these elasticities, either from the past literature or from direct
efforts to estimate them. Because recent estimates (Fishelson 1979,
Paraskevopoulos 1979, for example) show that less than unitary elasticities
are still hard to refute in general, and because we are more interested in
the way the model behaves, we have chosen to use a set of elasticity param-
eters that seem more or less to be a lower bound of such values. We will see
whether these values replicate history with a comfortable degree of precision.
Sensitivity analyses will be employed for further testing of their plausibil-
ity. The values chosen are shown in Table 3.9.
Table 3.9. Elasticity of factor substitutions assumed.
Elasticities between
Equipment and and
Sector skilled labor and buildings unskilled labor
1 0.3 0.4 0.55
2 0.35 0.45 0.6
3 0.4 0.55 0.85
4 n.a. 0.46 1.15
5 0.42 0.6 0.95
6 0.3 0.4 0.55
7 0.48 0.7 0.95
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As we have already discussed, it is assumed that modern sectors have
less substitutable technologies than do traditional sectors. This relates to
the higher number of production processes available in traditional sectors.
Even if each process has a Leontief type of technology, the aggregation of
different factor-proportion processes into one sector makes our assumption
more plausible.
Now we are ready to calibrate all the production parameters. Sectors 1,
2, 3, 5, 6, and 7 have the following production functions
(a em + a2 sl ) + es 2+ Y ul
All that needs to be calibrated now is a,, c 2, and y given the first order
conditions. These are shown in Table 3.10.
Sectors 4 and 8 have the following production functions:
0.4 ( 2 ~ 2 43'42Q = (minerable resources) (4475-em + 4457-cs4 )
+ 0.6534-u 43 )0.6/p3
where
p2 = 1.1739 and p3 =,0.1304
and
-1 -1 -1 0.7Q = 0.96 (0.46 em8  + 0.32 cs8  + 0.12 ap )
ul0.375 land0.2 5
This latter function means the capital stock in agriculture is assumed
to be the aggregation of equipment and machinery (em), constructed structures
and buildings (cs) and animals and plants (ap) with elasticity of substitution
of 0.5. The coefficients of the Cobb-Douglas form are taken from Hayami
(1975) assuming that fertilizer is an intermediate input.
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Table 3.10. Production parameters.
Sector a a 1 Y
1 0.5014 e-2 0.4957 e-5 0.7994 e-2 0.7989 e-1
2 0.1842 e-2 0.8381 e-4 0.3761 e-2 0.2850
3 0.1074 e-3 0.4202 e-4 0.2771 e-2 0.3828
5 0.2134 e-8 0.6198 e-8 0.5489 e-5 0.4272
6 0.1125 e-1 0.4760 e-4 0.1443 0.2310
7 0.5839 e-8 0.2133 e-9 0.1007 e-2 0.5275
Consumption demand functions take the ordinary linear expenditure system
cd hi (E. - TCEh) + Y.
hi pc hi 3 hi
An extensive search of the literature was made for the marginal propen-
sities to consume. Estimates with enough disaggregation to make the calibra-
tion of consumption functions with the present sector division possible were
very few. Actually the only works available covering Japan during the period
concerned with substantial sectoral disaggregation are Sasaki (1982) and
Sasaki and Fukagawa (1982). Even these works, however, do not include rural
residents, and do not quite conform to the sector divisions of this model.
The discretion of the author was therefore applied substantially, utilizing
the results of the two works cited above and Yoshihara (1977) and Lluch,
Powell and Williams (1977). The author also got some ideas as to the values
of the supernumerary income ratios ($.) or the inverse of the Frisch param-
eter from these econometric analyses. Thus, Yhi can be calibrated as*
E hi
y.. = hi - h .$) for all h,ihi pch. hi hi h
*See Taylor (1979) for a good exposition.
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where w hi is the expenditure share of good i by consumers of type h. The
parameters that result from these exercises are shown in Table 3.11.
Investment is carried out by investors' expectations on future factor
prices and demand. It is a multiple of the most efficient capital-output
ratio times the expected increase in demand, i.e.,
I - DD3r
where
c = the cost function with expected user costs of factors
r = the user cost of concerned capital stock
DD = the expected increase in demand.
Calculating this value for each sector in the base year, however, does
not give values close to the actual investment next year. As a matter of fact,
there is a tendency that capital goods producing sectors invest more heavily
than this investment equation suggests, and among the similar sectors, modern
Table 3.11. Consumption parameters.
Urban Rural
Sector y Y
1 0.040 0.4490 e-3 0.040 0.3441 e-3
2 0.090 0.1518 e-2 0.080 0.1485 e-2
3 0.400 0.3204 e-1 0.380 0.1986 e-1
4 0.001 0.6198 e-4 0.002 0.4848 e-4
5 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
6 0.259 0,9659 e-2 0.220 0.8601 e-2
7 0.200 0.6588 e-2 0.248 0.6507 e-2
8 0.010 0.5894 e-2 0.030 0.4594 e-2
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sectors invest more than traditional sectors. The differences may be attribu-
ted to economic forces that our model is unable to capture, or other political/
institutional factors, or simply the "animal spirits" of the investors. We
calculate the ratio of actual values of investment in 1961 and what the model
produces, as the desirable investment for the next year in 1960 and call it
"animal spirit" parameter (AS). That is,
3cI = AS --- DD
actual 3
These animal spirit parameters appear in Table 3.12.
Origin sectors of investment in equipments and machineries are calibrated
from SAM, i.e., sectoral compositions of equipment and machinery are shown in
Table 3.13.
Constructed buildings and structures naturally originate only from sector
5, i.e., the construction sector. We also assume that the investment in ani-
mal and plants all originates from sector 8 the agricultural sector.
Table 3.12. Animal spirit parameters.
Equipment & Building &
Sector machinery structures
1 2.008 1.423
2 2.337 2.214
3 1.452 1.031
4 0.001007 0.000701
5 1.747 1.978
6 1.120 1.626
7 0.853 0.801
8a 0.324 0.604
aFor animals and
is 0.0701.
plants of this sector, the same value
Table 3.13.
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Origin sectors of equipment and machinery in non-agricultural
sectorsb.
Sector
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
Composite
0.0
0.886
0.16
0.0
0.0
0.008
0.089
0.0
This table shows the origin sectors of capital
stock (em), e.g., one unit of em includes 0.886
bunits of sector 2 goods.
For simplicity it is assumed that all agricultural
equipment and machinery comes from sector 2, and
all animals and plants from sector 8.
International trade is specified as follows:
import: M = Z E) P e )6  TD
0 e ( + t r) e pm
export: X = a WT
where (sector subscripts are suppressed)
0,(= elasticities of import and export, respectively, with respect to
terms of trade
= the elasticity of export with respect to world demand
TD = the total demand for domestically produced commodities net of
export
mmammim
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WT = the quantum index of the world trade of the concerned sector
goods
e = the exchange rate (= 1.0)
pm,pw = import and export prices
a,EQ = parameters to be estimated
tr = the tariff rate.
Here, pm, pw, and WT are given exogenously from the history (see Tables
3.20 and 3.21), C, 6 and are taken from Matsukawa (1979) because of the
similar time periods and issues in both his work and this. WT's are indices
whose value is I for all sectors in the base year, and p/e-pw also equals 1
in the base year, a is given as the base year value of the export in each
year. TD is given (well almost) in SAM, and y can also be calibrated from
the import equation because we assume all domestic prices are 1 in the base
year*. All these values are given in Table 3.14.
Table 3.14. Trade related parameters.
Sector 6 E y
1 3.1 0.309 1.401 0.616 1.669
2 0.8 0.16 1.6 1.700 1.127
3 0.5496 0.001 1.9053 2.869 1.059
4 3.0 0.509 1.0 0.500 2.018
8 0.201 0.201 1.0 0.500 1.608
*
Y in the aggregation function of domestic and imported goods, i.e.,
$ = Y[E M TI + (1 - E) TDn]
can be calibrated assuming
1 e 1-0 0 1-6 /-
pp (- {[E (1 + tr) e'pm] + (1 - E) p 6-1Y/1)Y
is I as well.
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Service sectors are also expected to explicitly benefit from trade.
There are such foreign exchange earning activities as storage, insurance,
and transportation of traded commodities. From the base year data we assume
that a portion of the total exports in the base year prices (= 1), becomes
these handling charges. This portion is 0.126 for sector 6 (modern services)
and 0.029 for sector 7 (traditional services).
The last set of parameters that relates to the static solutions is the
parameters in nominal wage determination. This is an important set of param-
eters but it has been impossible to estimate them in any sense. We do not
have any good estimates of hiring and training costs of unskilled labor in
each sector, and we only have the wage elasticity of quits in very aggregated
sectors (e.g., Shorey). Discrete judgement, therefore, has been used to
choose the matrix of 8's in
7 , w.y iji '8j
q. = AT. E for i = 1,...,7
3 i=. pci , pcii=1 \u/ , R
where
q. = quit rate of sector j
AT. = sector specific constants which reflect both training and hiring
costs and some measure of propensity of unskilled laborers in the
sector to stick to the job
w. = nominal wage of sector i
pciUpciR = consumers' price indices of urban and rural areas, respec-
tively.
The sector specific constants reflecting both training and hiring costs
(AT.) are calculated from the first order conditions of labor cost minimiza-
tion for the base year. That is,
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0W \ IJ w2 2J w. 30 = 1 + 3.. AT. .P]~ (pc.i-9 ..
pcl pe pciu
7 ya 8j
pci UC1 )c
Table 3.15 contains all the values of the 3..'s and AT.'s used for model simu-
IJ J
lation. The high values of own sector 8's (3..) reflects the results of
11
Shorey (1980). This could mean, among other things, that people have illusions
about their own wages due to the lack of information about the wages of other
sectors. Before we move to the variables and parameters for dynamic runs, we
need to calrify how the population is divided into five income groups. Table
3.16 contains this information. The numbers for proprietors and capital own-
ers in Table 3. 16 are the historical values as given in the Japan Statistical
Yearbook. r3, r5, and r7 are given the values of 0.18, 0.20, and 0.20 respec-
tively, and represent the share of capital income that would actually go to
poorer classes, i.e., capital income that accrues to family firms, for example.
The values are given as the ratio of unincorporated capital income to corporate
capital income with some discrete judgement.
Table 3.15. Wage determination parameters.
3
Sector 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 AT
1 -4.0 0.2 0.2 0 0 0.6 0.2 0.6 0.012
2 0.5 -3.2 0.4 0.2 0.1 0.2 0.6 0.65 0.118
3 0.2 0.3 -2.0 0.2 0.4 0.3 0.8 1,0 0.470
4 0.1 0.2 0.3 -3.0 0.3 0.1 0.6 0.85 0.423
5 0.2 0.2 0.6 0.4 -2.5 0.1 0.6 1.0 0.338
6 0.3 0.2 0.1 0 0.2 -3.0 0.1 0.45 0.037
7 0.2 0.4 0.8 0.2 0.1 -0.3 -2.0 1.2 0.317
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Table 3.16. Division of the population into five income groups.
Representative name of income group
Urban modern Urban
unskilled traditional Skilled Capital Rural
Sector workers workers workers workers workers
I ul sl co
2 ul sl co
3 ul-ri sl (1-r )co rl
prop
r 3co
4 ul co
5 ul-rl sl (1-r )co rl
prop
r 5co
6 ul si
7 ul-rl (1-r 7 )co rl
r7co
sl
8 ul
Govern- government
ment workers
Note: ul = total unskilled workers
rl = unskilled workers living in rural areas and commuting to non-
agricultural jobs
sl = skilled workers
prop = self-employed proprietors
co = capital owners
r3 ,r5 ,r7 = shares of capital income going to self-employed or other workers
in sectors 3, 5, and 7.
rl is explained in Section 3.1.10.
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3.2.2.2. Values of parameters and exogenous variables for dynamic runs
In order to solve the model year by year, we need more information on
parameter values and exogenous variables. These include rates of depreciation,
rates of factor augmenting technical progress, parameters in expectation func-
tions, population and labor force growth rates, world prices, world trade
quantum indices, government consumption, government investment, government
employment, and housing investment. These values are mostly historical values
except for the rates of technical progress and expectation formation param-
eters. The latter set of parameters is simply guessed, taking into consider-
ation the assumption that modern sectors are quicker in reacting against un-
expected changes in circumstances. The literature on such aspects of Japan
during the assumed period is almost nil. There have not been abundant esti-
mates of sectoral factor augmenting rates of technical progress either. We
have decided here, therefore, to choose an arbitrary process: to set the
capital augmenting technical progress at relatively low rates and jiggle the
rates of labor augmenting technical progress so that the model simulation re-
sults resemble the Japanese history of the period concerned. The following
tables (3.17 - 3.23) give the values of all the parameters/variables mentioned
above for 10 years simulation.
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Table 3.17. Rates of depreciation and factor augmenting technical progress.
em cs sl ul
Sector dep tp dep tp ret tp tp
1 0.14 0.035 0.09 0.018 0.04 0.044 0.085
2 0.12 0.025 0.07 0.012 0.035 0.036 0.083
3 0.07 0.022 0.04 0.010 0.03 0.028 0.071
4 0.09 0.010 0.06 0.005 n.a. n.a. 0.042
5 0.08 0.011 0.05 0.008 0.03 0.018 0.052
6 0.13 0.020 0.08 0.018 0.04 0.044 0.088
7 0.06 0.009 0.04 0.007 0.03 0.018 0.062
8 0.07 0.009 0.04 0.005 n.a. n.a. 0.028
Table 3.18. Parameters in expectation formation.
Cost for Cost for
Unskilled equipment constructed Domestic
Sector wages capital capital demand Exports
1 0.6 0.45 0.3 0.4 0.4
2 0.6 0.45 0.3 0.4 0.3
3 0.5 0.45 0.3 0.3 0.3
4 0.5 0.35 0.2 0.2 0.3
5 0.5 0.45 0.3 0.4 n.a.
6 0.6 0.50 0.4 0.5 n.a.
7 0.4 0.45 0.2 0.3 n.a.
8 0.2 0.25 0.2 0.25 0.2
Note: these values are adjustment parameters in expectation formation equa-
tions (see Section 3.1.8 ).
Table 3.19. Population and labor force growth rates.
Urban Rural
Population 0.88 1.10
Labor force 2.01 1.50
Table 3.20. World prices.
Sector
Year 1 2 3 4 8
1960 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0
1961 0.9722 1.0211 1.0 0.98 0.9895
1962 0.9444 1.0421 0.9901 0.96 0.9895
1963 0.9196 1.0494 1.0 0.963 1.0588
1964 0.9197 1.0617 1.0233 0.97 1.1059
1965 0.9286 1.0988 1.0581 0.97 1.0941
1966 0.9107 1.1235 1.0814 0.95 1.1176
1967 0.8750 1.1235 1.0814 0.959 1.1059
1968 0.8571 1.0617 1.0349 0.962 1.0706
1969 0.8750 1.0988 1.0930 0.98 1.1412
1970 0.8920 1.234 1.1628 1.0 1.176
Table 3.21. World trade indices.
Sector
Year 1 2 3 4 8
1960 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0
1961 1.0946 1.0741 1.0357 1.04 1.0341
1962 1.2027 1.1358 1.0952 1.09 1.0909
1963 1.3667 1.2222 1.1860 1.17 1.1406
1964 1.6333 1.3889 1.3256 1.20 1.1875
1965 1.7667 1.5556 1.4419 1.31 1.2344
1966 2.0333 1.7222 1.5581 1.40 1.2813
1967 2.2667 1.8889 1.5814 1,49 1.3281
1968 2.7000 2.3056 1.9302 1.63 1.483
1969 3.0333 2.6389 2.1860 1.75 1.4219
1970 3.3330 2.7778 2.325 1.90 1.5620
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Table 3.22. Government consumption (billion yen in 1960 prices).
Sector
Year 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
1960 31.159 83.885 60.859 1.639 5.947 127.785 587.434 0.935
1961 38.392 84.802 48.669 2.868 5.371 132.657 650.242 0.875
1962 47.308 85.728 38.920 3.794 4.852 137.714 719.765 0.819
1963 58.301 86.665 31.124 2.333 4.382 142.964 796.722 0.767
1964 49.872 88.257 36.318 1.435 6.876 142.346 864.568 0.432
1965 42.661 89.878 42.379 1.110 1o.789 141.731 938.192 0.243
1966 42.338 97.867 41.165 0.858 11.980 167.638 960.252 0.120
1967 42.017 106.566 39.986 0.663 13.302 198.281 982.831 0.0
1968 41.698 116.039 38.841 0.513 14.769 234.524 1005.941 0.0
1969 41.382 126.353 37.729 0.39 16.399 277.393 1029.595 0.0
1970 41.060 137.580 36.640 0.35 18.200 328.090 1053.800 0.0
Table 3.23. Government investment and employment, and housing investment.
Government Government Housing
investment employment investment
Year (billion yen) (thousands) (billion yen)
1960 675.9 1879 665.8
1961 810.4 1964 737.7
1962 1037.3 1993 837.297
1963 1196.0 2125 998.058
1964 1276.2 2140 1263.540
1965 1415.3 2125 1487.188
1966 1024.7 2081 1592.778
1967 1710.8 2301 1858.772
1968 1940.1 2257 2195.210
1969 2114.6 2287 2537.662
1970 2315.0 2360 2872.634
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APPENDIX I TO CHAPTER 3
EIGHT SECTOR SOCIAL ACCOUNTING MATRIX AND SECTORAL COMPOSITIONS
OF FINAL DEMAND OF 1960 JAPAN
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Table 3A1.1.
Sector 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 Total II
Input-Output Relationship
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
II
2994.
81.
169.
507.
17.
370.
255.
135.
4529.
Value-Added
wL 452.
rK 581.
YA -
dK 219.
SI 15.
IT 178.
Sub 0.
VA 1444.
TC 5974.
1132.
1305.
356.
2.
16.
229.
301.
6.
3348.
815.
541.
146.
20.
97.
0.
1620.
4968.
853.
130.
2031.
86.
21.
353.
502.
2267.
6243.
967.
569.
138.
17.
545.
-46.
2190.
8433.
23.
15.
16.
5.
6.
36.
16.
12.
128.
165.
38.
39.
0.
10.
-8.
244.
373.
338.
569.
760.
50.
3.
193.
224.
26.
2162.
608.
300.
61.
10.
7.
0.
987.
3150.
161.
167.
81.
103.
137.
327.
123.
0.
1100.
1139.
1109.
657.
39.
220.
0.
3165.
4265.
225.
107.
559.
6.
59.
520.
558.
66.
2100.
1715.
1235.
265.
19.
91.
0.
3325.
5424.
200.
38.
195.
0.
17.
65.
49.
474.
1038.
1759.
209.
0.
48.
-10.
2006.
3044.
5926.
2414.
4166.
759.
277.
2093.
2028.
2987.
20650.
5861.
4373.
1759.
1734.
121.
1197.
-64.
14982.
35631.
HHC GC KF SI EX IM Tariff Total FD Total
Demands
153.
403.
3618.
9.
0.
1791.
2587.
552.
9112.
31.
84.
61.
2.
6.
128.
587.
1.
900.
0.
1706.
29.
0.
2857.
15.
158.
18.
4782.
15.
20.
17.
0.
10.
39.
19.
0.
1907.
270.
506.
746.
1.
0.
259.
66.
58.
-1736.
-400.
-152.
-151.
-391.
0.
-60.
-19.
-564.
-104.
-22.
-14.
-55.
-7.
0.
0.
-1.
-6.
121.
470.
2720.
472.
11.
2873.
2233.
417.
624.
16821.
5974.
4968.
8433.
373.
3150.
4265.
5425.
3044.
35631.
II = intermediate inputs, HHC
consumption, KF = investment,
= household consumption demand, GC =
EX = export, IM = import, SI = skill
government
investment,
FD = final demand, wL = labor income, rK = capitalists' income, dK = depre-
ciation allowances, YA = agricultural income, IT = indirect tax, Sub = sub-
sidy, VA = value added (gross), TC = total cost. Unit in billion yen 1960
yen in producers' price.
Source: Japan Statistical Year Books-A joint work of 7 ministries and
agencies of the Japanese Government.
Final
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
Total
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Table 3A1.2. Sectoral Composition of Final Demand in 1960 Japan.
GC/Q
0.0038
0.0136
0.0027
0.0044
0.0020
0.0296
0.1225
KF /Q
0.0
0.3477
0.0036
0.0
0.9104
0.0034
0.0318
Sector
2
3
4
5
6
7
II/Q
1.0045
0.5014
0.4988
2.0203
0.0876
0.4955
0.3120
0.9827
HHC/Q
0.0243
0.0796
0.4386
0.0231
0.0
0.4268
0.5248 b(0.2351)
0.1805
baandling charges for exports.
This portion of sector 7 outputs is for the mark-up of consumption goods
by retail and wholesale subsectors, i.e., it does not enter directly in
the consumption demand functions.
Note: Q = total product
II = intermediate input
HHC = household consumption
GC = government consumption
KF = capital formation
EX = exports
IM = imports
EX/Q
0.0395
0.0923
0.0818
0.0023
0.0
(0.0448)
(0.0091)
0.01868 0.0003 0.0053
(IM+Tarrif) /Q
-0.0720
-0.0347
-0.0255
-1.0500
0.0
0.0
0.0
-0.1874
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APPENDIX 2 TO CHAPTER 3
SOME PRELIMINARY ECONOMETRIC RESULTS FOR MIGRATION PARAMETERS
Some preliminary econometric results for migration parameters are re-
ported here. We assume that both net outmigration rates and urban-rural wage
ratios are endogenous, and estimate the migration equation using a two-stage
least-squares with the first order serial correlation*. The results are shown
in Table 3A2.1. These results illustrate that, for the entire period, lagged
investment is significant at the 2 percent level, whereas relative wages are
not significant at the 5 percent level. When each of the pre- and post-World
War II periods are examined, however, the reason for this becomes partially
clear. During the pre-World War II period, wage differentials were important
factors in pulling agrarian workers into urban activities. Table 3A2.1 shows
that lagged investment, on the other hand, is not significant at 5 percent,
although it is still significant at 10 percent. More non-agricultural jobs
were available because new investments had a positive influence on outmigra-
tion. For the post-World War II period, however, results are incompatible with
the conventional economic knowledge. The investment variable i(-1) is not
significant and wage ratios (rw) have a negative and significant coefficient.
The former problem is caused by the high multicolinearity during this period
between i(1) and rw. Excluding rw in an ordinary least square (OLS) analysis
results in a significant (at I percent) and positive coefficient for i (-1).
*See Fair (1970).
-76-
Table 3A2.1. Estimated coefficients of the migration function.
Variable
Period rw i(-1) p dw
Entire period 1.53954 0.13983 0.76890 1.83
1921-1940 ( 1.7055) (2.6454) (7.1147)
1952-1970
Pre-World War II 1.69153 0.34813 0.53443 2.55
1921-1940 ( 2.70221) (1.91024) (3,48217)
Post-World War II -3.01500 0.01567 0.19503 1.95
1952-1970 (-4,1538) (0.50831) (0.81985)
Note: t-statistics are in parentheses
p = the coefficient of first order serial correlation
dw = the Durbin-Watson statistics
rw = urban wages, agricultural wages
i(-1) = lagged investment.
The unexpected negative sign for rw, however, seems to come from misspecifi-
cation. There is no longer a strong simultaneity between rw and net outmi-
gration rates. The causality is presumably only from net outmigration rates
to wage ratios during the period concerned for the following reasons.
There was a considerable spatial diffusion of nonagricultural investment
after World War II, thus creating more jobs within a commuting distance from
rural households, Table 3A2.2 shows this trend between 1965 and 1975. It
shows the ratios of rural males who shifted to nonagricultural jobs without
moving to cities (NM) to those males who actually moved (M). The ratio (NM/M)
increased greatly in this decade, especially for those whose physical exis-
tence with the family was socio-institutionally more important, i.e., family
heads and first sons. The advantages of not moving from the farm are many.
There are few physical or psychic costs, or risks and uncertainties involved.
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Table 3A2.2. The ratio of rural males who shifted to nonagricultural jobs
without moving, to those males who did move.
Year Household heads First sons Other male siblings
1965 9.0 3.3 0.8
1975 63.6 8.6 2.6
Furthermore, men who do not move are able to work on the farm from time to
time. The marginal value products of labor, which is safely assumed to be
close to contract workers' wages, are not the opportunity costs for nonmoving
males, these wages are of relatively little concern as long as the benefits
of changing jobs exceed costs. The extensive labor-saving mechanization of
agriculture during the period 1965-1975 also helped accelerate this process.
Less labor and more capital on the farm- pushes up contract workers' wages,
reducing the wage ratio variable as a consequence. Hence the results for this
period in Table 3A2.1.
Further studies on urbanization during this period should be carried out
with a more detailed data set, which includes the rate of spatial diffusion
of nonagricultural investment, the type and magnitude of technical progress
in agriculture, and the human capital stock of the rural people. For the
purpose of this paper of simulating a macro model, however, we conclude that
the use of both wage and investment variables in migration functions is appro-
priate for the pre-World War II period, and only the investment variable
should be used for post-World War II. The latter has been done for this model-
ing effort by assuming
shift = a x (new jobs created by new investments)
at mig, in turn, was calibrated by only dividing the total number of shifts by
the new investments multiplied by average labor-capital ratios, i.e.,
I. (L /KI il1
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APPENDIX 3 TO CHAPTER 3
MODIFICATIONS OF THE BASE MODEL
The following modifications to the base model have been made:
1. Incorporation of urban and rural housing markets.
2. Incorporation of a simple market for speculative land holding.
3. Incorporation of endogenous interest rates by using aloanable
fund equation.
4. Incorporation of endogenous treatment of agricultural labor
supply.
5. Incorporation of endogenous treatment of saving propensities.
It is rather difficult to ignore the urban housing market when studying
the pattern of urbanization and migration in a growing economy. The avail-
ability and costs of housing are factors that strongly influence potential
migrants' decisions. Investment in housing also affects the overall economic
growth by competing for funds with other directly productive investment de-
mands. Housing sectors, however, are sufficiently complicated that we need
some drastic simplication and abstraction in order to incorporate them in our
economy-wide model. We have, therefore, made the following assumptions:
1. Urban housing requires both structures and land whereas rural
housing requires only structures (in an economic sense); land
is not scarce in rural areas.
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2. Elasticity of substitution between structures and land in the
production of urban housing service is assumed to be 1.
3. Housing stocks are completely mallable.
4. Urban housing rent is the same everywhere, i.e., the rent
gradient has zero slope.
The production of housing services is specified as follows:
UH h'UH
UH 'UH csUH hiUH
RH = RH cs RH
where the subscripts UH and RH are urban and rural housing, respectively, and
hlUH is the urban housing land. Housing rents in the urban area are expressed
by the cost function of the Cobb-Douglas production* function:
1 UH UH $UH 1 ~UHP -s ( r rUH UH UH ( UH cs hl
where rcs and rhl are the imputed rents of residential structures and land,
respectively.
The use of a capital-land unitary elasticity assumption in urban housing
is, to say the least, debateable. A recent review by McDonald (1981) shows
that empirical estimates of the parameter in the United States ranges from
0.36 to 1.13, most of which is significantly less than 1. However, McDonald
also points out serious land value measurement errors that bias the estimates
towards zero. Knowing this we see no reason to elect to use a more complicated
*Some prefer to call this an aggregator rather than production (Arnott
1978), however, it actually is a function that reflects both technology and
tastes.
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production (aggregation) function than the Cobb-Douglas one. Further research
is seriously called for in this regard.
The accumulation of urban housing stocks is carried out by investing in
both land and structures in a similar manner as investing in "productive"
capital stocks, i.e., through expectations. First, the expected urban housing
demand for the next period (cdUH) is
cd = CUH + mig + fam + n cdUH UH tupop u UH
where
cdUH the observed total urban housing consumption this year
mig = the total migrants who actually moved to cities this year
fam = the family members who moved with mig
tupop = the present total urban population
n = the natural growth rate of the urban population
(UH =a parameter (> 1) that implies the changing taste of people for
more housing services per capita as time passes (improvement of
desired housing quality)
The expected land rent is:
hl max PT hl [rhl - rhl(-1)] + rhl)
where pT is the price of new urban residential land and i is the interest
rate used for discounting. The expected structural rent is
re = y [r - rC (-1)] + r
cs s cs cs cs
pT is derived by solving the equilibrium of the derived demand for new
residential land and its supply. This supply is assumed to be rather in-
elastic because of the developers' (and farmers") expectation that PT will
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rise so quickly that witholding the sale of land for a while may be more
profitable than its immediate sale. There is, in other words, room for specu-
D
lation. The derived demand for new residential land (ihl ) is, then, usingUH
Shephard's Lemma again
D P UH e e
Ahl = (cd - QHU e UH IJH
Brhl
where undefined notations are
P e = the expected cost of urban housingUH
e e
= (r e1r ePUH hl' cs
QU e= the expected supply of housing services in the absence of new
investment
[UH 1 UH
=UH [(1 - 5) csUH] hlUH
where 5 is the depreciation rate of housing structures.
The supply function of urban residential land is rather arbitrary. We
assume that the supply comes only from land held speculatively. Supply, there-
fore, depends on the rate of inflation of urban land /pT as follows
TAh + g'>
where pal is the price of agricultural land (= agricultural land rent/i),
namely, the faster urban land prices rise, the slower will be their sale.
Holding land for speculative purposes is determined completely by the specula-
tor's demand, and this is actually the demand for the conversion of agricultural
land into urban land. The developer/speculator will purchase land as long as
e
T T
Pal +i
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where
pT = the expected sales price of a unit of land to the urban
housing sector
pal = the purchase price of agricultural land
CT = the cost of keeping the land idle for one period (C T/3T > 0
when T is the total amount of land held in speculation)
i = the discount rate.
This simply says that a speculator would buy land if the purchase of a
parcel of land in one period and its sale in the next less the holding cost
exceeds what would be obtained by keeping the same amount of money as interest
bearing assests. C consists of taxes, interest and the cost of keeping theT C
land in a sellable condition all the time and it is upward sloping because of
the progressivity of tax for such land holdings. In addition, if bank loans
are needed for these purchases then the interest cost would goup: the more
one needs to borrow, the less priviledged financial markets one would have to
depend on.
Demand for the new urban residential structure (AcsUH) is written as
UH e ee
PUH (cd - Qe
e UH - UH
r
cs
Rural housing investment takes the following simple form:
D ( ( 1 _ mig + fam ( css
csRH = max jRH trpop + nR csRH H 6csRH)
where trpop is the total rural population; other notations are obvious.
Next, the interest rate used for discounting and capital user costs is
endogenous here. We assume not all private savings enter the financial mar-
ket as deposits or any other form of financial asset that can be mobilized
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for fixed capital formation. The rest of the private savings go straight to
finance own sector capital stocks (in the case of corporate retained earnings)
or housing (in the case of personal savings). We therefore assume a simple
loanable fund supply equation (a share of private savings) and demand function
for loans that includes traditional sector's physical investment demand and
portions of the housing investments and purchase of speculative land. An in-
terest rate equilibrates the demand and supply and is used for discounting.
This rate also, of course, influences the investment decisions for the next
period.
Among others Pigou (1943) and Metzler (1951) have stressed the importance
of assets and real balances in personal consumption behavior, i.e., if the
real value of one's assets or balances increases, then consumption propensi-
ties should increase even if income stays constant. In Japan too, there are
some empirical evidences to support this proposition (Shiba 1979). Although
the debates on Japanese high savings rates have been lively as mentioned in
Chapter 2, and there are a few scholars who would argue otherwise, we assume
here that saving propensities are influenced by macro growth rates (gy) and
asset holdings.
For wage earners, assets are usually limitel to owner-occupied housing
stocks and deposits in financial institutions. Other means of holding assets
were scarce due to the underdeveloped financial market. We also have to dis-
regard deposits as assets influencing savings behavior, due mostly to the
data problem and lack of past empirical research. Thus, the saving propensi-
ties (s.) for urban wage earners are
sj = s (gy, QUH) j = 1,2,3
and for rural residents
s5 = s5 (gy, RH)
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as. as. as
L > 0 J 5 < 0
3(gy) ' 3Q ' 3Q
~UH 9 RH
For convenience, only people in the income class 4 (capitalists) hold land for
speculative purposes and
s = s (gy, QU' pTT
where p is the GDP deflator and T is the amount of land held for speculation
purposes. 'gy' is included in the argument because of the adjustment lag of
consumption to the rapidly expanding income claimed by many scholars (Ohkawa
and Rosovsky 1973, Shinohara 1970, among others). Although, as Williamson and
de Bever (1978) point out, this argument is too ad hoc and convenient, the
strong econometric results make it difficult to exclude this variable in this
simple way of endogenizing saving propensities.
One final, and minor, change in this version of the model is to use a
labor supply function in agriculture. This supply was assumed fixed period by
period in the base version of the model. As more and more young siblings move
out of agriculture, however, the older parents or females who would not nor-
mally be working in agriculture full time were forced to work. Thus, it is
not so reasonable to assume predetermined labor force growth rates. We,
therefore, assume here
u8 = pul f ( a)88 p8
where subscript 8 denotes agriculture and
ul = unskilled labor
pul = potential labor
f ( y)= logistic function
P8
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This formulation does not change the results qualitatively, but quantitatively
some changes become less rapid, e.g., the improvement of the agricultural
terms of trade.
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APPENDIX 4 TO CHAPTER 3
HOW THE PROGRAM WORKS
A. SOLUTION ALGORITHM
The static version of the base models is solved in the following way.
(1) Guesstimate the domestic price vector (the initial value is
the solution of the last period).
(2) Compute the value-added price vector, the
vector, and the consumer's price vector.
(3) Compute the agricultural income given the
and factor endowments of the agricultural
purchaser's price
value added
sector.
(4) Solve the wage determination mechanism to get all the nominal
unskilled labor wages given the agricultural income and con-
sumer's price indices.
(5) Compute the unskilled labor demand in all sectors given the
wage vector and other fixed factors (Sector 4 needs iteration).
(6) Compute the supply vector given all factor demands and endow-
ments.
(7) Compute the income of all income classes given the supply and
price vectors.
(8) Compute the consumption demand.
price
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(9) Compute the export demand.
(10) Compute the investment demand (only in NC)
(11) Compute the intermediate input demand.
(12) Compute government accounts.
(13) Sum up all demands.
(14) If the total demand for each sector equals its supply, program
ends, if not a new guesstimate on price vectors must be made
and go back to (1).
The above steps (1) to (14) constitute the program to solve the static
solution. The convergence check at (14) is done by examining if the sum of
the squares of excess demand of each sector is close to zero, i.e., the
solution is obtained if
F(p) < E
where
n+m
F(p) = [D. (p) 2 (p)]
i=1 ' S)
and
n = the number of sector goods to be cleared
m = the number of factors to be cleared
D (p) = the demand for goods (factor) i
S (p) = the supply of goods (factor) i
S = 1.0 x 10-8 *
*After each 20 iterations, E is multiplied by 5 to get the solution
quickly.
-88-
Any updating of the guesstimates of the price vector (p) is done by
using the Marquardt (1963) method, which is a modified Gauss-Newton method.
Taking
f. = D. - S.
1 1 1
3f.
J Jacobian of f (J. . I)i3 3p.
32F
H = Hessian of F (H.. = F
ij p. 3p.
1 J
The new guess of p at (n+1)th iteration is made by
(n+1) 
_ (n) +
where
A = -2 {[H (n) + a(n) I-1 , (n)I f (n)
the number in parentheses showing the number of iteration. a (n) is the scal-
ing parameter devised by Marquardt,
The FI closure can get to the solution within 20 iterations and quite often
within 10 iterations. The NC and IX solutions, however, sometimes took more
than 20 iterations. The CPU time for each solution is about 30-40 seconds*
on Unix VAX 11/780.
B. PRINTING OUTPUT
When the solution is obtained, we proceed to:
(15) Given the solution price vector, compute all the relevant
endogenous values and print.
*Increasing the number of sectors (number of excess demand equations) in-
creases the time require quite rapidly. 12 sector models take about 60-70
seconds CPU time to solve.
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C. UPDATING THE INPUT
After the output has been printed out, we then proceed to update the
input files*
(16) Given the solution prices, wages, and total demand, compute
expected labor and capital costs and expected next period
demand.
(17) Compute the animal spirit parameters for each sector and for
each kind of capital and obtain the following year's desired
investment.
(18) Using exogenously given data and the solutions of this period,
update all the values that are exogenous to the solution
algorithm in (A) above, i.e., urban and rural populations,
sectoral capital stocks, urban and rural labor forces, taking
into account the period's investment and rural urban migration,
etc.
The following simplified flowchart describes this process.
*This is a combination of Stages I and II from Adelman and Robinson (1978).
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(1)
Initial guess
on prices
Compute:
value-added prices (pv)
purchasers' prices (pp)
consumers' prices (pc)
pv & capital stock,
labor force in
agriculture
Compute:
agricultural output
& income
agricultural income
& pv
Compute:
all wages of
urban unskilled workers
wages
4
Compute:
urban unskilled
labor demand
/labor, capital, etc.
(2)
(3)
(4)
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0
Compute:
supply given factors
supply and
value-added prices
(7)
(8)
(9), (10),
(11), (12)
Compute:
income to each
income class
Income
Compute:
total consumption
personal savings
tax
by income class
total consumption
expenditure
Compute:
sectoral consumption demand
of each income class
Compute:
all other demand
(export, intermediate,
investment)
All demand factors/
to
(6)
/
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(13) Sum up all
sectoral demands
Total sectoral
demand
(14) Demand Change
price vectorsupply False
V.
I
True
Call value
subroutines
Solution price
vector (p*)
(15) Calculate all
relevant values
IPrint all relevant
endogenous values
* , Q*
(16) Calculate expectation
of wages, prices
etc.
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Expectations
(17) Calculate animal
spirit and desired
investment for
next year
Desired investment
(18) Update all values
(population, capital
stocks, etc.)
Write input file
for
next period
47
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CHAPTER 4: BASE SOLUTIONS
In this chapter, the 10-year solutions of three different closures of
the model are described. The first section describes the FI solution in
detail because, for reasons stated later, this solution looks superior to
the results of the other two closures: the neoclassical (NC) and the hy-
brid of NC and FI, called IX. The comparison of the NC and IX solutions
with the FI appears in the second section of this Chapter.
4. 1. BASE REFERENCE SOLUTION OF THE MODEL
In this section, the 10-year solution of the FI closures is described
in detail. This solution will be the reference for the rest of this chapter.
The GDP in constant 1965 prices grew in Japan at the rate of 10.7 percent
per annum during the 10 years starting in 1960, whereas the model shows an
annual growth rate of 10.3 percent for real GDP*. Sectoral growth rates of
production are shown in Table 4.1. The growth rates are somewhat underesti-
mated in the modern manufacturing sectors and overestimated in the traditional
manufacturing and service sectors. Table 4.2 shows similar results for labor
employment. The large discrepancy between model results and actual figures in
sector 4 (mining), shows the incapability of this kind of model to replicate
the history of those sectors where policy variables played major roles. The
*Because we use 1960 as the base year and prices in the model are all
1 in that year, the "real GDP" referring to the model output should be
understood as the GDP in 1960 prices.
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Table 4. 1. Average annual growth rates (in percent).
Sector
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
Base
13.2
14.9
10.8
4.2
11.8
12.0
11.2
3.0
Solution
Table 4.2. Average annual growth rates of sectoral labor employment (in
percent), 1960-1969.
Base solution Actual total
Sector Unskilled Skilled employed
1 -0.8 5.3 3.1
2 3.4 6.0 5.2
3 4.4 3.0 4.1
4 1.8 n.a. -8.5
5 6.2 5.8 8.1
6 7.7 6.8 6.0
7 7.1 7.4 7.6
8 -2.2 n.a. -2.2
Actual
15.1
16.7
8.2
2.0
11.2
11.6
8.9
2.1
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Japanese government, seeing that there was not much future for Japan's
mining sector and a potential for cheap imported oil, was instrumental in
closing many coal mines which encouraged the labor force in that sector to
shift to other more productive sectors. The model, where policy aspects
are insufficiently endogenized, is unable to capture this and just shows
that mineral resources in Japan got less and less, raising the cost of ex-
ploiting new resources. This is why the model shows a 1.8 percent increase
in employment instead of an 8 percent decrease in the labor force. We
disregard this for the moment, however, because the mining sector is a
very small sector in terms of both employment and output (1.3 and 1.7 per-
cent of the total in 1960, respectively).
Table 4.3 compares the growth rates of trade variables in the model
with the actual figures. Exports are fairly well replicated. The tendency
of the model to overshoot somewhat the actual value in sector 3 is counter-
acted by the opposite tendency of sector 1. Overall the amount of exports
is almost exactly the same as the actual value. Similar things can be said
with regard to imports, below actual values for manufacturing, but above
for raw materials (sectors 4 and 8).
It is suspected that some of the discrepancies between model outputs
and actual values can be attributed to the use of constant intermediate
input-output coefficients for 10 years, unless the parameter values chosen
or functional specifications are completely unrealistic.
Next we turn to the year-to-year values of some model outputs. Figure
4.1 shows the annual growth rates of real GDP, and unskilled labor share of
GDP. Figure 4.2 shows the historical values for real GDP growth rates and
changes in the labor share.
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Figure 4.2. Historical values of real GDP growth rates and
changes in labor share.
Source: Annual Report on National Income Statistics.
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Table 4.3. Comparison of growth rates of
actual figures (in percent).
Model
Exports of sector
Imports of sector
2
3
1
2
3
4
8
18.8
23.7
11.7
13. 1
10. 1
11.9
17.8
12.3
model trade variables with the
Actual
20. 1
23.2
8.5
14.1
15.5
16.5
15.7
11.8
In general, the unskilled labor share has a declining trend (-0.59
percent per annum), and moves in opposite directions to the real GDP growth
rates, i.e., the faster the economy grows, the less share the unskilled
labor receives. The major reason for this happening in the model is the
less-than-unity elasticities of substitutions between the unskilled labor
and the composite capital that we have elected to use.
When the economy grows faster, it does so in FI closure by employing
more unskilled labor whose supply is perfectly elastic. The faster growth
means, therefore, capital shallowing in the short run. With limited elas-
ticity of substitution, the labor share has to decrease. As we discuss in
Chapter 5, higher elasticities of factor substitution will have a completely
different distributional outcome than this one. According to Minami and Ono
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(1981), however, the labor share moved counter-cylically as in Figure 4.2.
which conforms to the present model outputs. One could naturally argue that
this phenomenon of the opposite movement of GDP and labor share growth in
reality has been caused by completely different factors, e.g., lags in wage
adjustment to growth. Such institutional explanations, however, are too 'd
hoc and with the existence of "bonus"* payments which enable the employers
to be responsive to market conditions, it is difficult to believe that wage
lags have been so consistently conspicuous. In any case, at least from this
distributional aspect, it is difficult to refute the model as irrelevant.
The first years of the simulation, however, exhibit a high GDP growth and
higher labor share growth. This is because the base year chosen, 1960, was
a year with high growth rates. For this year we took the historical values
of fixed capital formation that are higher than most other years relative
to the stocks of capital. As a result, the second simulated year exhibits
strong capital deepening, and an improved functional distribution in the
second and (moderately) the third years. Essentially this is what happens
throughout the simulation with versions of macro closure where physical
capital stocks grow relatively fast whereas the labor force growth is rather
limited.
Shares of skilled labor force increase consistently throughout the ten
years because the total composite capital share increases and because the
quantity of skilled labor stock increases less rapidly than the rest of the
capital stocks with similar factor-augmenting rates of technical progress.
*It is a well spread institution in Japan that employers pay a "bonus"
twice a year according to the employee's productivity and profit rates of
the company. This can be quite a substantial part of wage income, worth
five to 20 months contract income. Mizoguchi et al. (1980) state that this
is the major cause of the inequality in size distribution of income in
post-war Japan.
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As a result, capital owners' share decreases at the average annual rate of
1.0 percent.
In the actual history, the labor share, although moving counter to the
growth rates, had a slight increasing trend (Minami and Ono) during the
1960s after a sharply declining trend in the 1950s. Although this seems to
contradict with the declining labor share in Figure 4.1, it should be
noticed that the figure is only for unskilled labor. If we take both skil-
led and unskilled labor shares, the sumdoes produce a slight increasing
trend of the labor share. The question, then, is whether these disaggre-
gated labor shares behaved as the model output show in the actual history,
i.e., a decreasing unskilled share and an increasing skilled share. There
is no readily available data set or study in this regard. Studies on wages
definitely show that the skill-unskilled wage gaps narrowed during the 1960s
(e.g., Minami 1973, Chapter 8), but such results do not say anything about
shares. A very crude check on this aspect, however, seems to say that the
disaggregated labor shares did indeed move as they do in our model. See
Table 4.4-it shows the percentage changes in labor force sizes and average
nominal wages by occupation between 1960 and 1970. Regrettably, the occu-
pational wage data are available only for production process workers, and
the average of managerial, administrative, and clerical workers.
If we assume that only managers and administrative workers are skilled
workers, and that average nominal wage increase for them was in fact 180
percent, than their total wage bill increased 494 percent in 10 years. The
nominal national income increased 346 percent during the same decade. The
skilled workers definitely increased their share in the national income.
Even if we assume that clerical workers are also skilled, which is not quite
a realistic assumption but more consistent with the data here, thewage bill
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Table 4.4. Percentage changes of labor force, wages, and wage bill by occu-
pation.
Share in AL AW AWL
urban labor L W WL
force in 1970
Managers and admin-
istrative workers 5 % 112 72494 1
72 180381
Clerical workers 17 % 63 n.a.
Sales workers 15 % 32 n.a. n.a.
Production process
workers and 39 % 32 222 326
laborers
Source: Japan Statistical Yearbooks.
for the skilled increases by 381 percent, a still higher value than the
national income growth rate. The wage bill for production process workers
increased, however, by only 326 percent, less than the growth of the nomi-
nal national income. As long as we can assume these production process
workers represent the unskilled workers in general, we can say that the un-
skilled labor share had a decreasing trend in the 1960s despite the narrow-
ing of wage gaps. This is a very rough method -of examination, but it cer-
tainly has a clear message within its limitation.
The average rates of annual increases in nominal wages are shown in
Table 4.5. The relative wage rates (sector I unskilled wage 1.0) for 1960,
1964 and 1969 are also in the same table. From these we can see that all
unskilled wages except for the mining sector become closer toward 1. Japan
definitely experienced a narrowing of the gaps between the different sector
wages during this period (see Minami 1973, Mizoguchi et al. 1980, Minami and
Ono 1981, and Ono 1973). Due to the peculiar aspect of the mining sector
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Table 4.5. Average annual growth rate of nominal wage increase and the
relative ratios.
Base solution Relative wages for unskilled
Sector Unskilled Skilled 1960 1964 1969
1 5.1 6.7 1.00 1.00 1.00
2 6.8 11.7 0.91 0.98 1.00
3 9.9 18.1 0.54 0.65 0.77
4 7.4 n.a. 1.02 1.11 1.20
5 9.2 15.5 0.67 0.78 0.89
6 4.9 6.9 1.11 1.11 1.09
7 10.3 10.0 0.48 0.19 0.70
8 16.9 n.a. 0.17 0.24 0.42
as stated above, we disregard this sector and discuss the overall trend of
the other sectors.
The relative growth rates of nomiral wages of unskilled labor conform
to the actual values. The growth rates of skilled labor wages for sectors
3 and 5, however, grow much faster. This is because proprietors (self-
employed) and skilled labor are assumed to be perfect substitutes for each
other in production functions. The existence of large pools of self-
employed proprietors in these sectors pushes down the skill investment,
thereby increasing the wages for skilled labor to such high levels.
The wage dualism decreases in this run naturally because urban wage
gaps narrow. Not only the urban gaps, but also the urban-rural gap de-
creases. The urban wage dualism is measured by the ratio of the weighted
average of modern sectors (sectors 1, 2, and 6) wages (W M) to the weighted
average of traditional sectors (sectors 3 and 7) wages (W T). Weights are
employment shares. This measure decreases from 2.02 to 1.47. The measure
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between the rural and urban traditional sector wage defined by (WT /WA) also
decreases from 3.00 to 1.72*. These are consistent with actual history.
We now take a look at a measure for welfare. We literally take the
belief that consumption functions usually have underlying (direct or in-
direct) utility functions. The linear expenditure system (LES) that has
been employed has the following utility functions
n B.
U = r (cd. - gcd.)
i=l
where
U = utility level
cd. = consumption of sector i goods
gcd = subsistence consumption of sector i goods
= marginal propensity to consume sector i goods
We assume that the actual utility level is a montonic transformation
of this value. The growth rates of the value U for each income class appears
in Table 4.6. This value is often used to measure some type of satisfaction
level of the people concerned, however, whether or not we should really be-
lieve such values reflect monotonic transformations of the utility level is
up to the reader. We decided to use this measure mainly because there is no
other index that is definitely superior in measuring the welfare level in
such economy-wide models.
*Note that this measure has agricultural wage as the denominator. If
we use the average income of agricultural workers, the same value moves from
1.125 to 0.645, i.e., agricultural average income is higher than the wage
level of traditional workers.
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Table 4.6. Average annual growth rates of per capital utility levels (in
percent).
Sector Growth rates
1 11.2
2 31.1
3 16.1
4 13.9
5 22.7
Of course, however, these utilities are in some sense absolute, because
they are based on the consumption of persons concerned and levels of con-
sumption of others do not have any influence on these utilities. But in
the development literature, relative equality of income distribution has
been discussed intensively, with a belief that less extreme distribution
of income is somehow better from the socio-political and perhaps even the
economic efficiency point of view. We therefore examine here how size dis-
tribution of income changed over time. Regrettably again, there is no sin-
gle index of distribution that is better than others in all aspects. We
therefore examine four measures of distribution of income of total popula-
tion and that of urban residents. The four measures are Atkinson's measure*
withc= 1, called A(Q), Atkinson's measure with c=2, A(2), Theil's mea-
sure**, T, and Gini coefficient, G. A(2) and G tend to catch the changes
1-6 1-E:
n
A(E) = 1[ - x.
Smaller s(>O) tends to emphasize higher income brackets, and higher E tends
to emphasize the poorer people -- where y.=income share of group i, x.=
population share of group i, y=average income. Within group inequality is
disregarded.
n /y
T = y. log -- | (notations are same as in the above footnote).i=1 s Ei
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in distribution of income of those at modal points or lower, whereas the
other two tend to be sensitive to the changes in the upper tail of income
distribution. Table 4.7 shows these indices. The close fit with the real
GDP growth rates are striking in all indices. When the real GDP grows fast,
the inequality measures increase.
There is little change in overtime patterns of distribution between
urban and total populations. But in between two sets of measures with
different emphases there is a clear distinction, i.e., in between A(2)
and G on one hand, and A(!) and T on the other. The first set, which
emphasizes the modal and lower distribution, is quite stable or declining
after the initial rapid decrease. The second set, however, shows a dis-
tinctive increasing of inequality. This set is sensitive to changes in
distribution of higher income brackets. This means that there was an
overtime improvement of income distribution at lower income brackets, but
that it deteriorated at higher income brackets. Indeed Lorenz curves would
show these trends exactly (Figure 4.3).
Mizoguchi et al. (1980) compute different sets of inequality measures
for post World War II Japan*. Their Gini coefficients of employee house-
holds show an overall trend of decline in the 60s, after an increasing trend
in the 50s. A year-to-year observation shows (Figure 4.4) in the 60s, the
Gini coefficient and the real GDP growth rates moved together fairly well
as our model output does, until around 1967. In the 50s it is more ambiguous,
but if we take the three-year moving averages of both Gini coefficients and
*We should realize that Mizoguchi et al. (1980) is the result of de-
tailed data studies from different surveys of expenditure, savings, and
employment. To compare their results with outputs of general equilibrium
models might be doing them an injustice. Care should be taken to delimit
the comparison only to the general trends.
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Table 4.7. Distribution indices of base runs (FI).
Total population Urban only
A T G A T G
Year c= S=2 = = 2
1 0.207 0.358 0.601 0.408 C.239 0.426 0.660 0.464
2 0.184 0.326 0.525 0.376 0.217 0.397 0.592 0.439
3 0.180 0.319 0.514 0.371 0.213 0.389 0.579 0.432
4 0,182 0.318 0.526 0.369 0.216 0.388 0.595 0.429
5 0.192 0.327 0.564 0.376 0.227 0.396 0.638 0.4344
6 0.198 0.330 0.587 0.377 0.233 0.398 0.664 0.4335
7 0.200 0.330 0.599 0.373 0.237 0.399 0.682 0.431
8 0.198 0.325 0.595 0.368 0.233 0.391 0.675 0.420
9 0.205 0.331 0.626 0.372 0.240 0.394 0.707 0.418
10 0.214 0.336 0.669 0.374 0.250 0.397 0.753 0.416
A = Atkinson's measure
T = Theil's measure
G = Gini coefficient
Figure 4.3. Lorenz curves of FI run (year I and year 10).
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growth rates, we can observe that two sets of indices moved really together,
again, until around 1967. Another interesting thing to note in Mizoguchi
et al is that all the indices behave similarly until around 1967. After
that time, indices that include all data shows stable or increasing inequali-
ty trends, whereas indices that look at only employee households have decreas-
ing trends. The log-variance of the total households increases most in the
second half of the 60s. Considering that the log-variance is another mea-
sure of inequality that tends to be sensitive to the upper tail of the dis-
tribution, all of these tend to show that in actual history the general in-
equality level of size distribution of income around the modes decreased,
but that the distribution of income at the upper end may have turned more
unequal*. This is another trend that our model picks up. Whereas the danger
of naive comparisons of outputs between two studies whose methods are vastly
different is fully acknowledged; it is also interesting to note that these
two different methods produce (crudely) similar results.
Agricultural terms of trade defined by the ratio of agricultural goods'
price to the weighted average of urban prices improve monotonously and signi-
ficantly. This is exactly what happened.(Figure 4.5) in history during this
time period. The price level defined bythe GDP deflator in the model increases
about 50% in the ten years. This is again almost exactly what happened in
history (50.7%).
*If we look at the share of net profits or corporate retained earnings
in the national income, these decrease in the early 1960s but increase very
rapidly in the second half of the 1960s. This also corroborates Mizoguchi
et al.'s findings of the behavior of the long-variance.
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Figure 4.4. Historical values of Gini coefficients. Source: Mizoguchi
et al. (1980).
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Figure 4.5. Historical values of agricultural terms of trade.
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The overall performance of the model in replicating Japanese history is
not striking. The general trends are captured, but not very precisely. A
better replication of the history is, however, possible by jiggling the
technical progress parameters, the investment function parameters, and the
elasticities of factor substitution. It will be a time consuming and mono-
tonous process. The solution stated above has been chosen as the reference
because "qualitative" results.that come out of the model seem to be very
consistent and changing a few percentage points in the growth rates of any
variable does not seem to change the qualitative results at all.
4.2. BASE SOLUTION COMPARED WITH OTHER MACRO CLOSURE SOLUTIONS
In this section, two ten-year solutions using different closure rules
are compared with the base reference solution (FI). One closure (IX) uses
the same investment specification as F1, but it assumes that urban labor
supply is limited; hence, it is assumed that the urban wage level is endo-
genous. Another closure (NC) assumes, further, that the investment is de-
termined by the savings available in the economy. Comparisons with complete-
ly the same specifications, however, have been impossible because of the
spirally accelerating nature of the NC closure. NC has endogenous invest-
ment that is constrained by the amount of total savings. The total savings
are the sum of private savings, government savings and foreign savings.
Higher investments tend to lower the domestic prices in the next period and
this decreases foreign savings by increasing exports and decreasing imports
in the next period, which pushes down investment. This occurs because change
in trade deficit is fully transmitted into the change in foreign savings,
whereas change in domestic income caused by change in trade deficit is not:
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a part of export income is consumed. Lower investment decrease the price
further taking more foreign savings away from the economy. Of course, the
appearance of this outcome and how long it lasts depend partly on the values
of trade elasticities. In Japan (and in this model), the pressure for ex-
ports has been quite strong, and consequently a rapid spiral decline results
from the simulation. By the sixth year of the simulation the real GDP growth
rate becomes negative: a truely unrealistic outcome. Changing the trade
elasticities enables us to evade this problem, but it is not the real solution.
The real problem here is the lack of monetary aspects in the model.
We have endogenized trade deficits, but their monetary repercussions are
left out. Continued trade surplus would actually increase ceteris paribus
the money base of the economy by accumulating foreign reserves. This could
give different price and interest rate profiles.
In anticipation of the future inclusion of monetary aspects, therefore,
we have decided to "rescue" the NC closure from the problem of extremely
large negative foreign savings by using a new numeraire; the general price
level. The general price level can (and in the future should) be related to
the price of money that comes from the interaction of money supply and money
demand. As a start, however, instead of fixing the urban unskilled wage
level as a numeraire, we have kept this price level exogenous, i.e.,
n
G . p. = C
i=1
where Q. is the base year GDP shares of sector i=1,...n, and C is an exo-
genous variable kept constant or varied by historical values of the general
price level. In addition,
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w.w. W
11
where w. is the solution of the wage determination mechanism and W is the
1
endogenous wage level.
At first sight it appears strange that changing the numeraire alters
the solution of a "general equilibrium" model. It should be noted, however,
that the' model is not homogenous of degree zero with respect to commodity
prices and factor returns because of the uncleared foreign exchange market
with the Armington specification. Here we need to keep a fixed exchange
rate because the market is not cleared, otherwise the model would be inde-
terminant*. With a fixed exchange rate, multiplying all other prices by
the same factor changes the real part because of the volume of export and
imports have to change. Care should be taken therefore in interpreting
the results of this section: NC has a different numeraire than either FI
or IX. The overall price level of NC is controlled, where as for the other
closures it is not. With this much warning we will now proceed.
The average annual real GDP growth rates are for FI (the base reference
solution) 10.3 percent, for NC 9.6 percent, and.for IX 9.8 percent. The re-
lative values in the last (tenth) year of the simulation for NC and IX appear
in Table 4.8. For example, the first column of Table 4.8 shows the tenth
year values of the sectoral outputs of NC and IX divided by the same value
for FI. Because the first year solutions are almost identical in all three
closures, the table shows how things can differ in different closures over
*
Letting the exchange rate market clear, the model becomes completely homo-
genous.
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Table 4.8. Macro closures compared.
Employment of
Output Unskilled Skilled Equipment & machinery*
0.917
0.958
0.984
0.986
0.996
0.988
1 NC
Ix
2 NC
Ix
3 NC
Ix
4 NC
Ix
5 NC
Ix
6 NC
Ix
7 NC
Ix
8 NC
Ix
1.076
0.856
0.849
0.876
0.905
0.857
1.831
0.727
0.405
0.910
1.032
0.824
0.778
0.823
1.017
1.011
Export
0.480
1.021
0.495
0.966
0.794
0.959
0.815
0.951
0.877
0.968
0.901
0.974
0.944
0.982
0.913
0.927
0.898
0.980
0.935
0.985
0.951
0.984
0.800
0.810
Consumption
0.821
0.929
0.857
0.910
0.851
0.945
0.874
0.964
0.931
0.970
0.959
0.924
0.942
0.989
*This moves very similarly to "constructed buildings and structures".
0.974
0.919
0.889
0.918
0.942
0.927
1.253
0.870
0.658
0.951
0.968
0.942
0.864
0.899
0.912
0.922
1.017
0.988
1.025
0.986
1.020
0.995
Import
1.148
0.978
1.718
0.905
1.557
0.871
1 NC
Ix
2 NC
Ix
3 NC
Ix
4 NC
Ix
5 NC
Ix
6 NC
Ix
7 NC
Ix
8 NC
Ix
1.021
0.975
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time. We note first that the outputs of the capital goods producing sec-
tors (sectors 2 and 5) grow quite slowly in the NC version, reflecting the
reduced investment. The construction sector gets hit hard because this
sector good is neither consumed nor traded. The reduction of investment
is directly translated as a reduction in the demand for this sector's goods.
Sector 2, on the other hand, suffers less than the construction sector.
The commodity produced in sector 2 is not only an investment goods, but
also a tradeable consumption good. The decline in investment demand is
counteracted by relative increases in consumption and export, and the out-
come is only an 11 percent decrease in the output of sector 2 as compared
to that of FI where the decline in the construction output is 34 percent.
The outputs of NC in the other urban sectors are mostly higher than
those of IX. This mostly occurs because of the higher exports and reduced
imports in NC. (Recall that even service sectors have indirect demand for
exports for transportation, storage, and insurance, etc.) Unskilled labor
is allocated accordingly and in sectors 2 and 5 the amount of unskilled
labor employed are higher in the IX solution than in the NC. The employ-
ment of unskilled labor in the construction sector of NC is again the lowest
of all; less than one-half of the same amount in the base (FI) solution.
The unskilled labor employment in the other urban sectors of the NC solu-
tion are all higher than those in the IX, reflecting the higher export de-
mand, the higher import substitution, and for some inelastic intermediate
input demand (e.g., the mining sector) of the NC solution. The unskilled
labor forces in sectors 1, 4, and 6 in the NC solution are even higher than
those of the FI. For sectors 1 and 6 this is partly because of the assumed
wage determination mechanism and several of the demand factors cited above.
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The modern sector wages are relatively high and less sensitive to
the income level in the rural areas. In the NC solution the nominal agri-
cultural income goes up about as fast as the FI base run. From the wage
determination mechanism, the wage gap narrowing occurs in terms of w, but
the insufficient urban demand in general forces the wage level to go down
for all sectors proportionately. The nominal modern sector wages, there-
fore, decrease most relative to the base solution. Hence the results ob-
tained here for sectors 1 and 6.
The unskilled employment of the mining sector (sector 4) goes up even
more in terms of percentage relative to the FI solution. This partially
reflects the smallness in size of its original employment,but the major rea-
son this happens is that with high export and import elasticities and a high
elasticity of substitution assumed between capital and labor, this sector
works as an adjusting sector reflecting the tightness of the unskilled labor
market. When this market is tight, this sector releases the unskilled labor
by importing more goods, and when the market is loose, this sector absorbs
more labor by exporting more and importing less.
Physical capital stocks, equipment and machinery, and buildings and
structures increase at higher rates in IX than in NC. This is the natural
result of the fact that physical capital stock accumulation is completely
up to the animal spirits of the investors in the IX solution, whereas accu-
mulation in NC is rather stalled by the decline in the foreign savings. The
capital stocks in IX are lower than in FI (the base reference solution)
because of the lower expectations of demand growth. This happens despite
the fact that higher wages in IX makes the desired capital-output ratios
(which we conveniently call the animal spirit parameters) relatively high.
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Skilled labor seems to have a somewhat erratic outcome. It is assumed
that the equipment and machinery, and skilled labor are close compliments.
The levels of skilled labor employment in sectors 3, 5, 6, and 7 in the NC
solution are higher than those in IX despite the fact that the quantity of
capital stocks are more in all sectors in IX than in NC. This, however,
is not at all erratic. Skill investment increases as capital stock decreases
from a certain skill capital ratio*. That is, at a relatively high value
of S/K, the marginal return of skill is higher for smaller capital stocks.
The skill capital ratio is by assumption very high in sector 6. The other
sectors (3, 5, and 7) do not have such a higher ratio. The reason that
these sectors behave similarly to the sector 6 is that these sectors have
a substantial amount of self-employed proprietors. As stated earlier, these
proprietors are assumed to be perfect substitutes of skilled labor in the
production functions. Thence, the result of NC; the lower physical accumu-
lation increases the investment in skill.
Taking again a two factor case
1/p-
Q (SP + KP) , then
2(rK) = A (1 - 2p) K + p
3S3K Sp + KP '
where A has a positive value, p = 1-1/E and r=3Q/3K. If 0 < e < 1, then
3 2(rK) < 0
BSas
S > 1
I < l-
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The fact that different closures produce different factor intensities
has a profound impact on functional distributions of income. The average
annual changes in the shares of unskilled urban labor are as follows
FI -0.595%
NC -0.534%
IX +0.013%
Figure 4.6 shows the year-by-year real GDP growth rates and changes in labor
for NC and IX closures. These outcomes are expected from the less-than-
unitary elasticities of substitution. The limited labor force growth and
high investment in IX produces the overall capital deepening, whereas in
FI (Figure 4.1) the higher growth rates of labor force results in the capi-
tal shallowing in urban sectors. NC, ironically, also has a negative change
in the labor share as the FI solution, but this time it is a capital shal-
lowing from insufficient capital accumulation.
These aspects of functional distribution already tell us something
about the welfare of different income classes. To be sure we now look at
Table 4.9. This table shows the growth rates of measures of utility per
capita of five income classes in the three closures. It is noticed that
in IX the capitalists and skill-owners lose relative to FI, whereas un-
skilled labor and rural workers have fairly stable rates of increase in
utility per capita between the two closures.
In NC, almost everybody is worse-off than in FI or IX reflecting the
slower growth of NC. The income class 5 is better-off than in IX because
of relatively higher agricultural terms of trade in NC. These terms of trade
are measured by agricultural producers' price divided by the weighted average
of urban prices. As mentioned earlier, they improved montonously in the
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Table 4.9. Average annual growth rates of utility per capita (in percent).
Income class FI NC IX
1 11.16 5.50 10.15
2 31.08 23.63 29.98
3 16.14 6.46 12.57
4 13.95 9.09 10.15
5 22.67 26.37 22.47
actual history during the 1960s, Only FI, however, captures this. NC and
IX have deteriorating agricultural terms of trade after the initial rapid
improvement, The cause of this is the fact that IX and NC have a limited
supply of unskilled urban labor. As soon as this labor becomes a strong con-
straint to growth, the urban wage level is bid up increasing urban prices
relative to the agricultural prices.
IX naturally has a higher level of urban wages because of the high
investment demand, this deteriorates the agricultural terms of trade more
than in NC, and the utility per capita growth rate of rural residents is
the lowest in IX. For the same reason, the unskilled labor gains most in
IX whereas capitalists gains in FI.
The distribution of income also behaves without a good fit to the his-
torical facts in NC and IX. Tables 4.10 and 4.11 show the same inequality
measures of size distribution of income for NC and IX as were used for FI
in the previous section. The distribution of income of total population in
IX is strongly influenced by the changes in terms of trade. Urban indices,
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Table 4.10. Distribution indices of base NC run.
Total population Urban population
A(!) A(2) T G A(i) A(2) T G
1 0.207 0.358 0.600 0.408 0.239 0.426 0.659 0.464
2 0.181 0.314 0.523 0.361 0.226 0.403 0.623 0.443
3 0.174 0.306 0.499 0.356 0.209 0.378 0.572 0.416
4 0.175 0.308 0.503 0.359 0.208 0.376 0.573 0.417
5 0.176 0.309 0.505 0.361 0.206 0.370 0.567 0.410
6 0.175 0.308 0.500 0.363 0.200 0.360 0.550 0.400
7 0.178 0.311 0.513 0.363 0.204 0.364 0.567 0.400
8 0.178 0.311 0.516 0.363 0.203 0.359 0.565 0.394
9 0.182 0.317 0.527 0.368 0.202 0.356 0.568 0.389
10 0.183 0.313 0.534 0.360 0.208 0.360 0.586 0.388
Table 4.11. Distribution Indices of base IX run.
Total Population Urban Population
A(!) A(2) T G A(G) A(2) T G
1 0.207 0.357 0.600 0.408 0.239 0.426 0.659 0.464
2 0.174 0.303 0.501 0.353 0.224 0.400 0.620 0.441
3 0.172 0.300 0.496 0.347 0.218 0.390 0.601 0.430
4 0.176 0.306 0.506 0.352 0.213 0.382 0.588 0.423
5 0.184 0.321 0.531 0.374 0.213 0.380 0.589 0.421
6 0.189 0.332 0.544 0.387 0.210 0.375 0.583 0.415
7 0.190 0.334 0.548 0.388 0.209 0.372 0.582 0.410
8 0.186 0.327 0.537 0.381 0.204 0.361 0.569 0.398
9 0.187 0.333 0.540 0.386 0.199 0.352 0.557 0.386
10 0.183 0.326 0.527 0.376 0.193 0.339 0.542 0.369
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however, show that the real GDP growth rates and the inequality measures
move counter to each other: the higher the growth, themore equal the dis-
tribution becomes, As explained in the previous section it is unlikely
that such was the case in actual history, except for, possibly, the time
period after 1968,
Finally, Table 4.12 shows the shares of the components of savings for
the first year (same for all closures) and the tenth year of simulations.
The most notable is the drastic decrease in foreign savings in the NC
closure, clearly showing the cause of the problem with this closure. The
negative foreign savings amounts to 26 percent of domestic savings. Be-
tween FI and IX, the results conform to the previous ones. In FI, the
savings by capitalists keep the relatively high share whereas the unskilled
workers' shares are relatively smaller. Completely the opposite occurs in
IX.
Comparison of above results for different closures shows that the FI
closure seems to be the clear winner for use in the study of Japanese
economic history during the 1960s. Not only does it replicate growth
rates of the real variables best*, it also behave's qualitatively similar
to the history with respect to the relationship of growth and distribution,
wage dualism, and agricultural terms of trade. IX and NC have deteriorating
terms of trade while the opposite was true in the history. Their labor
share and size distribution measures behave differently from the history
*
As long as replicating the history of real variables alone is concerned,
IX and NC may also be able to perform fairly well if we repeat enough
exercises of changing various parameter values.
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Table 4.12. Shares of savings by components.
Type First Year* Tenth year Closures
Private savings
Class 1
Class 2
Class 3
Class 4
Class 5
Total private
Foreign savings
Government
savings
TOTAL
0.0875 (0.101) 0.0660
0.0985
0.0750
0.0789 (0.091) 0.1260
0.1446
0.1244
0.0145 (0.017) 0.0173
0.0221
0.0168
0.6103 (0.702) 0.6345
0.7516
0.5740
0.0781 (0.090)
0.8692 (1.000)
-0.0319
0.1627
1.0000
0.0797
0.0970
0.0663
0.9235
1.1138
0.8565
-0.1866
-0.3530
-0.0650
0.2631
0.2393
0.2086
1.0000
*
Same for the three closures.
(0.071)
(0.088)
(0.088)
(0.136)
(0.13)
(0.145)
(0.019)
(0.020)
(0.020)
(0.687)
(0.675)
(0.670)
(0.086)
(0.087)
(0.077)
(1.000)
(1.000)
(1.000)
FI
NC
Ix
FI
NC
IX
FI
NC
Ix
FI
NC
IX
FI
NC
Ix
FI
NC
IX
FI
NC
Ix
FI
NC
IX
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at least until around 1967. The casual observation, however, that in the
history starting from 1968, the inequality measure and the real GDP growth
rates started to move counter to each other more or less consistently, may
be telling us that FI closure ceases to work from around that time. In
other words, it can be conjectured that the unskilled labor may have become
a real constraint around 1967-68, and therefore a macro closure of NC* or
IX may perform better in the 1970s.
The same is true with respect to the wage dualism. In IX, the measure
for within-urban dualism oscillates and the measure for urban-rural dualism
'increases' over time. In NC, the within-urban dualism shows decreasing
trend as in FI (and in history), but the urban-rural dualism oscillates
and is stable overall as a trend during the ten years.
Finally, the FI closure also replicate the overall inflation rate:
4.89% per annum, whereas the historical rate was 4.61%. The IX closure
actually has a closer rate (4.86%) to the historical value. However,
it does not mean much because as one can see from the behavior of the terms
of trade, the relative prices in IX closure is quite apart from the his-
torical behaviors.
*
Given a disastrous growth performance of NC closure, NC may still be
difficult for use in studying the 1970s, even if the above conjecture
is correct.
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CHAPTER 5: COMPARATIVE DYNAMICS OF DIFFERENT MACRO CLOSURES
The previous chapter described the base reference solution and the dif-
ferences in solutions using different closure rules. These different model
closures also make the model react to various impacts in quite diverse ways,
and these are described in this chapter. The following experiments have been
made:
1. A devaluation of the yen by 10 percent (HEX).
2. A higher export demand for the modern manufacturing sector's
goods (HWT).
3. Higher elasticities of substitution between unskilled labor and
composite capital. (HSIG).
4. Higher rates of population increase without proportionate labor
force growth (HPOPH).
5. Higher rates of population increase with proportionate labor
force growth. (HPOP)
6. A higher propensity to migrate from rural to urban areas (HMIG).
7. A higher tariff rate (HTF).
Each solution is compared with the solution of the same closure described
in the previous chapter, and summary figures and tables are given for each
solution.
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5.1. DEVALUATION
5.1.1. FI Framework
A 10 percent devaluation of the yen in FI increases the real GDP by 0.92
percent in a static setting. The main cause of this is naturally an increase
in exports and a decrease in imports. The response in trade values, as can
be imagined from the small increase in real GDP, is limited. The total export
goes up only 1.94 percent in the first year, despite the high elasticities of
export assumed in some sectors of the model. This is because the'higher pres-
sure for exports is translated into higher domestic prices. Domestic urban
prices increase about 9 percent cancelling most of the effect of devaluation.
Agricultural price increases as much as 12 percent so that the exports of this
sector actually decline.
Unskilled labor share decreases because more unskilled labor is employed
to meet the higher demand. Consequently, the utility per capita for income
classes I and 2 decreases by 2.9 and 8.3 percent respectively, while all other
income classes gain in utility per capita. The real income per worker* in
each income class shows a slightly different profile. It decreases in all
labor income classes (income classes 1, 2, and 3). This decline is largest
in income class 1 (-4,33 percent) followed by income class 2 (-3.86 percent).
The skilled labor (income class 3) loses marginally (-0.36 percent).
These are, however, static effects. If we look at the dynamic effects,
the outcome is- quite different. First of all, in the second year of the simu-
lation the total exports actually decreases relative to the base run, despite
devaluation. This comes from the higher investment demand in this year. The
*The discrepancy in real income per worker and utility per capita comes
from the assumption that dependents are distributed in accordance with the
numer of workers in each income class. This amounts to the assumption that
additional unskilled workers come from all income classes with equal probabil-
ity. This- may not be accurate, but the assumption that additional workers of
a kind only come from the people of the same income class is equally, if not
more, unrealistic.
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higher export demand in the first year pushes up the demand expectation for
the following year, and as a result investment demands go up in most sectors.
Inflationary pressure is thus exerted and the total export in the second year
decreases (-0,24 percent) relative to the base run.
The third year again shows an increase in exports. This, of course, is
partly the result of higher supply capacity due to the increased capital
stock because of the high investment in the second year. This higher supply
pushes down prices and increases exports. The amount of exports peaks around
the fourth year and then gradually declines to the level of the base run by
the tenth year. This last decline is the result of wage expectation rising
less rapidly than the expected user cost of capital. Nominal agricultural
income is around 13-14 percent higher in this run than in the base run, which
increases the nominal urban wage rates by about 6-7 percent. The expectation
of capital user cost, however, goes up around 10 percent relative to the base
run because it is closely related to pk (the price of capital that is a
weighted average of urban prices) and pk goes up around 10 percent due to the
demand pressure caused by devaluation. This low wage-rental ratio depresses
investment and decreases the supply capacity. Exports decrease relative to
the base run during the second half of the simulation, because prices go up
while demand factors stay more or less the same.
Figure 5.1 and Table 5.1 summarize these results, Real GDP relative to
the base run oscillates around the level that is 1.3 percent higher than the
base run. The peak years are the second (1961) and the seventh-eighth year
(1966-1967). The unskilled labor share shows completely the opposite move-
ment, troughing in 1961 and 1966. If we examine the sectoral breakdown, we
notice that the movement of real GDP is governed mostly by the physical capi-
tal investment, rather than the export demand.
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Table 5.1. Results of a 10 percent devaluation (HEX) in the FI framework.
A. Rates of percentage change of distribution measures
A (:)
1.45
2.08
1.87
2.51
2.64
2.80
A(2)
Total population
0.00
0.61
0.89
Urban population
1.41
1.52
1.76
T G
2.16
2.66
2.99
3.33
3.61
3.85
-0.25
-0.27
-0.27
1.29
1.15
0.96
B. Rates of percentage change of dualism measures
Year I
1.25
-7.03
Year 5
0.95
-7.03
Year 10
0.90
-8.27
,modern wages/traditional wages
traditional wages/agricultural wages
C. Compositions of savings
Year I Year 5 Year 10
0.08372 (0.09757)
0.07819 (0.09113)
0.01423 (0.01658)
0.60372 (0.70359)
0.07819 (0.09113)
0.85806
-0.03404
0.17598
5306.59172
b.08841 (0.08845)
0.11159 (0.11165)
0.02086 (0.02087)
0.68157 (0.68191)
0.0907 (0.09712)
0.99950
-0.21780
0.21831
6702.60860
0.06178 (0.06850)
0.12330 (0.13672)
0.01660 (0.01840)
0.62217 (0.68989)
0.07799 (0.08648)
0.90183
-0.17277
0.27094
18188.9887
. b .. c
government savings, foreign savings, government savings,
nominal savings
Year
1
5
10
5
10
1
2
3
4
5
TPSa
fsb
C
gs
sd
Total
total
I
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Note also that the welfare levels (utility per capita) of the unskilled
labor are always below the base run levels. Instantaneous effects are such
that rural workers benefit most from devaluation because the agricultural
terms of trade in this run jump to a level of 4 percent higher than the base
run in the first year. Without an increase in investment in the first year,
the higher exports push up the demand for agricultural goods, as the urban
traditional manufacturing, where agricultural intermediate input demand is
substantial, expands. In the second year, however, *the increased demand comes
more from a higher level of investments. The intermediate demand of agricul-
tural commodities from investment goods producing sectors is quite limited,
and agricultural terms of trade worsens. To the extent that real GDP growth
rate is governed by the physical capital accumulation, agricultural terms of
trade and, therefore, the level of rural utility per capita, worsens as real
GDP grows faster. When the export demand pressure is relatively higher, the
agricultural terms of trade improve.
Throughout this simulation, the total physical investment is increased
slightly (except for the first year, of course). The increased savings come
from income classes 2(traditional unskilled), 4 (capitalists) and 5 (rural
workers), and the government. Class 2 has higher savings mostly because sec-
tor 7 expands strongly, increasing the unskilled employment. One main reason
for this sector's output expansion is its high intermediate demand from the
tradeable sectors. Capitalists increase their savings share (i.e., income
share) because of the increased total employment of the unskilled labor that
pushes the capital-labor ratio down. The rural workers' higher contribution
to savings comes from the improved agricultural terms of trade. Finally, the
government increases its savings because of the higher GDP. This expands
the government revenues. With the government expenditures fixed, the govern-
ment savings have to increase. Relative contributions of foreign savings and
the modern skilled workers naturally decline.
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The higher unskilled employment is accompanied not only by reduced
labor share, but also by worsening overall income distribution, as one can
observe from Table 5.1. Only the Gini coefficients show signs of improved
income distribution. These coefficients actually picked up the improved terms
of trade in agriculture. All other measures show worsening income distribu-
tion. This worsening, of course, occurred in the urban sectors, The reduced
unskilled labor share with higher employment means higher population share
and lower income share for the unskilled in general, and vice versa for
capitalists. This alone increases the inequality. The increased intraurban
dualism, however, adds to it. Modern sector unskilled wages go up relatively
faster than the traditional unskilled wages. This might sound inconsistent
with the assumption in the model, i.e., traditional wages are more closely
tied to the rural income than modern wages, The wage determination mechanism
described in Chapter 3, however, uses the real wages as arguments.
Nominal wages are deflated by the urban and rural consumer's price in-
dices. The determinants of the wages are not only nominal agricultural in-
come, but also the rates of change in consumer's price indices. Because we
assume that the modern sector workers are more sensible to the changes in
real wages, it is the same as saying that modern sector employers are more
willing to compensate for the erosion of the salaries of their employees
caused by inflation. Rural-urban wage dualism, of course, decreases, reflect-
ing the improved agricultural terms of trade,
5.1,2. NC Framework
A 10 percent devaluation in the NC framework seems to make the already
bad situation only worse. Figure 5.2 and Table 5.2 summarize the results.
An increase in exports further reduces investment through a decrease in
foreign savings. Real GDP is higher than in the base (NC) run only in the
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Table 5.2. Results of a 10 percent devaluation (HEX) in the NC framework.
A. Rates of percentage change in distribution measures.
Year A(1) A(2) T
Total population
1 -5.80 -6.15 -5.33
5 3.98 2.27 5.15
10 21.31 15.66 25.09
G
-6.37
0.55
13.06
Urban population
1 0.00 -0.47 0.45 -0.43
5 6.31 4.89 7.06 4.15
10 22.6 17.78 25.43 17.01
B. Rates of percentage change in dualism measures
Year 1 Year 5 Year 10
M/T - 6.44 -0.62 6.21
T/A -16.81 -8.12 -9.8
C. Composition of savings
Year 1
1 0.09137 (0.09852)
2 0.08281 (0.08281)
3 0.01510 (0.01628)
4 0.64332 (0.69364)
5 0.09486 (0.10228)
TPS 0.92746
fs -0.10498
gs 0.17753
ts 4326.5664
Year 5
0.09432
0.11171
0.02072
0.68687
0.10108
1,01470
-0.21204
0.19734
6059.6344
(0.09296)
(0.11009)
(0.02042)
(0.67692)
(0.09961)
(0.08421)
(0.10324)
(0.01506)
(0.71890)
(0.07859)
Year 10
0.13254
0.16249
0.02370
1.13147
0.12370
1.57389
-0.89264
0.31874
6169.963
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first year. This increase occurs because of the reallocation of labor from
the sectors with lower labor productivity to those with relatively high2r
labor productivity, eg,, from sectors 2, 5, and 7 to sectors 1 and 6. But
this increase in the real GDP is only 0.2 percent.
From the second year, the real GDP decreases relative to the base NC
run consistently. By the 10th year, real GDP is almost 9 percent below the
base year rate. The share of urban unskilled labor income goes down as well.
This is again due to the increased labor-capital ratio as a result of the
decrease in capital stock relative to the base run. Annual accumulation
diminishes to less than half of the base NC run by the 10th year. The
physical capital stocks are around 20 percent less than the base run values
in that year. Production goes down very rapidly, despite the fact that sec-
tors 1, 3, 4, and 6 produce more than the base run in the first year due to
the higher exports. By the third year all sectors, except for the mining
sector, are producing less than the base run and going down fast. Exports
shoot up naturally as a result of the devaluation. The total exports are
24 percent higher than the base run in the 10th year. Most of the increase
occurs because of the increase in exports of sector 3 goods, whose export
elasticity is as high as 2.87. Despite the increase in exports the overall
aggregate demand is rather stable, This stability occurs as a matter of
course because trade deficits are included in savings and any increase in
exports and/or decrease in imports automatically change the savings by the
same amount.
Over time, the accumulation of physical capital stock declines and,
therefore, the supply capacity falls as well relative to the base run. The
relative fall in physical capital stocks is the largest for capital goods
producing sectors (sectors 2 and 5)-around 25 percent less than'the values
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in the 10th year of the base run. The next largest fall can be seen in the
modern sectors (sectors I and 6)-around 20 percent. The capital stocks
of the traditional sectors decrease still less; around 16 percent for sec-
tors 3 and 7, and around 12percent for sectors 4 and 8. These supply factors,
together with the aforementioned demand factors, interact and determine how
relative prices move over time. Sector 6 prices shoot up from being the low--
est to the highest. This rise is, of course, because the supply capacity
relative to the base run goes down rapidly through less capital stock, while
the demand for this sector's goods picks up due to the increased export
handling charges. In addition, this sector is not hurt so much from the de-
cline in investment because it contributes very little to the physical capi-
tal formation, nor does it supply a great amount of intermediate inputs to
capital producing sectors.
Another sector whose relative price increases consistently is sector 1.
Compared with sector 6, sector I commodities are traded directly and any hike
of relative prices decreases the export demand and increases the import sub-
stitution thereby limiting the price hike.
All other sector prices have falling trends. The agricultural price
falls very rapidly from 12 percent above the base run in the first year to
2 percent below in the 10th year. The major reason this occurs is that, rela-
tively speaking, this sector does not lose the supply capacity so much. As
mentioned above, the decline of capital stocks in this sector is among the
lowest in the economy, In addition less urban investment keeps agricultural
workers from migrating to cities or shifting to nonagricultural jobs. This
sectorls supply, therefore, decreases less rapidly than most other sectors,
which quickly worsens its terms of trade,
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Sector 2 has a price movement that is more or less opposite from sec-
tor 8's prices. Its price decreases first due to the decrease in investment.
The increase in export demand for this sector's goods is not enough of course.
Capital formation has more than three times as much weight as export among
various demands for this sector's goods (see Appendix 2 of Chapter 3). The
price climbs back up, however, becoming closer to the base run values during
the next few years because the capital stock of this sector decreases fast
whereas the real investment demand stays at a relatively stable level of
about 10 percent below the base run. During the rest of the simulation
period, the price of sector 2 stays at a constant level of 1 percent below
the base run price. The reduction of consumption and investment demand and
the increase in the export demand pressure for this sector's goods, together
with the lower supply capacity balance out to produce this result.
If we turn to the levels of utility per capita, the shifting effects of
agricultural terms of trade dominate. The rural residents are the only
gainers, increasing their utility per capita by 31.2 percent relative to the
NC base solution for the first year. Traditional urban workers lose most
severely, by 42 percent. Urban unskilled workers in modern sectors lose 18.4
percent, skilled workers by 10.3 percent, and c'apital owners by 4.4 percent.
The dynamic picture is, however, completely different. Rural residents lose
continuously as agricultural terms of trade worsen because more agricultural
workers stay in the area, and a relatively small decrease in capital stocks
in the same sector is shown. Skilled workers also lose continuously. The
reason for this is the "increase" of skilled labor stock relative to the
physical capital stock. The latter is about 20 percent less than the base run
in the 10th year, whereas the skilled labor is only 1-5 percent less.
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With the very low elasticities of substitution between skill and physical
capital assumed in the model, skilled workers lose their share among "capi-
tal" owners substantially. The two classes of mostly unskilled workers have
a similar pattern; relatively increasing utility per capita until the fourth
year, and then declining rapidly.
The first increase in utility per capita for unskilled workers occurs
because of the relatively strong aggregate demand while the capital stocks
are rapidly decreasing. In other words, the level of urban wages increases,
relatively, until the fourth year. The decrease is due to the economy-wide
decline through the sharply reduced accumulation of capital stocks. The de-
cline in utility per capita of the traditionalworker class, however, is
faster than its modern counterpart, and this is related to the wage determin-
ation mechanism: traditional unskilled worker wages move more closely with
the agricultural income than do modern unskilled wages, and agricultural in-
come decreases rapidly during the whole period.
The only income group whose utility per capita increases over time is
the physical capital owners' group. Even if the economy as a whole diminishes
rapidly, capitalists manage to have an absolutely "higher" level of per capita
utility than the base run in the 10th year. This is all related to the in-
creasing share of total income they receive as the physical capital stocks
become relatively smaller and smaller.
The differences between dynamic effects and static results are striking.
In the static experiment, all urban residents lose and only the rural resi-
dents enjoy an increased level of utility per capita. With dynamic effects,
however, the rural residents are the most hard hit, and only capitalists en-
joy a higher level of utility per capita than the base run by the 10th year
of simulation.
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As can be seen from the rapid change in utility levels per capita, the
distribution impacts are profound. As the economy first adjusts to the
shock of increased pressure for exports and decreased pressure for investment
(through decreased savings), labor demand becomes weaker because the labor
intensive sectors, i.e., machinery (sector 2) and construction (sector 5)
suffer. However, agricultural demand is hightened as a result of, as ex-
plained earlier, the direct impacts of reduced imports and increased demand
for intermediate inputs. Agricultural income, therefore, goes up. Through
the wage determination mechanism, traditional sector wages go up relatively
more than modern sector wages. The weak labor demand in urban sectors, how-
ever, drives the whole wage structure down, resulting in a drastic improve-
ment as far as distribution measures are concerned, in the first year of
devaluation. Through the deterioration of agricultural terms of trade as
discussed above, the inequality measures increase rapidly. The intraurban
wage dualism behaves similarly because traditional wages move quite closely
with agricultural income. The measure of rural-urban dualism is rather
stable. Actually, this reflects the relatively abundant supply of urban
labor throughout the simulation.
5.1.3. IX Framework
A 10 percent devaluation in the IX closure, i.e., saving-investment
relations is that of FI, but the urban unskilled labor supply is constrained
as in NC, has very little impacts as far as the total aggregates are con-
cenred. The real GDP in the first year is only 0.01 percent higher than that
of the base run, and even though it decreases relative to the base run as
time goes by, this decrease is only 0.16 percent by the 10th year.
All nontradeable sectors produce less output than the base IX run in the
first year because tradeable sectors absorb more unskilled laobr in order to
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meet the increased export demand as a result of devaluation. The real GDP
increase is, hcwever, much less than the first year of devaluation in NC be-
cause the high investment demand keeps the employment of such low labor produc-
tivity sectors as the construction sector relatively high. This, therefore,
keeps the employment of high labor productivity sectors (modern sectors)
low (Figure 5.3 and Table 5.3).
The slow decline in real GDP relative to the base run from the third
year is due to the lower investment. The second year has a very high invest-
ment as a result of the sudden increase in demand in tradeable sectors, but
this increase in investment demand brings about higher prices (note that
in the second year, the physical capital stocks in all sectors are still
the same as the base run), then this, in turn, tends to reduce export de-
mands. The third year shows the opposite effect; investment is lower and
together with the higher supply capacity due to higher investment in the
second year, tends to reduce the price level that now increases export de-
mand. During the second and third years these two forces, export and
investment, cancel out and the resulting real GDP is almost exactly equal
to the base run values in these years. The continued relatively lower in-
vestment in most sectors, however, slowly, but'surely, decreases the real
GDP relative to the base run. The lower investment is caused by the decline
of both animal spirit parameters and future expectations of domestic demand.
The former comes about because the capital price is higher than the base-
run value by around 8-9 percent, whereas the nominal wage levels increase
by around 6-7 percent (from the second year). The latter, the slow increase
in demand expectations, is caused by both slower investment growth and weak
household consumption demand.
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Table 5.3. Results of a 10 percent devaluation (HEX) in the IX framework.
A. Rates of percentage change in distribution
Year A(!) A(2)
Total population
1 -0.48 -0.56
5 0.0 -0.31
10 -0.55 -1.23
measures.
T
0.0
0.19
0.0
G
-0.98
-0.80
-1.33
Urban population
1 0.84 0.47 1.06 0.43
5 0.94 0.79 1.02 0.24
10 1.04 0.89 1.11 0.27
---------------------------------------------------------------------
B. Rates of percentage change in dualism measures.
Year 1 Year 5 Year 10
M/T 1.42 1.65 0.44
T/A -2.57 -3.47 -5.60
---------------------------------------------------------------------
C. Composition of savings
Year 1 Year 5 Year 10
1 0.08581 (0.09921) 0.08589 (0.09306) -0.07373 (0.08622)
2 0.07785 (0.09002) 0.10461 (0.11335) 0.12364 (0.14459)
3 0.01447 (0.01674) 0.01974 (0.02139) 0.01667 (0.01950)
4 0.60750 (0.70240) 0.62418 (0.67630) 0.57374 (0.67093)
5 0.07925 (0.09163) 0.08852 (0.09591) 0.06735 (0.07878)
TPS 0.86488 0.92293 0.85513
fs -0.03987 -0.11308 -0.07303
gs 0.17498 0.19014 0.21790
TS 5181.62394 7364.0950 17352.7074
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Observe the two distinctive patterns in both output growth and invest-
ment. One is the pattern of investment goods, the other is that of trade-
ables. Sectors 1, 2, 3, and 6 are the latter and sectors 2 and 5 the former.
Sector 2 goods are tradeables as well as investment goods, and. show somewhat
less distinctive patterns of investment goods than the construction sector
does. In any case, these two sets of commodities tend to move in opposite
directions. Compare, for example, the investment in sectors 2 and 6.
Utility level per capita again shows a wide discrepancy among income
classes in a static sense (i.e., in the first year), but the discrepancy
tends to narrow as time goes on. In the first year, the winner is again the
rural group with a 4 percent increase in utility level per capita, and the
biggest loser is the urban traditional workers group, i.e., a decline of
more than 11 percent. This group, however, improves its lot rapidly because,
of course, the smaller the original utility per capita the bigger the percen-
tage increase in utility per capita is when consumption is increased by the
same amount.
The increase of the rural utility per capita relative to the base run
diminishes because the supply capacity increases as a result of higher invest-
ment in the sector. The agricultural terms of trade, however, improve again
in the second half of the simulation because the labor force in agriculture
shrinks as a result of high migration which, in turn, is the result of
higher rates of turn-over in urban employment. This overwhelms the low in-
vestment in the migration function.
The unskilled labor share is lower than the base run throughout the 10
years. The share, however, has an inverted "U" shape over the simulation
period. The earlier increase is due to the shift of the labor force from
sectors with low labor shares to those with higher shares. The increase in
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overall capital stock in the third year also helped to increase the labor
share relatively. From then on, however, the higher migration and lower in-
vestment worked against the unskilled labor classes constantly.
The high investment in the second year is financed by higher foreign
savings that occurs because of the higher price level. The inflation-caused
redistribution of income in favor of the capitalists, i.e., the high savers,
does not work here because the higher price levels do not lower the real
wages very much. With urban labor fully employed, the only way to increase
the urban labor supply is to have more migration or more births, neither of
which occurs very quickly. Wages, therefore, go up almost as much as value-added
prices. How then does the economy keep the amount of investment constant,
for example, in the first year, with "reduced" foriegn savings? There is,
of course, a slight shift of income to the capitalists, but the real savings
(nominal savings deflated by a capital price) of capitalists actually de-
clines. The loss of foreign savings is made up for by the shift of income
toward agriculture because of the changing terms of trade, and the government.
The government, of course, benefits from the increased value of imports in
"yen" because the tariff is ad valorem. Real imports only go down around
1.0 percent whereas the value increases 10 percent. We might also recall,
although it is only a small thing, that government worker's wages are exogen-
ously given by nominal terms. Any inflationary pressure thus increases the
government savings in this regard as well.
Overall, however, the distributional aspects, as well as the real
physical structure of the economy, do not vary very much in this sensitivity
run. The inequality measures generally decrease, reflecting the improved
agricultural income vis-a-vis other income streams. The urban population
would suffer a slight worsening effect of size distribution of income which
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reflects the decreased labor share as previously explaind, and the relatively
worse urban wage dualism that, again, is caused by the high inflationary
pressure.
5.1.4. Overview of devaluation
Generally speaking, the ineffectiveness of devaluation in any closure
is striking, but this result is somewhat expected from the past literature
on devaluation in developing countries (see, for example, Taylor 1979,
Krugman and Taylor 1978). It quite simply does not have the expected effects
of expansion of economic activities. On the contrary, the NC closure has
a devastating result in that it shrinks the economy with severely worsening
income distribution. The decreasing foreign savings is the cause for this
sprial decline of the economy. The other two closures fare a little better,
but far from what is expected by traditional proponents of devaluation. In
both the FI and IX closures, the devaluation is translated to almost as much
domestic price inflation, nullifying most of the effects of devaluation.
In both cases, the distribution of income shifts towards capitalists,
agricultural workers, and the government. The urban unskilled workers suffer
most in that their income share decreases. The initial effect is that the
traditional sector unskilled workers experience more severity than the modern
sector counterparts because of the interaction between the inflation and the
wage determination mechansim. The intraurban wage dualism tends to worsen,
whereas the rural urban dualism tends to lessen. In IX, the real GDP actually
declines over time realtive to the base run, because high inflation with
a reliatvely slow increase in nominal wages, pushes down the "animal spirit"
of the investors and also of some factors of final demand.
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The overall magnitude of change in the IX closure, however, is quite
small. Being a full employment model, all that can happen is a reallocation
of urban labor whose total supply is more or less fixed.
In the FI closure, with the elastic urban labor supply, the economy can
grow, but the magnitude of growth is only about 1.3 percent higher than real
GDP throughout the simulation, accompanied by a considerable worsening of
income distribution.
5.2. HIGH EXPORT DEMAND
The next set of experiments involve increasing the world demand for
Sector 1 (modern manufacturing) goods by 20 percent for 4 years starting in
1963.
5.2.1. FI Framework
The exogenous shock has a fairly expected result for FI (Figure 5.4
and Table 5.4). The output of sector 1 increases 2-3 percent during the ex-
port boom. Most other sectors also enjoy output expansion during the boom.
Sector 7 expands relatively more because of its high consumption and inter-
mediate demands. The expansion of sector 6, on' the other hand, is mainly due
to the export handling charges. Sectors 2 and 5, the capital goods producing
sectors, once again have similar patterns over time in both physical capital
investment and output. The only sectors whose output is reduced inthe first
year of the export boom are 2 and 3. They both have higher outputs than the
base solution from the second year of the boom. For sector 2, this higher
output is due mainly to the increase in the investment demand. For sector
3, however, it is the increased consumption demand that does the trick.
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Table 5.4. Results of increasing the world demand for Sector 1 goods by
20 percent (HWTl) in the FI framework.
A. Rates of percentage change in distribution measures.
Year A(!) A(2) T G
Total population
4 1.72 1.37 1.95 1.18
5 2.79 2.02 3.10 1.68
6 1.92 1.64 2.54 1.39
10 -0.37 -0.30 -0.48 -0.48
Urban population
4 1.44 1.08 1.64 0.89
5 2.13 1.49 2.56 1.24
6 1.76 0.98 2.12 0.99
10 -0.32 -0.14 -0.36 -0.36
----------------------------------------------------
B. Rates of percentage change in dualism measures.
Year
4 5 6 7 8 9 10
M/T 0.44 2.06 0.65 0.38 -0.06 -0.56 -0.27
T/A -0.42 -1.11 -1.13 -1.03 -0.48 0.08 0.09
C. Composition of savings.
Year 4 Year 6 Year 10
1 0.10489 (0.09836) 0.08562 (0.08570) 0.06632 (0.07160)
2 0.11260 (0.10559) 0.11519 (0.11529) 0.12658 (0.13666)
3 0.02200 (0.02063) 0.02172 (0.02174) 0.01731 (0.68643)
4 0.72252 (0.67752) 0.68379 (0.68438) 0.63579 (0.68643)
5 0.10441 (0.09790) 0.09281 (0.09289) 0.08022 (0.08661)
TPS 1.06643 0.99914 0.92622
fs -0.24862 -0.22877 -0.18963
gs 0.18220 0.22963 0.26341
TS 4733.55440 7406.32170 15780.09680
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Investment has a much larger function than consumption on outputs. The
second year of the boom sees a radically increased investment demand for sec-
tor 1, and moderate increases in sectors 6 and 7. These are direct and in-
direct consequences of the export increase. Overall, the animal spirit
parameters decline, because capital price increases faster than wages. In-
vestment, therefore, decreases in sectors at times when the demand pressure
is realtively weak. For example, sectors 2, 3, and 5 in the second year of
the boom: sectors 2 and 3 due to decreased export in the first year of the
boom, and sector 5 due to a lack of investment increase in the first year of
the boom to counteract the decrease in the animal spirit parameter.
The increase in investment in the other sectors during the second year
of the boom, however, heightens the expectation of demand for capital produc-
ing sectors, and, therefore, the investment in these sectors jumps up in the
third year. Similar oscillation is repeated later. Sector 1 naturally has
larger ups and downs in investment; investment in this sector goes up by al-
most 9 percent relative to the base solution in the second year of the boom,
but delcines to a level of 5.6 percent below the base run immediately after
the boom.
During the boom, utility levels per capita arie higher for urban income
classes, but lower for rural residents. The latter is caused by the lower
price hike in agricultural goods as opposed to urban goods. Of the urban in-
come classes, the physical capital owners and skill owners improve on their
welfare level quite substantially during the boom, whereas the unskilled urban
workers increase their utility levels only marginally. When the boom is
over, however, the order is completely reversed. Agricultural terms of trade
improve because urban goods are now less expensive relative to their own
products. Capital owners suffer because the higher accumulation during the
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boom results in higher stocks of both physical capital and skill, whereas
the demand pressure is not so high anymore.
Real GDP and the labor share summarize this. The real GDP increases
during the boom but decreases after it, while the labor share again moves in
a completely opposite way. Naturally, the savings that finance the increased
investment come from the urban income classes plus the government. Especi-
ally capitalists and skill owners increase their savings conspicuously. Un-
skilled worker classes also contribute to increased real savings, except for
the traditional unskilled,in the first year of the boom. (This happens be-
cause the rate of overall inflation is not too high due to the deterioration
of the agricultural terms of trade,) Contrary to what occurs in the case of
devaluation, there is now a shift of income from rural to urban areas. This
clearly shows up in the distribution measures. All indices during the boom
show that overall distribution deteriorates more severely than urban distri-
bution, showing the worsening position of the rural areas. Intraurban dis-
tribution also gets worse due to the shift of income away from the unskilled
toward capital owners and the increased intraurban wage dualism among the
unskilled. The latter occurs because the agricultural income effect is so
small in the wage determination mechanism that.it is overwhelmed by the
inflation effect.
The government, once again, benefits from the increased tax and tariff
rates (because higher GDP increases imports), revenues and the fixed nominal
wages of government employees.
5.2.2. NC Framework
With an NC closure, the consequences of the export boom look rather dif-
ferent (Figure 5.5 and Table 5.5). The output of sector I goes up during the
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Table 5.5. Results of increasing world demand
percent (HWT4) in the NC Closure.
for sector 1 goods by 20
A. Rates of percentage change in distribution
Year A(b) A(2)
4
6
10
0.97
2.86
1.09
Total population
0.65
2.59
0.64
measures.
T
0.80
2.80
1.12
G
0.56
1.93
0.56
Urban population
4 0.48 0.54 0.52 0.48
6 3.00 2.50 3.64 2.00
10 0.96 0.83 1.20 0.77
B. Rates of percentage change in dualism measures.
Year 4 Year 6 Year 10
M/T 0.16 0.44 0.44
T/A 0.09 0.10 -0.22
C. Composition of savings.
Year 4 Year 6 Year 10
1 0.08586 (0,09697) 0.08934 (0.09320) 1:0.09899 (0.08816)
2 0.09915 (0.11198) 0.11595 (0.121) 0.14430 (0.12852)
3 0.01966 (0.02220) 0.02218 (0.02314) 0.02184 (0.01945)
4 0.59108 (Q.66758) 0.64224 (0.66999) 0.76046 (0.67729)
5 0.08966 (0.10126) 0.08883 (0.09267) 0.09721 (0.08658)
TPS 0.88540 (1.00000) 0.95858 1.12279
fs -0.05096 -0.15830 -0.36241
gs 0.16556 0.19972 0.23961
TS 6492.5866 7347.09430 9022.0679
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boom, but apart from the mining sector whose intermediate input to sector
I is high, all other sectors have lower outputs than the base run. The key
reason can be seen in sectors 2 and 5. Their outputs decrease during the
boom showing that the capital investment is below the base run level during
this period. Indeed, the investment decreases for the same reason it does
when devaluation is used: the decreased foreign savings through higher ex-
port demand. With the lower accumulation of capital stocks the real GDP
relative to the base run values goes down continuously.
The labor share also decreases continuously, except for one year after
the boom. In the first year of the boom, the decline is caused by the shift
of urban unskilled labor towards the low labor share sectors, i.e., sectors
I and 3. The once-and-for-all increase in the share in the year immediately
following the end of the boom is caused by the reallocation of unskilled
workers in the opposite direction, i.e., away from sectors I and 3. The
rest of the declining trend in the urban unskilled labor share is explained
by the slower physical capital accumulation resulting in a higher labor-
capital ratio.
The per capita utility levels show that only capital owners and skilled
workers gain in the first year of the boom, although skilled workers' im-
proved welfare is short lived due to the higher rate of growth in skill
stock than that of the physical capital stocks. The decline in nominal wages
and the decrease in the unskilled labor share, coupled with slower growth,
make sure thatunskilled labor classes are the losers. Agricultural terms of
trade worsens fast, then improves, but finally worsens again. This oscilla-
tion is reflected in the utility per capita level of rural residents. The
first decline in agricultural terms of trade is due to the higher demand for
urban goods relative to rural goods. The last decline is caused by the in-
creased supply capacity of agriculture due to fewer migrants out of agriculture.
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The distributional aspects seen from the inequality and dualism measures,
also look dismal. They all worsen. Both of the dualism measures increase
because the real income of agricultural workers decreases. With the absence
of an inflation effect, this naturally pulls down all unskilled wage levels;
traditional wages more than modern wages.
5.2.3. IX Framework
The IX closure has a constrained urban unskilled labor supply, while the
investment is not constrained ex ante by the savings. With the high export
demand for sector I goods, sector 1 increases its production by absorbing
unskilled labor from other sectors. The wage level climbs up to the level
of 4.2 percent higher than the base run by the second year of the export boom
reflecting the tightness of this labor market. The price of sector I goods
increase 3.8 percent by that time, but because other prices do not increase
as much, the value-added price of this sector goes up almost 6 percent, en-
abling the expansion of unskilled employment (Figure 5.6 and Table 5.6).
Because sector I increases its unskilled employment, some other sectors
have to lose it. Sector 4, with high trade and factor substitution elastici-
ties, is one releaser of unskilled workers. Sectors 2 and 3 also lose un-
skilled workers, not only because they have price-responsive demands, i.e.,
exports and consumption, and inflationary pressure caused by the export boom
reduces these demand quickly, but also because they have very small input
ratios to sector 1. The output expansion of sector I hardly increases the
intermediate input demand from sectors 2 and 3. As a result, these sector
prices do not increase enough to counteract the wage increases, therefore,
losing the unskilled employment.
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Table 5.6. Results of increasing world demand
percent (HWI) in the IX closure.
for sector I goods by 20
A. Rates of percentage change in distribution
Year A( ) A(2)
Total population
4 1.14 0.98
6 1.06 1.51
10 -0.55 -0.92
measures.
T
1.19
1.47
-0.57
G
1.14
1.55
-0.80
Urban population
4 0.47 0.52 0.68 0.47
6 0.48 0.53 0.52 0.72
10 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
B. Rates of percentage change in dualism measures.
Year 4 Year 6 Year 10
M/T 1.03 2.07 -1.04
T/A 1.31 3,00 -2.01
C. Composition of savings.
Year 4 Year 6 Year 10
1 0.09119 (0.09655) 0.08781 (0.09358) 0.07479 (0.08728)
2 0.10246 (0.10847) 0.11143 (0.11875) 0.12462 (0.14544)
3 0.01951 (0.02066) 0.02093 (0.02231) 0.01673 (0.01953)
4 0.63337 (0.67055) 0.63839 (0.68035) 0.57366 (0.669448)
5 0.09801 (0.10377) 0.07976 (0.08501) 0.06707 (0.07827)
TPS 0.94455 0,93832 0.85687
fs -0.10947 -0.13493 -0.06532
gs 0.16492 0.19660 0.20845
TS 5628.14240 7898.5252 16065.658
-161-
The patterns of investment over time look very similar to the FI closure
for sectors 1, 2, 3, and 5. Sectors 4 and 8, the primary sectors, however,
have much less investment than the base run during the boom, reflecting the
lower demand for their goods. Sector 4 that actually has lower real wage
(w/pv), has reduced employment, output and investment. This is caused by the
very high import elasticities assumed in this model. The moderate increase
in this sector's commodity prices induces so much import as to reduce the
domestic output relative to the base run. Sector 8 has lower investment be-
cause of the worsening of its terms of trade, due mainly to the decrease in
intermediate demand.
We now turn to the utility levels per capita. Most noticable is the ups
and downs in the level of welfare of rural residents. This is strongly re-
lated to the agricultural terms of trade as can be seen in the diagram of
prices. Modern workers, both skilled and unskilled, gain most during the
boom. This increase in modern sector workers' utility levels is natural con-
sidering the increase in demand for sector I goods. Note that in FI, the
increase of utility per capita for this group of people during the boom is
much less than in the IX case, and the increase in the capital owners utility
level much higher. This is because in FI the labor supply is perfectly elas-
tic whreas in IX it is not. The reaction after the boom is suddenly over, is
a mirror image of what goes on during the boom. The utility levels of modern
unskilled workers and skilled workers declines sharply, reflecting the high
accumulation of both physical and skill capital stocks in many sectors, in
particular, sector 1.
The way total savings become equal with the value of investment is simi-
lar to that in FI, Foreign savings decline, although only slightly because
of the higher prices and higher GDP. Personal savings and government savings
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go up. Among the personal savings, the capitalists, skilled workers and
modern unskilled workers increase their contributions. In other words, all
the classes with higher than average incomes benefit more or less equally.
The inequality measures, therefore, do not go up very much compared with the
FI case. The urban population especially only suffers a marginal increase in
inequality measures. As can be observed, this marginal increase comes from
the intraurban wage dualism that worsens much more than in FI. Rural-urban
dualism increases in IX, reflecting the tight urban unskilled labor market
and the deteriorated agricultural terms of trade. Urban wages go up whereas
rural income is relatively stagnant.
All in all, this closure, where urban unskilled labor supply is limited,
reacts to the exogenous increase by inflation, with wages rapidly increasing
to keep total employment unchanged. The real GDP only goes up around 0.1
percent at most (in FI it increased 0.78 percent), and the GDP deflator goes
up by 2.6 percent(1.7 percent in FI), in the second year of the boom. Thus,
the total benefit to the economy in terms of increased output is small,
whereas the losers (rural workers) suffer much more seriously.
5.2.4. Overview of Increased Modern Manufacturing Export Demand
The increased export demand for modern manufacturing goods shows the ex-
pected effects of increased outputs and utilities in FI. The loss of foreign
savings is compensated for by the shift of income from rural to urban, and
within the urban area from unskilled workers to the capitalists and skilled
workers. Both the overall and urban income inequality measures increase.
However, even the traditional unskilled workers enjoy higher utility per
capita during the boom, Only the rural workers lose, but their loss in util-
ity is minor compared to what happens in other closures.
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In IX, the overall pattern of response seems similar to that of FI.
However, the limited unskilled labor supply does not allow for a rapid growth
from the export boom, Certain sectors have to lose unskilled workers to
increase the output of sector I whose export expands, True,there is a severe
shift of income from rural to urban population via changing terms of trade.
Within the urban sectors, however, the unskilled workers do not lose their
share very much because urban employment does not increase. As a result,
wages go up very much, pushing up the inflation and worsening the agricul-
tural terms of trade. The increase in output is marginal whereas the loss
of the rural population's utility is substantial.
The NC case shows that there is no possibility for export-led growth in
the neoclassical paradigm. The decreased foreign savings are not made up by
any segment of the economy. The economy, therefore, experiences a very
rapid decline in capital accumulation and the labor share declines as a by-
product of the decreased capital-labor ratio. However, this by no means makes
up for the loss of savings. Again, the NC fails to work.
5.3. HIGHER ELASTICITIES OF CAPITAL-LABOR SUBSTITUTION
In the next set of dyanmic sensitivity analyses, elasticities of substi-
tution between the composite capital and unskilled labor are increased in
most urban sectors. This experiment involves changing the elasticity values
for sector I from 0.55 to 0.65; for sector 2 from 0.6 to 0.8; for sector 3
from 0.85 to 1.15; for sector 5 from 0.95 to 1.25; for sector 6 from 0.55 to
0.70; and for sector 7 from 0.95 to 1.35. These elasticitiy values reflect
some conventional, although not unanimous, knowledge, which says that, espec-
ially for traditional sectors and construction, the elasticity of substitution
is typically higher than unitary.
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5.3.1. FI Framework
In an FI framework, the real GDP grows more rapidly when the elastici-
ties are larger. The real GDP in the 10th year is 5.5 percent more than the
base run counterpart. The unskilled labor share declines first and then be-
comes larger than the base run values. This is because during the first few
years capital stocks are growing more rapidly than the unskilled labor force
even in efficiency units. With the elasticities of substitution higher than
those of the base run, the labor share has to decrease when the production is
within AOK in the diagram (Diagram 5. 1), and where the capital-labor ratio is
close to the base run production point, e.g., C. This is what happens. Dur-
ing the first two years, the capital stocks are exactly the same as in the
base run, and the unskilled labor force in each sector does not change sig-
nificantly (Figure 5.7 and Table 5.7).
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Table 5.7. Results of a higher elasticity of substitution between unskilled
labor and composit capital (HSIG) in the FI closure.
A. Rates of percentage change in distribution
Year A( ) A(2)
Total population
5 - 3.13 -2.75
10 -11.22 -9.82
measures.
T
- 3.37
-12,26
G
-2.66
-9.36
Urban population
5 - 2.64 -2.27 - 2.82 -2.07
10 - 9.20 -7.05 - 9.83 -6.49
B. Rates of percentage change in dualism measures.
Year 5 Year 10
M/T
T/A
-2 .54
-7.37
-5.49
-6.38
C. Composition
1
2
3
4
5
TPS
fs,
gs
TS
of savings.
Year 5
0.08666 (0.09158)
0.10959 (0.11582)
0.02192 (0.02317)
0.63397 (0.67003)
0.09405 (0.09940)
0.94619
-0.14801
0.2081
6681.7898
Year 10
0.06330
0.12451
0.01834
0.55063
0.08166
0.83844
-0.09709
0.25865
18180.658
(0.07550)
(0.14850)
(0.02187)
(0.65673)
(0.09740)
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When these initial effects are over, the interaction of effects of
higher elasticities and of changing capital-labor ratios start to come in,
and this results in a monotonous increase of the unskilled labor share. This
result comes from the strong upward pressure of the share in sectors 3, 6,
and 7 relative to the base run. At first sight, it might look contradictory
that all of these four sectors have increased shares, because sector 6 exper-
iences capital shallowing realtive to the base run, and the rest experience
capital deepening. The puzzle, however, is solved if we realize that in
efficiency units all of these sectors are relatively labor intensive sectors.
Then, referring to Diagram 5.1, the comparison is done in the area AOL when
the labor share is increasing. For sectors 3 and 7, the shift of the produc-
tion point inbetween the base run and this run can be characterized by a move
from point G to F*, whereas for sector 6 it is from D to E. In both cases,
with a sufficient change in the elasticity value, but a limited change in
the capital-labor ratio, the labor share increases.
Investments are generally higher than the base run from the second year.
This is due to the higher animal spirit parameters** (aided later by higher
*Sector 5 experiences the same pattern, but the labor share only starts
to improve in year 9, fni I (r / ts
**Assuming C = cost function (r + w the animal spirit is
AS = ;C - I[ + (w) 1 - 1 /l-
A r r
Taking a logarithm of AS and getting the first order derivative with respect
to a will give us
( -)
3(ln AS) _ . l-cy a r
=I 2S n [ + ( ) ] + (ln r - ln w)(1a)2  l-[+r + ( )~
This means that if a < I and r > w, then the animal spirit parameters increase
with the increase in a. In the other cases, the Taylor expansion of the first
order around w/r = I is
w
9(ln AS) ~ n2  r
3 ~ (1-a)2 + 2
So only in the case where a is substantially big and w/r significantly less
than 1, the animal spirit parameter decreases with the increase of a
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expectations of demand). The increase in these parameters occurs despite
the lower expected wage-rental ratios than in the base run. This naturally
is the result of- the fact that the economy Is already relatively capital in-
tensive. Although the unskilled employment is lower for sectors 1 and 2
than the base run, the production goes up. This is partly due to this higher
physical capital accumulation.
Nearly everybody enjoys a higher level of utility per capita than when
the elasticities are smaller due to the higher GDP. Only rural residents
lose during the first year or so. This loss is due to the low output growth
of sector 3 whose intermediate input coefficient for agricultural goods is
quite high. But as physical capital accumulation in agricultural lags behind,
and workers leave the agricultural sector, the agricultural terms of trade
improve and rural utility per capita increases. Among the urban classes, the
utility levels of capitalists and skill workers behave similarly. Both im-
prove rapidly at first as the labor share decreases, but when the accumulation
of stocks has proceeded enough and as the labor share starts to increase, the
two unskilled labor classes improve on their welfare persistently. The level
of utility per capita of the traditional workers' class increases much faster
than the modern counterpart, reflecting the higher nominal wage growth of the
traditional sectors caused by the rapid increase of agricultural income. The
earlier part of the increase in traditional workers' utility is, however,
amplified by the fact that some capital income and sector 7 skilled labor in-
come are included in this income class. These factors and the increase in
construction workers, account for most of the first years' increase of this
class's income growth.
The economy first feels the change of the technical parameters in the
second year, when the demand for investment goods suddenly increases due to
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the high animal spirit parameter in the first year. Because the capital
stock is still at the same level as the base year, the increased investment
has to be produced by increased unskilled employment, which, of course,
accompanies the inflation. Urban sector prices, especially the capital goods
related sectors increase their output prices. Agricultural prices do not go
up as much. The intraurban wage dualism, therefore, increases slightly in
the first two or three years because the inflation effect is much larger than
the agricultural income effect. Then, as capital stock increases and the
demand for agricultural goods picks up, the latter effect takes over and the
intraurban dualism tends to go down. Inflation, however, does not worsen the
distribution of income very much because of the higher elasticities of substi-
tution assumed. The inequality measures go down very quickly after the
fourth year of the simulation. In addition, we can observe that A(!) and T
go down more than the other two, showing that the upper part of the distribu-
tion is becoming more equal.
Capitalists are definitely losing their share. This is also visible
from the composition of savings. Everybody has increased real savings but
only capitalists lose their share by the fifth year. Note also that the
higher price and higher GDP depress exports and increase imports, thus in-
creasing foreign savings significantly.
5.3.2. NC Framework
The situation is not radically different in NC (Figure 5.8 and Table 5.8).
The overall change, however, is small. The real GDP goes up and is 2.9 per-
cent higher in the 10th year than in the same year of the NC base run. The
labor share declines during the first half of the decade and then increases
during the second half. The first decline is again explained by the higher
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Table 5.8. Results of a higher elasticity of substitution between unskilled
labor and composit capital (HSIG) in the NC closure.
A. Rates of percentage change in distribution measures.
Year A(!) A(2) T G
Total population
5 -1.71 -1.94 -1.58 -2.49
10 -4.92 -5.11 -5.24 -5.28
Urban population
5 0.0 0.27 0.18 -0.24
10 -2.89 -2.50 -2.90 -2.84
------------------------------------------------------
B. Rates of percentage change in dualism measures.
Year 5 Year 10
M/T -3.54 -5.49
T/A -7.37 -6.38
------------------------------------------------------
C. Composition of savings
Year 5 Year 10
1 0.08193 (0.09273) 0.09388 (0.08874)
2 0.10384 (0.11750) 0.13947 (0.13184)
3 0.02176 (0.02463) 0.02286 (0.02161)
4 0.58549 (0.66270) 0.70332 (0.66480)
5 0.09048 (0.10241) 0.09840 (0.09302)
TPS 0.88350 1.05793
fs -0.06465 -0.29839
gs 0.18115 0.24046
TS 7197.2238 9692.1338
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elasticities without significant changes in factor allocations from the base
run. Also, the higher speed of capital accumulation in this run relative to
the base run after the third year delays the recovery of the labor share.
The increase of this share in the second half of the decade comes from the
fact that there are more urban unskilled workers than in the base run, and
more of them are employed in the high labor share sector (sector 6).
Sectoral outputs mostly go up relative to the base run except for the
second year when reallocation of the unskilled labor before capital stocks
are adjusted causes a minor dip in modern manufacturing sectors. Wages in
these sectors are kept relatively high with unchanged capital stocks, de-
creasing the labor employment and output. The mining sector output goes up
during the first half of the simulation and then declines. This wave is
caused by the movement of the unskilled labor employment. It is worthwhile
to repeat that with the high trade and technical elasticities of the mining
goods, this sector indicates how tight the urban unskilled labor market is
when the supply of this factor is fixed. Agricultural output shows an oppo-
site pattern to that of mining, it decreases then increases. This is because
the faster employment shift out of agriculture decreases its labor force dur-
ing the time when the capital stock in this sedtor is not yet high.
The real investment grows relatively slowly at first. This can be ex-
plained by the higher relative price of the capital, particularly sector 2
goods, caused by the slower growth of this sector's output compared to the
others. The capital price increases whereas the consumer's price index or
GDP deflator goes down. Consequently, the total savings deflated by the
capital price is relatively small at first compared with the base run values.
Those sectors without significant increases in animal spirit parameters,
therefore, have lower physical investment than the base run at first, i.e,
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sectors 1, 4, 6, and 8. As explained earlier, these are the sectors with no
or relatively small increases in the elasticity of substitution.
The increased investment from the second year onwards is first financed
by skilled workers and expanded foreign and government savings, later being
joined by the traditional unskilled and rural residents.
Utility levels per capita behave more or less as expected from the above.
Rural utility starts low but shoots up rapidly, and from the fifth year is
the highest relative to the base run of all the five income classes. This,
again, is a reflection of the movement of the relative price of agricultural
goods. The slow investment and increased outmigration are the reasons
why this price goes up so fast. Urban unskilled workers have first reduced
and then increased utilities per capita relative to the base run. This is
the result of the movement of the unskilled labor share. Of course, with
higher elasticities and more stocks of physical capital in the economy than
in the base run, the demand for unskilled labor tends to go down. But as
the economy grows more rapidly, the unskilled labor demand starts to go up
again, causing these U-shapes in the utility levels of the unskilled workers.
The workers in traditional sectors are better off relatively than the
modern unskilled. This is because the increase in unskilled labor shares is
larger in the traditional sectors than in the modern sectors due to the
larger change in elasticities, and because agricultural income goes up faster
than in the base run. Skilled workers have very high utility per capita at
first, but this graudally decreases to almost the level of the base run by
the 10th year. The larger increase in skilled labor over physical capital
stocks is the cause of this. As a reflection of the slow increase in capi-
talist's income and improved agricultural terms of trade, the inequality
measures of the total population as well as the dualism measures, decrease.
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However, the decreased income for the modern unskilled workers, and
the high increase in skilled income worsens the intra-urban distribution at
first, but this problem quickly disappears as the unskilled labor demand
picks up.
5.3.3. IX Framework
In IX, the real GDP is 5.2 percent higher than the IX base run in the
10th year, a value much closer to the FI version than to the NC. The labor
share goes down first and then goes up: the same pattern as in the last two
versions. But the dip is shallow, and the speed of increase very slow. This
is naturally a result of the interaction of complex factors, i.e., technolo-
gies and factor intensities of all sectors, but essentially it is explained
by the higher physical capital accumulation in this run. The labor-capital
ratio remains low, even in efficiency units. With an elasticity of substi-
tution higher than in the base run, the labor shares are kept low in many
sectors (Figure 5.9 and Table 5.9).
The sectoral output growth rates overall look similar to those of NC.
The differences are that the general growth rates are higher in IX; the
construction sector in particular, goes faster in IX, and the mining sector
declines first in IX. These are explained by the higher investment in IX.
With higher investment, the economy grows faster, especially the capital
goods producing sectors, and if the economy is growing faster, the mining
sector can easily lose because the unskilled labor market is tighter. The
mining sector plays the role of a "safety valve" as explained earlier.
Prices move as expected. Urban prices generally go down as a trend with
the higher investment (and unchanged other demand structures). Agricultural
prices go up because of the relatively lower investment, and higher migration
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Table 5.9. Results of a higher elasticity of substitution between unskilled
labor and compositecapital (HSIG) in the IX framework.
A. Rates of percentage change in distribution measure.
Year A(!) A(2) T G
Total population
5 -2.72 -2.18 -3.01 12.41
10 -6.56 -6.75 -6.45 -2.93
Urban population
5 -1.88 -1.32 -2.04 -1.43
10 -2.07 -2.07 -3.32 -3.25
-----------------------------------------------------
B. Rates of percentage change in dualism measures.
Year 5 Year 10
M/T -1.61 - 8.48
T/A -3.80 -11.88
------- ---------------------------------------------------------------
C. Composition of savings.
Year 5 Year 10
1 0.08036 (0.09271) 0.06927 (0.08543)
2 0.10107 (0.11661) 0.12049 (0.14860)
3 0.02080 (0.0280) 0.01910 (0.02355)
4 0.58005 (0.66923) 0.53332 (0.65771)
5 0.08447 (0.09745) 0.06870 (0.08472)
TPS 0.86675 0.81089
fs -0.04624 -0.02455
gs 0.17939 0.21367
TS 7659.5426 17710.0718
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cause the supply to go down. The initial low investment is caused by the
lower intermediate demand for this sector's goods due to the compositional
change of outputs.
Levels of utility per capita move quite similarly to the NC case. The
differences are: the skilled workers' utility per capita does not fall be-
cause there are proportionate increases in physical capital investment; and
the levels of utility per capita for unskilled workers (income classes 1 and
2), no longer improve towards the end, reflecting the very slow overall in-
crease in the unskilled labor share.
The sudden increase of investment in the second year comes as a shock
to the economy, which tries to produce more with higher unskilled employment.
The unskilled labor, however, is limited in supply. The wage level, there-
fore, goes up causing inflation. Inflation, however, does not increase the
capitalists' income because the aggregate labor-capital ratio is fixed.
Increased investment, therefore, is financed mainly by changes in foreign
savings, followed at first by government savings. Later on, the rural popu-
lation, traditional unskilled and skilled workers join to finance the higher
investment. Essentially, therefore, the extra investment is at first
financed by the general inflation, and later by the structural change and
growth of the economy.
Income distribution changes accordingly. First the total population
inequality measure goes down slightly because of the agricultural terms of
trade deterioration. From then on inequality constantly decreases. The
same is true for the dualism.
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5.3.4. Overview of Higher Elasticities of Substitution
In general, the more flexibility given to the economy by the increased
substitutability among production factors seems to produce positive effects
in all three closures. The economy grows faster and income distribution is
more equal. The higher growth is financed first, in all closures, by expan-
ded foreign savings and then by skilled workers, traditional unskilled work-
ers, and rural workers. Captialists never really come out as "winners" in
these experiments because the unskilled labor shares do not decrease very
much at any time in any closures, whereas the skilled labor share increases
disporportionately. The rural workers lose at first because the investment
increase is the only change that happens in the economy, and agriculture does
not supply much intermediate input to the capital producing sectors. As
the economy starts to grow in harmony, however, and More workers outmigrate,
the agricultural terms of trade shoot up, shifting the distribution of income
heavily towards the rural sector.
As far as the growth rates are concerned, NC grows very much more slowly
than the other two closures, naturally because increases in animal spirit
parameters are not translated directly to investment increases. They are
deflated by the available savings in the economy that go up, but slowly.
5.4. HIGHER RATES OF POPULATION GROWTH WITHOUT ADDITIONAL LABOR FORCE
This section and the following two sections examine some of the demo-
graphic implications upon the economy. First, we examine a case when the
total population is growing twice as rapidly as the base run, but not the
labor force, meaning, for example, such a situation as having more children
in an economy where compulsory education is well-spread. These children are
consumers but they do not participate in the labor force. In this section,
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the consequences of this are examined, without considering such dynamic ef-
fects as human capital accumulation through providing the children with more
education. After all, this section deals only with a 10-year simulation,
and 10 years is a short enough period not to have to consider such long-run
dynamic effects. Consideration of these effects, however, should be done in
the future with more elaborate specifications of demographic aspects and
government behavior.
5.4.1. FI Framework
As expected, this change has largely negative impacts. Real GDP de-
clines monotonously relative to the base FI run until the eighth year, then
it comes up a little closer to the base run, however, it is still 0.16 per-
cent less in the 10th year. The total population is 8.05 percent higher
than the base run in the same year, reducing the real GDP per capita in this
run to the level of 8.2 percent lower than the base run. Essentially, there
are more mouths to feed. The employment in nonagricultural sectors, however,
"declines" relative to the base run, i.e., despite the existence of more de-
pendents, the urban unemployed increased in number. This is because having
more mouths to feed means higher consumption demand for such income inelastic
and essential items as food. The agricultural prices go up, so does the
agricultural income per agricultural worker. Urban nominal wages have to go
up accordingly. The modern sector prices, however, go up at different speeds
from the traditional sector prices. Reflecting the inflexible consumption
demand for traditional sector goods per head and investment demand, prices
of sectors 3, 5, and 7 go up much more rapidly than the prices of sectors 1.,
4, and 6. The price of sector 2, a sector that produces both investment and
income elastic consumption goods, behaves somewhere in between. The price
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increase, however, is not large enough to counteract the nominal wage hike.
As a result, the real wages go up for all urban sectors reducing urban un-
skilled employed as stated above. The decrease in unskilled employment is
much larger for modern sectors because their wages go up with the agricul-
tural income but their prices either stay fairly constant or even decrease
relative to the base run (Figure 5.10 and Table 5.10).
The unskilled employment of the traditional sectors (sectors 3, 5, and
7) decreases by a small margin during the first four years, after which it
starts to increase relatively, and all these sectors have higher unskilled
employment in the 10th year than the base run. This comes from the increased
consumption and intermediate demand for their goods.
Investment demands also show completely different behavior between the
modern and traditional sectors. Sectors 3, 5, 7, and 8 have higher invest-
ment than the base run for most years, whereas sectors 1, 2, 4, and 6 have
consistently lower amounts of investment throughout the simulation. These
differences are the result of the differences in expectation in demand. The
animal spirit parameters are similar to the base run values for most sectors,
but demand expectation fluctuates very highly.
Levels of utility per capita of all income classes behave similarly.
They all decline monotonously relative to the base run values. These levels
for capitalists and skilled workers decline least because of their originally
high income per capita*. Among the unskilled, the second income class (the
traditional sector workers) lose more than class 1 at first. Eventually,
however, the former overtakes the latter due to the relatively fast increase
in both of the wage levels and unskilled employment in traditional sectors,
*Examining again real income per worker and per consumer, we can see that
capitalists and skilled workers actually lose. These two values ryw and ryc
respectively, and utility per capita (upc) relative to the base run are shown
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Figure 5.10. Results of higher population growth without proportionate
labor force growth (HPOPH).
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Table 5.10. Results of higher population growth without proportionate
labor force growth (HPOPH) in FI closure.
A. Rates of percentage change in distribution measures.
Year A(!) A(2) T G
Total population
10 -0.43 0.09 -0.25 0.10
Urban population
10 -0.48 -0,24 -0.46 -0.64
B. Rates of percentage change in dualism measures.
Year 10
M/T -0.31
T/A -0.92
C. Composition of savings.
Year 10
1 0.06516 (0.07117)
2 0.12572 (0.13730)
3 0,01706 (0.01863)
4 0.62772 (0.68556)
5 0.07997 (0,08734)
TPS 0.91563
fs -0,17663
gs 0,26100
TS 16101.8027
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caused by the strong demand for the goods of these sectors and increase in
agricultural income. The unskilled labor share increases relatively, reflect-
ing the smaller amount of employment in the economy. This is another reason
capitalists and skilled workers lose their real income more as noted in the
footnote.
5.4.2. NC Framework
The NC run does not give a macro pattern drastically different from the
FI (Figure 5.11 and Table 5.11). Real GDP is 0.1 percent below the NC base
run by the 10th year. The unskilled labor share is persistently above the
base run. The real GDP per capita decreases around 8.14 percent by the 10th
year. The levels of utility per capita behave very similarly. Not only are
they about the same values as the FI solution in the 10th year, but their
pattern of movement over time is so similar that these two are almost indis-
tinguishable. These levels decline consistently and the rural residents'
level of utility declines most rapidly, whereas the levels of unskilled work-
ers goes down faster at first and then slows down.
The change is more conspicuous in the traditional sector workers, as
their level goes down faster than their modern sector counterparts at the
beginning, but later it becomes relatively higher. If we look at the sector
breakdown, however, the picture is not similar. The sectors that have outputs
in the table for the 10th year:
ryw ryc upc
1 -0.27 -7.3 -10.8
2 0.30 -6.9 -10.0
3 -0.70 -7.9 - 8.7
4 -0.53 -7.8 - 7.5
5 0.95 -9.1 -11.6
After all, the utility levels fall quite quickly if expenditure falls the
same percentage point, when one is closer to the subsistence minimum than
when one is farily well off.
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Table 5.11. Results of higher population growth without proportionate
labor force growth (HPOPH) in NC closure.
A. Rates of percentage change in distribution measures.
Year A(!) A(2) T G
Total population
10 -0.56 -0.22 -0,15 0.12
Urban population
10 -0.45 -0.23 -0.22 -0.26
B. Rates of percentage change in dualism measures.
Year 10
M/T -0.85
T/A -2.15
C. Composition of savings.
Year 10
1 0.09792 (0.08810)
2 0.14475 (0.13023)
3 0.02203 (0.01982)
4 0.74846 (0,67337)
5 0.09834 (0.08848)
TPS 1.11151
fs -0,35032
gs 0.23881
TS 9098.4872
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higher than the base run are sectors 3, 4, and 8. The reason sector 4 has
such a high output can be traced to the fact that in the model this sector be-
haves very much as the adjusting factor of the unskilled employment. The un-
skilled labor market is not tight and this sector absorbs more labor than the
base run. The increase in output of sectors 3 and 8 is the direct result of
the consumption increase caused by the population pressure. They have rela-
tively high minimum subsistence consumption levels. As can be seen, how-
ever, the consumption demand is less than 20 percent of the total sector out-
put. Most goes to intermediate input demand. The increase in the output of
sector 3, therefore, facilitates a great deal to increasing the output of
sector 8.
All other sector outputs behave similarly. Sectors I and 5 have a little
higher outputs relative to the base run values than do sectors 2, 6, and 7.
The movement of sector 5 output is more or less the movement of private con-
struction investment. The output of sector I is relatively high despite its
highest decrease in household consumption demand. It is, again, because in-
termediate input demand for this sector dominates this sector's output move-
ment. The same applies to sector 2. On the other hand, sector 7's output is
more strongly influenced by the consumption demaud than by the intermediate
input demand.
The physical investment goes up in those same sectors where output goesup,
i.e., 3, 4, and 8. We have higher values of animal spirit parameters than
the base run values in sectors 3, 4, 5, 7, and 8. For sectors 5 and 7, how-
ever, the decreas-ing trend in outputs overweighs and investment fails to in-
crease. Again the modern sectors are the biggest losers as far as physical
accumulation is concerned. Sectors 1, 2, and 6 have the lowest and consis-
tently declining physical investment relative to the base run, due to the
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lower animal spirit parameters which in turn, are the result of relatively
large decreases in nominal wages in these sectors, plus the declining trend
in demand for these sector's goods.
5.4.3. IX Framework
The IX framework has a pattern very similar to NC. Only sectors 3, 4,
and 8 have persistently higher output than the IX base run. Reflecting the
higher investment, however, sector 5's output oscillates around the level of
the base run (Figure 5.12 and Table 5.12).
5.4.4. Overview of Population Growth Without Labor Force Growth
This set of experiments show that it is difficult to get an economy to
grow by an increased consumption demand for traditional commodities, at least
in the medium term. Income shifts from capitalists to the rural workers and
eventually towards the traditional unskilled workers as well. Distribution,
therefore, improves despite the decrease in per capita output.
Not everything is as dismal as it looks, however. In FI, the real sav-
ings (nominal savings deflated by a capital price) actually are higher than
in the base run, and accelerate over time. This.increase comes from the
higher foreign and rural savings through inflation and shifting terms of trade.
The higher animal spirit parameters (in all sectors) coupled with higher ex-
pected demand in traditional sectors, produce this result. As agricultural
capital stock increases, the favorable agricultural terms of trade cease to
exist and the urban wage level will slowly but surely come down increasing
employment and output. This is clearly visible in the behavior of real GDP
during the last years.
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Table 5.12. Results of higher population growth without proportionate
labor force growth (HPOPH) in EK closure.
A. Rates of percentage change in distribution measures.
Year A(!) A(2) T G
Total population
10 -0.11 0.42 0,15 0.05
Urban population
10 -0.24 -0,08 -0.34 -0.44
B. Rates of percentage change in dualism measures,
Year 10
M/T -1.03
T/A 
-2.11
C. Composition of savings.
Year 10
1 0.07444 (0.08712)
2 0,12462 (0.14584)
3 0.01668 (0.01951)
4 0.57170 (0,66906)
5 0,06705 (0.07847)
TPS 0.85448
fs -0,06271
gs 0.20823
TS 16144.0385
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NC, however, is more dismal. The real savings are again higher than in
the base run, but the difference is decreasing very rapidly. The major de-
crease comes from foreign savings: with a tendency for prices of tradeable
goods to decline, especially during the second half of the simulation.
In IX, the outcome is mixed. The real savings are less than in the base
run, but it increases towards the end of the period. The decrease in real
savings is caused by the decline in investment, which, in turn, is the result
of the decreased animal spirits in many sectors. Labor demand also starts to
go up towards the end, and if this brings up investment then there is hope
in this closure as well,
5.5. POPULATION GROWTH WITH PROPORTIONATE LABOR FORCE GROWTH
We now let the urban and rural populations and their respective labor
forces grow at twice the rates of the base run. This amounts to comparing
two steady growth states of population. The difference between this set of
runs and the previous set, where only populations increase, can be regarded
as warnings to the general equilibrium modelers who only use the labor forces
and regard them as populations as well,
5.5.1. FI Framework
This run amounts to increasing the total population and the agricultural
labor force, because we assume a perfectly elastic supply of the urban un-
skilled. More agricultural labor force means higher output from this sector,
and despite the fact that household consumption of agricultural goods increase
even faster than its output, other demands (exports, intermediate inputs, and
investment demands) do not keep up with the output increase and the price of
this good falls. This fall appears as a decline in nominal agricultural income
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per worker, and all the urban nominal wages decline as well. Traditional
sector wages decline more than modern sector wages in accordance with the
wage determination mechanism assumed (Figure 5.13 and Table 5.13).
This decrease in nominal wage levels would increase the employment of
the unskilled workers in each sector provided that the demand is such that
the prices do not fall more than the wage levels do. This is what happens
and all urban unskilled employment expands relative to the base run. Sector
3 increases its unskilled employment significantly because all household
consumption demand, export demand, and intermediate input demand show a strong
tendency to expand. Sector 1 expands its unskilled employment and output
next to sector 3 due mainly to the increase in intermediate demand. For this
sector good, the household consumption demand is actually less than the base
run and exports are only nominally larger than the base run values. But these
two demands are negligible relative to the intermediate input demands. Simi-
larly with sector 2. Strong intermediate demand and export demand coupled
with moderate increase in investment demand keep the sector 2 output relative-
ly high. Service sectors, sectors 6 and 7, increase their outputs only
moderately, For sector 6 it is mainly due to the fall in household consump-
tion demand, i.e., with more population in the economy people consume more
-essentially-needed commodities and less modern and possibly luxury goods.
For sector 7, it is the slow increase in the mark-up demand that keeps the
output increase relatively moderate, The smallest increase in output occurs
in sector 5, construction, reflecting the weak demand for physical capital
investment relative to the base run,
Investment in physical capital stocks actually increases for sectors 1,
2, 3, 4, and 6, i.e., the modern sectors and the traditional manufacturing
sector, despite the fact that the animal spirit parameters decrease in all
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Table 5.13. Results of higher population growth with proportionate labor
force growth (HPOP) in F1 closure.
A. Rates of percentage change in distribution
Year A(!) A(2)
Total population
5 1.04 0.61
10 2.34 1.79
measures.
T
1.24
3.14
G
0.27
1.34
Urban population
5 1.76 1.26 1.72 1.38
10 3.20 2.77 2.85 3.37
B. Rates of percentage change in dualism measures.
Year 5 Year 10
M/T 1.59 2.85
T/A 4.01 8.08
C. Composition of savings.
Year 5
0.09450 (0.09183)
0.11208 (0.10891)
0.02179 (0.02118)
0.70067 (0.68087)
0.10003 (0.09721)
1.02908
-0.23670
0.20762
5877.2914
Year 10
0.06979 (0.07263)
0.12510 (0.13019)
0.01882 (0.01958)
0.66267 (0.68963)
0.08453 (0.08797)
0.96091
-0.23944
0.27853
14726.0131
1
2
3
4
5
TPS
fs
gs
TS
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sectors (except sector 4*). The decrease in these parameters is due to a
larger decline in nominal wages than in prices of capital. The decrease is,
therefore, smaller for modern sectors. The higher demand expectations over-
come these smaller declines of the animal spirit parameters, and the capital
investment increases. For sector 3, the investment goes up despite the
larger decline in the parameter due to the aforementioned strong growth in
demands (and therefore output).
Investment goes down for sectors 5, 7, and 8. The animal spirit param-
eters are significantly below the base run values for all these sectors (-2.3
percent, -3.24 percent, and -4.5 percent, respectively for equipment and
machinery investment). In sectors 5 and 7, the weak demand pressure also
accelerates the decline of investment. For sector 8, however, the decline in
the parameter is so large as to outweigh one of the strongest demand pressures
in the economy; because wage goes down with the agricultural price, but the
capital user cost is largely determined by a weighted average of urban prices.
Real GDP goes up consistently relative to the base run. This mainly
occurs from the increase in the unskilled labor employment. The urban un-
skilled labor share therefore declines monotonously. The population again
increases around 8.05 percent relative to the ba'se run in the 10th year. The
same value for real GDP is 2.37 percent. Therefore, the real GDP per capita
goes down 5,68 percent relative to the base run 10th year value.
The utility levels per capita tell how this decline in products is dis-
tributed over different income classes. The traditional sector workers and
their dependents get hurt most severly throughout the simulation. This is due
to the larger decline in their nominal wages than modern sector workers. The
*This is because the mining sector's value-added price decreases much
more slowly than wages or capital prices. This increases the cost of the
natural resource, making more capital and labor inputs more desirable.
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real inocme per worker delcines for the traditional workers by 3.5 percent,
but it increases for modern unskilled by 0.2 percent relative to the base run
in the 10th year. The rural residents lose about the same as the modern urban
unskilled. The reason they do not lose as much as the urban traditional work-
ers or more, is due to the fact that the labor force is forced to increase
proportionately with the population. As a result, the number of dependents
increases less rapidly than the number of workers in agriculture, whereas in
urban areas, because the unskilled labor has an elastic supply and the amount
of the employment is demand-determined, the number of actually employed does
not increase as much as the total population, increasing the dependents per
worker relatively more than in rural areas.
The measures for income distribution worsen because the agricultural terms
of trade deteriorate and the traditional unskilled workers lose. With the
lack of an inflation effect, decreased nominal income of agriculture increases
both the intraurban and rural-urban wage dualism. Capitalists receive a high-
er share of national income; another cause of the deterioration in income
distribution.
Everybody, including the rural worker, has higher real savings except
for the urban traditional unskilled. The number of rural workers increase
more than their nominal income per capita decreases, But, the total invest-
ment is about the same as in the base run. The decreased foreign savings is
the major reason for small capital accumulation. Deflation only increases
exports and decreases imports,
5.5.2. NC Framework
Higher rates of growth of both population and labor force have extremely
large positive effects to the macro economy in general in NC. The real GDP
grows very rapidly and is as much as 10.6 percent higher than the NC base
run in the 10th year. The unskilled labor share has a distinctive U-shape.
The first decline is caused by the faster growth of the unskilled employment
than any of the components of the capital stocks. The second half is due to
the higher rates of physical capital accumulation plus the higher rates of
growth of unskilled employment in such high labor share sectors as sectors 2,
4, and 5, and consequently the lower rates for such low labor share sectors
as sectors 1 and 6 (Figure 5.14 and Table 5.14).
The outputs go up for all sectors. The increase is faster for the more
traditional goods at first due to the strong consumption demands for these
sector goods. As the economy grows and investments picks up, however, the
demand for more modern goods goes up because of the higher income elasticities
of consumption for these commodities and because of more intermediate input
demand for these commodities.
Higher domestic demand pressure for exportables keep their prices rela-
tively high, and exports in general are less than those of the base run,
whereas the rapid increase in domestic demand pushes up imports significiantly.
The foreign savings therefore increase 20 percent relative to the base run by
the 10th year, This accounts for 31 percent of the increase of the total sav-
ings. The government savings also increase because of higher tax and tariff
revenues. With all these together, the physical investment is around 40 per-
cent higher in the 10th year than the base run.
When we look at the utility per capita. it can be found that the urban
skilled labor class benefits most from the higher growth of population and
labor force. This run has much higher levels of unskilled urban employment
and physical capital stocks, but the amount of the skilled does not go up pro-
portionately. The per capita income for this income class therefore increases
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Table 5.14. Results of higher population growth with proportionate labor
force growth (HPOP) in NC closure.
A. Rates of percentage change in distribution measures.
Year A(!) A(2) T G
Total population
5 2.84 1.29 3.56 0.28
10 0.0 -1.28 1.50 -1.67
Urban population
5 3.40 2.43 4.59 1.95
10 1.44 0.0 2.90 -0.72
B. Rates of percentage change in dualism measures.
Year 5 Year 10
M/T -0.25 
-4,43
T/A -1,41 -5,25
C. Composition of savings.
Year 5 Year 10
1 0.08188 (0.09325) 0.08538 (0.08628)
2 0.10275 (0.11701) 0.13503 (0.13646)
3 0.02094 (0.02385) 0.02292 (0.02317)
4 0.58487 (0,66608) 0.65631 (0.66324)
5 0.08764 (0.09981) 0.08990 (0.09085)
TPS 0.87809 (1.0000) 0.98955
fs -0.06410 -0.23742
gs 0,18601 0.24787
TS 7464.1883 11103.7843
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quite rapidly. Both of the largely unskilled labor classes have U-shaped pat-
terns: they first decrease and then increase. For the traditional sector
workers the decline is sharper and the increase even more drastic than the
modern unskilled workers. This is caused by the slower increase in unskilled
employment in traditional sectors due to the higher elasticities of substitu-
tion assumed in these sectors. Wages are decreasing equally across the urban
sectors in the earlier period because agricultural nominal income is not so
different from the base run level. But the total population in urban areas is
increasing, the burden of which largely falls on the unskilled classes. Thus
these classes suffer. The class- 2 suffers more than class 1 because of the
smaller increase in unskilled employment in traditional sectors, plus the
large decrease in the relative price of sector 7 goods which form the bulk of
class 2's income. A good part of the value-added from this sector is included
in income class 2, The increasing part of the utility per capita level of
the unskilled classes comes from a higher increase in labor force than in
population, the increased labor share of the value-added, and the relative
slowing down of the decline of the general wage level. The last is due to
the higher economic growth absorbing more and more unskilled labor, eventually
attenuating the effects of the population pressure, Finally, more drastic
increase in the utility per capita of the traditional worker class comes from
the fact that, as the agricultural income increases, the urban traditional
wages go up relatively more than the modern unskilled workers' wages.
The composition of savings shows the extent to which foreign savings con-
tributed to the capital accumulation in this run. The more unskilled employed
means higher output that, in turn, increases imports. The higher demand for
sector 3 goods from the expanded population increases its price, decreasing
its exports. Because sector 3 goods are the major export commodity of this
economy, the total exports go down as well as increasing foreign savings,
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Captialists, however, contribute more to the higher saving than do
foreigners during the first years of the simulation. This comes from the
higher share of the total value-added they get with increased unskilled labor
but unchanged physical capital stocks.
The distribution of income becomes more unequal at first, but gradually
becomes less unequal. Urban income distributions becomes worse than over-
all distribution because the agricultural terms of trade improve throughout
the simulation whereas within the urban sectors capitalists and skilled work-
ers get higher shares of income. As the labor share increases and intra-urban
dualism disappears (through higher agricultural income), the distribution be-
comes more equal. All dualism measures naturally decrease.
5.5.3. IX Framework
IX has a more disconcerting result than NC. The real GDP grows at a
higher speed than the IX base run, and it is around 6 percent higher than the
base run in the 10th year. However, the unskilled labor share is down to a
level 3.5 percent below the base run in the same year. Reflecting this and
other factors, the utility levels per capita of unskilled urban workers fall
substantially from the base run values. Owners of capital stocks have consis-
tently higher and annually increasing levels of utility per capita. This out-
come is essentially necessary because the higher labor supply produces more
output and (with population growing more slowly than the labor force), prices
tend to fall, increasing exports, This increase in exports, without a large
expansion of imports, brings down the amount of foreign savings substantially
requiring an increase in domestic savings. As a result, the economy works to
benefit the high savers and let the low-saving classes suffer. This is done
by letting the nominal wage levels fall drastically as there are more unskilled
to be hired in the economy (Figure 5.15 and Table 5.15).
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Table 5.15. Results of higher population growth with proportionate labor
force growth (HPOP) in IX closure.
A. Rates of percentage change in distribution measures.
Year A(!) A(2) T G
Total population
5 2.17 0.0 3,39 -1.34
10 7.65 2.45 10.82 1.60
Urban population
5 5.16 3.42 6.28 2.38
10 11.92 8.26 14.58 7.05
------ ----------------------------------------------------------------
B. Rates of percentage change in dualism measures.
Year 5 Year 10
M/T 
-3.49 - 7.27
T/A -9.83 -15.98
------ -----------------------------------------------------------------
C. Composition of savings.
Year 5 Year 10
1 0.08709 (0.09250) 0.0776 (0.08497)
2 0.10426 (0.11073) 0.12415 (0.13595)
3 0.02023 (0.02149) '0.01888 (0.02017)
4 0.63700 (0.67656) 0.61881 (0.67553)
5 0.09294 (0.09871) 0.07388 (0.08089)
TPS 0.94152 0.91333
fs -0.12920 -0.14535
gs 0.18768 0.23201
TS 6500.8293 13642.1571
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The wage decline stalls or reduces the level of investments in many sec-
tors because of the large fall in the animal spirit parameters, i.e., the
wage levels go down much more than the user cost of capital. The relatively
small amount of output increase of sector 5 signifies the degree of investment
increase. Instead, the exportable sectors have largely expanded outputs, not
to mention the mining sector whose original domestic output is so small. Sec-
tors 1 and 2 have 13 and 10 percent higher outputs than the base run in the
10th year, and sectors 3 and 8 enjoy around an 8 percent increase in outputs,
Sectors 6 and 7 enjoy similar expansion-6 percent, for sector 7 due mainly to
the increase in consumption, and for sector 6 due to the increase in the ex-
port and intermediate goods.
Agriculture enjoys improved terms of trade, especially during the first
half of the simulation when its nominal commodity price is actually higher than
the base run, whereas all urban nominal prices decline rapidly. This price
rise comes not only from the increased consumption demand but also from the
large increase in intermediate input demands due to the rapid increase of
inter alia sector 3 production. A larger increase in the sector 3 production
than, say, the FI solution, comes from increased exports, as well as increased
intermediate demands through the general expansion of the economic activities
than FI, The improved terms of trade of agriculture, however, erode away in
the second half, because the high demand pressure pushes up the investment
in this sector substantially for the first five years of the simulation,
increasing disporportionately the supply capacity of agriculture.
The distributional measuresshow a major deterioration. The cause lies
in the urban sector: the increased income shares of capitalists and skilled
workers, and the decreased share of unskilled worker classes, Ironically,
the dualism measures all show an improvement because of the increased nominal
agricultural income with no inflation.
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5.5.4. Overview of Higher Population Growth with Labor Force Growth
Unlike the case of higher population growth without labor force growth,
this set of experiments shows completely varied results in the different
closures. First of all, the NC closures grows very fast and real GDP is
11 percent higher than the NC base run by the 10th year, The higher income
share of capitalists and increased foreign savings finance the growth.
In IX, the real GDP is 5.8 percent higher in the 10th year. Essentially
this is because the investment is stalled by lower nominal wages due to higher
urban unskilled labor supply, The same mechanism of increased supply of sav-
ings as in NC exists in the earlier phase of the simulation, but the in vest-
ment is predetermined by the previous year's conditions. The potentially
higher savings are brought down to equal the value of investments by deflation
which mainly decreases the foreign savings. Insufficient capital accumulation
with ever increasing urban unskilled labor supply severly deteriorates the
distribution of income.
FI has the lowest growth of the three closures: around 2,4 percent in-
crease in the 10th year. The agricultural income levels determine the wage
structures that, in turn, determine the levels of employment for unskilled
labor. This mechanism does not produce the employment growth of unskilled
labor as fast as the unskilled labor force is growing. Unlike the full em-
ployment scenarios of IX and NC, therefore, the unskilled employment does not
grow as fast. As a result, total investment stays around the same level as
in the base run, whereas in IX it declines because of lower animal spirit
parameters. The labor share decrease is, naturally, much less here than in
IX.
-214-
Using their general equilibrium model, Kelley and Williamson experiment
with almost a tripling of population growth in 19th century Japan and report
various positive outcomes of high population growth. It should be reminded,
however, that they use the NC closure with the labor force growing at the
same rate as the population, Population pressures in contemporary developing
countries may very well be the type experimented in the previous section.
Thus, the optimism of Kelley and Williamson may be difficult to share.
5.6. HIGHER RURAL-URBAN MIGRATION
The last of these demographic comparative dynamics is to raise the migra-
tion parameter by 20 percent (HMIG), That is, the a shift of
L.
shshif=saif (I. *1-) eL
shift i K. A
I
is raised from 0.055192 to 0.066230.
This usually means a higher output in total and per capita because rural
to urban migration is, in general, a shift of the labor force from less produc-
tive to more productive sectors (Yap 1976), In this section it is discussed
that this result depends on the assumptions of full employment in urban sec-
tors. As long as unemployment and under-employment exist in urban areas, the
result needs qualification. The same is true if the urban labor market is
dualistic, i.e., a modern sector (enclave) exists that does not havemuch to
do with either the agricultural labor market, or the labor market of the urban
traditional sectors.
5.6.1. FI Framework
A greater shift of the labor force out of agriculture works to lessen
agricultural production, improving the agricultural terms of trade. This
would increase agricultural income, which in turn, would raise the nominal
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wages of the urban unskilled, The rise in traditional sector workers' wages
is larger than that of the modern sector workers. The higher wage level de-
creases urban employment and reduces the total output. Real GDP goes down
to a level 1,2 percent below the base run by the 10th year. The unskilled
labor share increases by 8 percent, This is due to the fact that less un-
skilled labor is employment in urban areas with relatively constant capital
stocks. (Figure 5.16 and Table 5.16.)
Except for the primary sectors, the decrease in output is largest in the
manufacturing sectors because the decrease in demand is quite large for all
factors, consumption, exports, and intermediate inputs. Other urban sectors
(sectors 5, 6, and 7) lose less because they have less intermediate input
ratios than manufacturing, and the output declines in the rest of the sec-
tors does not affect them very much and, partly, because the overall invest-
ment demand for the construction sector shows a stability.
In this run, all urban classes lose in terms of utility per capita. The
skilled workers' class loses most because their share of valued-added goes
down while the number of their dependents increases. Similarly for the physi-
cal capital owner's class. The traditional workers lose least because their
dependents do not increase in number so much and, because their wages go up
more than the modern sector wages due to the high rate of increase in nominal
agricultural income, This is one of the few results where both capitalists
and skilled workers lose in terms of utility per capita, This result, however,
seems to depend very much on how we allocate the dependents, and we employed
an extreme assumption: that dependents are proportionate to the working popu-
lation. To see how much this assumption determines the outcome, we look again
at the real income per worker for each income class. The following table
shows the percentage change from the base run in the 10th year. For compari-
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Table 5, 16, Results of a higher propensity to migrate from rural to urban
areas (HIG) in the FI framework,
A. Rates of percentage chan
Year A(Q)
5
10
-1,56
-2,80
Lge in distribution measures.
A(2) T
Total population
-1.53
-2,98
-1,77
-3,74
Urban population
5 -0,44 -0.51 -0.78 -0.46
10 -1.12 -0.76 -1,73 -1.44
B. Rates of percentage change in dualism measures.
Year 5 Year 10
M/T -3,77 -10.62
T/A --8,92 
-21,22
C. Composition of savings,
Year 5
0,09214 (0.09132)
0.11222 (0.1112 )
0,02101 (0,02082)
0,68497 (0,67886)
0,09866 (0,9778 )
1,0090
-0,20758
0,19858
6075,487
Year 10
0,06350 (0.07052)
0,12365 (0,13732)
0.01638 (0,01819)
0,61668 (0,68485)
0.08024 (0.08921)
0.90045
-0,15475
0.25430
16715,9571
G
-1.86
-4.55
1
2
3
4
5
TPS
fs
gs
TS
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son, columns 2 and 3 show the real income per consumer and utility per capita
(as they came out from the run).
Real Real Utility
Class income/worker income/consumer per capita
1 -0.544 
-4.868 -6.948
2 +2.782 -1.307 
-1.864
3 -3.774 -7.985 -8.774
4 -1,496 -5.723 -5.565
5 +4.575 +5.117 +7.231
This table shows that the relative position of changes in income per capita
does not differ whether we deflate the income by the number of employed or by
the number of assumed consuming population. Of course, if we assume that all
additional unemployed are family members of unskilled workers, the relative
position of income classes I and 2 will become worse. But, the fact that
capitalists and skilled workers also lose remains unchanged.
In this run, real savings are very close to the base run. Those groups
whose real savings increase are rural works and foreigners. The.losers, of
course, are the high income earners, capitalists, skilled workers, and even
modern unskilled workers, The reduced capital share with reduced outputs
hits the capital owners hard,
The agricultural sector enjoys the improved terms of trade, and increases
all urban wages and therefore the prices, i.e., a situation of stagnation
occurs. Almost everybody is poorer, but the resulting income distribution is
more equal because the richer get poorer whereas the rural residents get
richer.
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5.6.2. NC Framework
The picture becomes less bleak with the NC solution than in FI because
all the urban unskilled labor is forced to be employed through adjustments
in the general wage level, Real GDP goes up to the level of 1 percent higher
than the base run by the 10th year. The unskilled labor share declines be-
cause there exists more employed unskilled labor in the urban economy rela-
tive to capital stocks, plus the fact that such low labor share sectors as
sector 6 increase their employment share steadily, As investment picks up,
the decline of the labor share slows down and starts to increase by the end
of the 10 years. (Figure 5.17 and Table 5.17.)
Output and employment increase most in sector 4 for the same reason, it
has higher flexibilities and substitutabilities. When the labor market is
loose, this sector can absorb more labor due to the high elasticities of
factor substitution, as well as high trade elasticities.
Sectors 1, 2, and 6, the modern sectors, have the next highest levels of
output and unskilled employment. Sector 6 has the highest employment growth
relative to the base run, but sector 2 which has higher accumulation of capi-
tal stock and much higher marginal productivity of capital stocks has the
highest output growth, The growth of these sectors enforces one another
through the interaction with intermediate input demand.
Despite the fact that the wage decrease makes the animal spirit param-
eters lower, the higher supply (and therefore demand) heightens the demand
expectation, increasing investment. The outputs of sectors 2 and 5 are,
therefore, enforced,
Utility levels also behave somewhat differently from FI. True, the
rural residents' utility per capita shoots up, reflecting higher agricultural
prices and a smaller agricultural labor force, Class l's utility falls
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Table 5.17. Results of a higher propensity to migrate from rural to urban
areas (HMIG) in the NC framework.
A. Rates of percentage change in distribution measures.
Year A(!) A(2) T
5 -1.71
-3,2810
Total population
-2.59
-4.47
-1,58
-3.00
G
-3.60
-7,22
Urban population
5 0,49 0.27 0,88 -0.24
10 0,96 0,56 1,54 -1,29
B, Rates of percentage change in dualism measures,
M/T
Year 5
-6.02
Year 10
- 8,50
T/A -2,19 -17.74
C. Composition of savings,
Year 5
0,08383 (0,09337)
0,10531 (0,11730)
0,02046 (0,02279)
),59600 (0.66383)
0,09221 (0,10271)
0,98782
-0,07592
0,8710
7074.7555
Year 10
0.09335
0,14084
0,02172
0.72897
0.10209
1.08698
-0.32585
0,23888
9362.0744
1
2
3
4
5
TPS
fs
gs
TS
(0,08588)
(0,12957)
(0,01998)
(0.67064)
(0.09392)
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consistently, again because, with the nominal agricultural income expanding
rapidly and urban wage levels going down, the rate of decrease is faster for
the modern sector wages than the others.
The high consumption and intermediate input demand also keep the modern
outputs high, keeping the employment levels of unskilled workers high in
these sectors, The wage levels of unskilled workers in traditional sectors
decrease marginally, however, and demands for their outputs do not increase
as much, The traditional unskilled employment, therefore, only increases
slightly, With more workers (and dependents), but with sharply decreased
wage levels, the modern unskilled workers can only lose, whereas the marginal
wage decrease in a slightly deflationary economy (plus the fact that some
traditional capital income is included in this group's income) enables the
traditional unskilled income class to enjoy much better welfare levels.
The levels of utility per capita for capital owners and skilled workers
also shows a small dip at first but then improves, The first dip occurs be-
cause the rural sector takes away so much of the income quickly. But the
increased share of capitalists and skilled workers quickly put their levels
of utility per capita back to the base run levels,
Overall distribution improves mainly because of the change in the agri-
cultural terms of trade, but urban distribution in general deteriorates,
reflecting the worsening position of income class 1. Gini coefficients, how-
ever, show an improvement even among the urban population, This is because
Gini coefficients emphasize the relatively lower end of distribution and, in
fact, pick up the improving position of the lowest urban income class, i.e.,
the traditional unskilled.
The higher investment is financed by all groups except the modern unskil-
led, but the initial "push" to the economy comes from increased foreign sav-
ings in the second year, 26.5 percent higher than in the base run.
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5.6,3. IX Framework
The solution with the IX closure gives similar results as NC. The only
differences are that growth in physical capital investment is rather limited.
Investment generally falls because of lower animal spirit parameters that
result from the rapid decline in unskilled wage levels. Unlike the NC case,
however, the decline in desired investment is realized next year, even when
the economy is capable of collecting more savings, This forced disavings
are, once again, realized by lower prices that decrease the foreign savings
relative to what is potentially possible (i.e., as in NC).
Because there is less capital accumulation in the economy, the capital
share increases much higher than in, say, NC. The unskilled labor class also
lose more, which is clearly shown in the utility per capita levels. The dis-
tribution measures also show this. Urban distribution is even worse than in
NC. (Figure 5.18 and Table 5.18).
5.6.4. Overview of High Migration Propensity
A higher propensity for the population to shift from agricultural to
non-agricultural activities gives two largely different results depending on
whether we assume full employment of urban unskilled workers or not. If we
do, the economy naturally grows faster. There are more workers to be em-
ployed. The real wage goes down and capitalists, as well as the (remaining)
rural workers, tend to benefit. In NC, the initial boost of savings because
of an increase in foreign savings would results in a continuous growth. A
higher GDP produces more savings, and therefore, higher investment. Here a
continued higher relative price of sector 3 goods, the major exporting goods,
supports the high savings, otherwise the economy could easily lose the
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Table 5.18, Results of a higher propensity to migrate from rural to urban
areas (HMIG) in the IX framework.
A. Rates of percentage change in distribution measures,
Year A(i) A(2) T
Total populacion
5
10
-1,63
-3,28
-2,49
-6.14
-1,51
-1.90
G
-3.48
-6.65
Urban population
5 0.94 0,26 1.02 -0,24
10 3.11 2.07 3.57 -0,27
------ ----------------------------------------------------------------
B, Rates of percentage change in dualism measures.
Year 5 Year 10
M/T -3,77 -10.62
A/T -8,92 
-21.22
g---------------------------------------------------------------
C. Composition of savings
Year 10
0,07261 (0,08421)
0.12313 (0,14281)
0.01664 (0,01930)
0.57712 (0,66938)
0.07267 (0.08429)
0.86217
-0,07284
0.21067
15561,8888
(0,09302)
(0.11317)
(0,02117)
(0.67388)
(0,09878)
1
2
3
4
5
TPS
fs
gs
TS
Year 5
0,08600
0,10463
0,01957
0,62302
0,09131
0,92452
-0,10204
0,17752
6760.299
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foreign savings. But the high price of this sector's goods is a natural out-
come because the growth is essentially investment led. This sector does not
contribute to the physical capital. A weaker demand keeps the investment in
this sector low and at the same time high wages keep the unskilled employed
and output low, but the prices high,
In IX, however, the lower wages work to decrease the level of investment.
This is more or less forced disavings and is carried out by lower general price
levels. The economy, therefore, cannot grow at its potential speed.
The picture becomes totally different when we assume the unemployed ur-
ban unskilled but a rigid wage structure. The agricultural income hike in-
creases the wages and prices, but keep employment and, consequently, outputs
low. A very unpleasant stagflation resultsin FI.
5.7. HIGHER TARIFF RATES
In this section, the effects of increasing the tariff rates are consid-
ered. No government action for redistributing the increased tariff revenue
is- considered, partly to keep it simple and analytically tractable, but mainly
because such redistribution mechanisms would be much too arbitrary. For ex-
ample, to whom should the government transfer the- extra money, and how much?
The experiments, therefore, are mostly contractionary in a static sense-the
government savings increase,
There are two sets of experiments: the first considers an across-the-
borad 20 percent increase in tariff rates of all importables (sectors 1, 2. 3,
4, and 8); the second is to increase the tariff rate by sector (20 percent
each).
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5.7.1. Across-the-Board Increase in Tariff Rates
In a static setting, an across-the-board tariff increase slightly ex-
pands the total GDP in all three closures (around 0,01 percent). NC, however,
gains most in terms of GDP. For NC and IX, the only way the total products
can differ in the first year from the base run first year is by reallocation
of unskilled labor. Sectors 1, 2, and 4 increase their unskilled employment
because of their high import elasticities, but this shift of labor to sector
I is the highest in NC due to the fact that the total (real) savings decrease
in NC (mainly due to the decline in foreign savings that overwhelm government
savings). This decrease contracts the demand for sector 2 and sector 5 goods,
thereby releasing more unskilled labor for employment in sector 1, the higher
labor productivity sector relative to sectors 2 and 5; thus the high first
year GDP of NC.
In FI, the higher tariff rates increase the urban prices more than in IX
or NC because despite the slight decrease in the average agricultural income
(i.e., a decline in the agricultural value-added price), the consumer's
price indices are kept high and urban wages are, consequently, still high. Of
course, this is a simultaneous process, high urban prices and high consumer's
prices are almost synonymous, In IX, however, the contractionary effects
would be translated to lower wage levels, bringingboth price vectors down,
whereas this mechanism does not exist in FI. Agricultural price is almost con-
stant because the higher intermediate input demand from the higher urban out-
put and the cross-price effect on-consumption, almost completely cancel out.
With less decrease in imports and more increase in exports, there are simply
more goods available for domestic consumption in FI. The decline in total
utility in FI, therefore, is the least among the three closures. Total utility
declines most for NC despites its best standing in real GDP. The curtailment
of imports in this closure is highest, whereas the curtailment of exports is
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lowest, leaving the least available for domestic uses.
Despite the tariff increase that can be called protective, the outputs
and, therefore, unskilled employment, decline in sectors 2 and 3 in FI. This
happens even if the urban labor supply is not limited as in other closures.
For these sectors, import substitution effects are limited due to the low
import elasticities, and high export elasticities reduce their export demand
significantly. The decline in household consumption for sector 3, and in in-
termediate input demand for sector 2, also contribute to the decrease in the
demand for these sectors. Similar things happen in NC and IX, but this time
the general wage level has to come down to keep all the urban labor employed.
This lowers the urban price somewhat increasing the consumption and export
demands. In IX, the sector 2 output even increases because of the continued
investment pressure in addition to the above two factors,
Distribution measures suggest that, in FI, inequality increase in any
measure in both urban areas and in the total economy, There is a worsening
of agricultural terms of trade and a decrease in the urban unskilled labor
share accompanied by a widening gap between the modern unskilled wages and the
traditional unskilled wages. The mechanism must by now be familiar.
In IX and NC, on the other hand, the total inequality decreases due to
the improved agricultural terms of trade, but the urban inequality increases;
the same as in FI.
The overtime path depends, in the cases of IX and FI, on the specifica-
tion of the fixed capital formation, With the specification elected here,
real GDP slides down relative to the base run continuously to thelevel 0. 1 per-
cent below the base run in the 10th year for both closures. NC fares a little
better: -0.02 percent in the 10th year, because the loss of foreign savings
is partially compensated for by the increased government savings in this
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closure. In FI and IX, the investors' decision predetermines the investment
for the next period. Investors see that wages are getting relatively cheaper,
making the perceived wage-rental ratio decline. The capital cost is more of
a function of the urban prices, and the rate of return on capital influences
the user cost of capital only partially. Investors then decide to invest
less because capital seems more expensive.
Experiments with the investment specification that respond more quickly
to the change in the profitability of capital stocks show that the infant in-
dustry arguments may indeed hold, provided that the import elasticities are
high for these sectors (as in sectors I and 4 in our model). If the capital
formation in these sectors are substantial, the overall labor share will in-
crease because the aggregate capital-labor ratio rises. The utility level
would go up first from that of capitalists and skilled workers, then eventu-
ally to the unskilled. But this specification* contradicts the fact that in
Japan, the faster growing sectors had lower rates of return on capital, and
yet they were investing more heavily than the rest of the economy. We,
therefore, do not take this new specification seriously here. It should sur-
fice to note that if we would like to believe in protection, we might use a
specification that combines the differential capital market and profit-rate
incentives in capital formation,
5.7.2, Sectoral Tariff Hikes
We now experiment with the 20 percent tariff rate increase by sector.
First, the manufacturing sectors, Figure 5.19 shows the real GDP changes
relative to the respective base runs of the three closures, We can see that
the tariff increase on sectors I and 2 have results that are not drastically
*A variant of such a specification has been used by Melo and Dervis
(1977) with similar interests,
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Figure 5.19. Real GDP changes relative to the respective base runs of
the three closures using a 20 percent tariff rate increase
in the manufacturing sectors.
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B. Sector 2
Figure 5.19 continued.
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different from one closure to another. This fact is also confirmed by look-
ing at sectoral disaggregated outputs (Figure 5.20) for the tariff increase
of sector I goods. At least the import substitution mechanism seems to be
working as one can observe from the relatively high outputs of sector 1.
When we look at the rest of the results of the tariff increase for sector 3
goods, however, they differ surprisingly. The consistent (and fast) de-
crease of real GDP for FI and LX, versus the rapid growth of NC. In examin-
ing the sectoral outputs for the sector 3 experiment (Figure 5.21) we
notice that import subsitution does not seem to have occurred at all (not
even in NC). This differences comes from the magnitudes of trade elasticities.
Sector I goods are "importables" or "import substitutables" in a sense
that the import elasticity is relatively high. Sector 3, on the other hand,
has limited import elasticity but a very high export elasticity: this sec-
tor's goods are exportables (at least during the 1960s).
When tariff rates go up, the domestic demand for importables shifts from
imports to domestically produced goods, raising both the domestic output
level and the domestic price for goods of the sector concerned. This, the
argument for protection goes, increases the profit of the sector's capitalists
and increases investment and, consequently, allows for further expansion of
the sector's output. It does not quite happen that way in any of the closures
in our model. First, for sector 1, animal spirit parameters do not increase.
Sector I is a capital intensive sector, and shifting domestic production to-
wards this sector means less demand pressure for unskilled labor in IX. Thus,
the urban wage level comes down, lowing the animal spirit parameters. The
expectation on demand does not increase very much either because the expan-
sion of domestic demand through import substitution is somewhat nullified by
the decline in exports, even for sector 1. Thus, investment declines for
sector I after the tariff increase for this sector.
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Figure 5.21. Sectoral outputs for 20 percent tariff increase
for sector 3 goods.
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In the FI closure, the decline in the animal spirit parameter comes from
the worsening of agricultural terms of trade. The rest of the story is the
same.
In NC, savings do not expand and the economy contracts over time. The
decrease in imports, especially in sector 1, lowers the foreign savings,
overwhelming the marginal increase in government savings. The further de-
cline in real GDP accelerates the decline in foreign savings. Sector 1,
again with low animal spirit parameter and low demand expectation, has the
lowest rate of investement relative to the base run.
Now we turn our attention to sector 3 (the result of a tariff hike in
sector 2 are somewhere in between sectors I and 3). The situation looks
miserable in FI and IX in this case, because sector 3 produces exportables.
The tariff hike does not increase output because, according to our assumption,
they are not close substitutes to foreign goods. However, it increases the
price to some extent reducing export disporportionately. To the extent,
therefore, that there is a positive level of substitutability with imports,
the output goes up, but the decline in exports is so overwhelming that the
investment in this sector falls way down (through the decreased expectation
of demand for the next period), This also decreases the unskilled employment
(in FI) or the wage level of the unskilled (in IX and NC). In NC, however,
the economy expands over time when the tariff is increased for sector 3
goods. This is, as mentioned above, not because import substitution has
occurred, but because sector 3 is the main export sector with a high export
elasticity. The decline in export in this sector has such a large positive
impact on foreign savings. The total savings in the economy, together with
the higher government savings, go up continuously. Thus this result.
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Because sector 3 is more labor intensive, the labor market impact is
much larger than in the case of sector ! tariff increases. More unemployment
for the FI closure and much lower wages for IX. We are far from the putty-
putty world of the pure trade theory, but all this certainly shows that
whether or not we are dealing with a labor-intensive sector or whether we are
dealing with exportables or importables, does matter a lot, as implied by
Brechner (1971)*, on the future welfare of the population in the economy.
We shall now look at the situation when the agricultural tariff is
raised. Real GDP declines in each closure, more so in FI than in IX or NC.
The tariff definitely improves the agricultural terms of trade pushing up
the urban wage level and urban prices, The consumption in general declines,
despite the wage hike, because of a counteracting decrease in employment
and higher prices, Export, of course, also declines. Overall, the GDP goes
down even from the first year of the tariff increase. The higher wage raises
the animal spirits of investors and the decline in investment is not as
serious as the decline in demand expectations. Consequently, the capital-
labor ratio goes up, increasing the labor share significantly.(Figure 22).
In IX and NC, the need for full employment initially keeps the output
high. But, the full employment is'maintained by'lower wages that push the
animal spirits down, Investment, therefore, gradually declines for IX. In
NC the increase in foreign savings, mainly from the decline of exports of
sector 3 and from the higher rural sector savings, keep the initial investment
quite high, However, the failure of either foreign savings or government sav-
ings to further contribute to relative increases in investment, and the rapid
decline of rural savings (from deteriorating terms of trade) push down the
*In FI, the fact that the wage level is determined by agricultural income
is equivalent to having a (shifting) minimum wage level for each solution,
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Figure 5.22. Real GDP changes relative to the respective base runs of
the three closures using a 20 percent tariff rate increase
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total investments, slowing down economic growth. Sector 3 suffers in all
closures because of its high agricultural intermediate inputs and close re-
lations in the labor market with the agricultural sector, They both con-
tribute to raising sector 3's prices relatively more than the other sectors.
The export and consumption declines really hurt this sector.
The distributional factors are shown in Table 5,19. Essentially, a
tariff hike on modern manufacturing sectors is unequalizing, it deteriorates
agricultural terms of trade and worsens the urban wage dualism. Tariffs on
sector 3 are equalizing at first, due to the higher intermediate input demand
from agricultural goods from sector 3. As sector 3 outputs decline, through
lower export, however, it quickly turns to the unequalizing factor in IX and
FI. An agricultural tariff raise is equalizing because of the terms of trade
effects, but. the impacts on intraurban distribution are rather limited.
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Table 5.19. Distributional impacts of higher tariff rates (shown in percen-
tage differences of Gini coefficients from the base run values).
Year 1 Year 10
Total Urban Total Urban
Sector I
FI 0.114 0.083 0.044 0.035
NC 0.098 0.066 0.066 0.027
IX 0.120 0,077 0.039 0.030
Sector 3
FI 
-0.042 -0.023 0.036 0.020
NC -0.055 -0.010 -0.116 -0.106
IX -0,125 -0.019 0.041 0.019
Sector 8
FI 
-0.054 -0.018 -0.025 
-0.014
NC -0,090 -0.014 0.012 -0.007
IX -0.095 
-0.014 
-0.022 
-0.004
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CHAPTER 6: SUMARY AND CONCLUDING REMARKS
The exercises so far have had dual purposes. One is to examine the pat-
terns of economic growth and distribution in Japan in a historical setting,
and the other is, by doing so, to learn some lessons of the general character-
istics of economic development, or at least a subset of them, for contemporary
developing countries. The latter purpose is based on the belief that, even
if each country is different in its socio-cultural and institutional settings,
there should be some aspects of one country's experience that can, with suf-
ficiently careful abstraction, be of relevance to another country's experi-
ences. We are, therefore, taking a similar viewpoint as that of Fei, Ohkawa
and Ranis (1982):
Our approach.,. represents something of a half-way house between
the unacceptable proposition that there is a general fixed evolu-
tionary model that is followed by all developing countries, and
the equally unacceptable proposition that every country is sui
generis and that its transition growth defies any efforts at
generalization and transferability (11-1,2).
The tool chosen for such abstraction and examination is a general equi-
librium model with different closing rules. It has been found that the FI
closure of the model performs quite well, not only in replicating the history
of various real variables during the concerned period of Japanese economic
history, but also in reproducing the qualitative relationships between growth
and the functional and size distribution of income. In this FI clousre, urban
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labor is assumed to have a perfectly elastic supply curve, and investment is
determined by investors' decisions alone. Urban wage structures are "deter-
mined" by reference to the agricultural per capita income and the levels of
consumers price indices. It is by now almost a textbook orthodoxy that the
distribution of income becomes more unequal in the short run when an economy
grows faster. Such has been the case in Japan: changes in functional dis-
tribution of income (and for most years size distribution as well), and the
real GDP growth rates moved completely against each other. FI behaves this
way, but the other two closures, NC and IX, fail to do so.
To the extent that the FI closure replicates the Japanese economic his-
tory moderately well, the sensitivity analyses in Chapter 5 can be considered
as counterfactual experiments.
It is worthwhile noting that, in the short run, a higher amount of in-
vestment deteriorates distribution of income much more than a higher amount
of export in FI. The overall distribution of income depends heavily on the
agricultural terms of trade, and a higher general export demand, e.g., through
devaluation, improves them because the export-oriented sector (sector 3), has
a large agricultural intermediate input coefficient. An increase in export
pressure, therefore, increases the demand pressure for agricultural commodi-
ties, which improves the terms of trade, The exogenous expansion of invest-
ment, however, raises the demand for urban goods that do not require many
agricultural intermediate inputs (sectors 2 and 5). Urban prices increase in
this case relatively more than the agricultural price does, worsening the
terms of trade and income distribution. Indeed, the magnitudes of intermedi-
ate input coefficients are very important in determining patterns of growth
and distribution. In an earlier work (Shishido 1982), it has been shown that
the real wage of urban traditional sector workers grows much more slowly if
agriculture supplies no intermediate input to modern manufacturing.
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In both cases of export expansion and investment increase, the urban
labor share declines in the short run, simply because there are more unskil-
led workers employed in urban sectors. The intra-urban distribution of in-
come (and intra-urban wage dualism) depends on all of the labor share, con-
sumers' price indices, average agricultural income, and the level of unskil-
led employment. In the experiments in Chapter 5, devaluation increases
intra-urban wage dualism by 1.25 percent, but decreases rural-urban dualsim
by 7 percent in the first year. If investment is increased (not shown in
Chapter 5), intra-urban dualism decreases slightly, and the rural-urban
dualism stays almost constant. When only the export of sector I goods, whose
intermediate demand for agriculture is also limited, is raised, the situation
is similar: a slight increase in both intra-urban dualism and rural-urban
dualism results.
It should also be noted, as the other side of the same coin, that when
the model economy does have smaller total output than the base run, it is be-
cause unemployed skilled workers increased in the urban sector in a static
setting, The unemployed can increase due to higher wages caused by improved
agricultural terms of trade (e.g., in the case of a higher tariff rate on
agricultural goods), or due to decreased investment. The former is akin to
the classical unemployment in the sense that real wage levels are too high
for full employment. The latter, of course, is similar to the Keynesian un-
employment.* Of course, with no rationing in the goods market**, even in the
pseudo-classical unemployment case, the aggregate demand for goods have to
come into equality with the supply. This is done by decreased exports and
*These definitions of classical and Keynesian unemployment are close
to those used by Bruno (1979) and Lluch (1979).
**See Malinvand (1977) for a case where there is a rationing scheme in
the goods market.
-247-
consumption through higher price, i.e., a good part of the wage increase is
passed on to the commodity price levels.
This last aspect is important because a higher level of urban wages per
se does not prompt capitalists to substitute labor for capital as much as
would be expected. The capital user price is a weighted average of urban
prices that are positively correlated with wages. The change in the animal
spirit parameters, therefore, is very limited. Consequently, a significant
investment increase has to come from higher expectation on demand. Therefore,
measures to lower agricultural income and, consequently, lower the urban wage
levels, usually serve to accelerate the growth rate of the economy in FI.
All cheaper agricultural imports, lower agricultural tariff rates, and lower
rural-urban migration serve this purpose, The last, lower migration, implies
that the longer the period of agricultural labor surplus continues ' Ia
Lewis, the higher will be the growth rate an economy is able to achieve, pro-
vided factor substitution is fairly limited. This result is naturally con-
sistent with that of Minami and Ono (19 78c) who postulate a subsistent sector
that can supply labor to a capitalist sector with infinite elasticity.
Of course, all these measures keep the distribution of income quite un-
equal, increasing both the rural-urban dualism and the intra-urban dualism,
and decreasing the urban labor share, Whether such a policy is possible or
not, therefore, depends very much on the country's political situation.
Devaluation also increases output through export expansion and import
substitution, but the effects are limited by the very fact that the prices
go up almost as much as the devaluation amount. Devaluation increases the
export of sector 3 goods especially, which, in turn, increases the intermed-
iate input demand from agriculture. Wages and prices of the urban sector
therefore go up, The rate of increase of urban prices is around 9 percent
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when devaluation is 10 percent. This improves the agricultural terms of
trade, decreasing the measure of rural-urban dualism. However, the aggre-
gate distribution gets more unequal because of the drastic shift of income
to the capital owners, and the increase in intra-urban wage dualism through
inflation, i.e., the modern sector unskilled wages go up more rapidly than
the traditional unskilled wages,
The rural sector would not be so lucky when, naturally, only urban ex-
ports are increased as in experiment HWT1. The rural-urban dualism decreases
but only around I percent (as compared with 7 percent in HEX), and intra-
urban dualism increases all the same, deteriorating the distribution of in-
come severely during the export boom.
In these two experiments on the trade aspects of the economy, the deval-
uation and the export boom, we obtained some higher total output (real GDP)
than in the base run. The third experiment on trade, higher tariff rates,
does not give this result. Investment declines because of the lower demand
expectation, mainly through the decreased export demand, and partly through
the contractionary effects of increased government savings. Whether the
import substitution effect, the usual argument for protection, occurs or
not, depends therefore on the degree of import- and export-orientation of
the concerned commodity. A higher tariff on sector I goods, for example,
would at least have this substitution effect (although the total GDP declines
over time), whereas it does not work at all on sector 3 goods, the export-
ables. Among the importables, however, the tariff increase on agricultural
goods would only give a negative outcome because of the aforementioned clas-
sical unemployment effect.
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The same classical unemployment effect* is at work on two of the three
demographic experiments, namely HPOPH and HMIG. The higher population
growth without a proportionate increase in the labor force, increases the
demand for agricultural goods disporportionately and not the supply, whereas
the higher rate of migration reduces the supply capacity of agriculture.
The investment in agriculture does not increase sufficiently to overcome
the difficulty. HPOPH is, however, a mirror image of what actually happened
in Japan. The birth rate decreased continuously after the baby boom that
occurred right after World War II. During the 1960s and 1970s, those young
people born in the baby boom started to enter the labor market as well-
educated, quality labor, in both urban and rural areas while the relative
size of dependents decreased. This clearly boosted the economy quite posi-
tively**.
HMIG gives a result that is strongly negative in terms of growth. The
high tariff rate on agriculture slows down rural-urban migration. Both af-
fect the economy adversely by the classical unemployment effect, but the
high migration case is more serious in terms of the loss of output and urban
jobs. The Japanese government's persistence on a high agricultural tariff
may largely be a result of political considerat'ions, but it may very well
have been a wiser choise even from a straightforward economic point of view-
given, of course, all the rigidities in the economy.
*We should emphasize that the classical unemployment usually defined
(Bruno 1979, Lluch 1979), is that the (institutional) subsistence minimum wage
level, which is exogenous to the economy, is too high for full employment.
Here rural income is endogenous and increases due to the relative scarcity
of rural workers. For such a case the Lewisian case easily reappears with
assumptions of an endogenous and elastic labor supply function, or just by
having an extremely higher amount of labor in the rural sector initially.
Assuming a higher factor substitutability in the rural sector should also
help (Bell 1979).
**This effect is naturally built into the present model as higher growth
rates of labor force than population. This is one reason for the growth
performance of the model economy.
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As discussed in detail in Chapters 4 and 5, NC gives a solution that is
unrealistic. This actually corroborates the results of Cardoso and Taylor
(1979)*. In NC, not only does the distribution of income move counter to the
historical facts, but it also fails to produce export-led growth: a result
that is not only quite inconsistent with the experience of Japan, but also
of many contemporary developing countries, The only way for an economy with
an NC framework to grow faster is to have higher output (e.g., as in the HPOP
experiment), or to have more savings (Shishido 1982a). Thrift and productiv-
ity are the only measures by which a neoclassical economy can be successful.
The IX framework produces results that are more rigid than the solutions
of the other two. This is, of course, expected because we assume animal
spirit investment and full employment of all factors. In this closure all
that can change in the short run are the sectoral allocation of unskilled
workers within nonagricultural sectors, and the amount of international trade.
The urban wage level in IX is endogenous and this makes the aspects of
dualism and distribution vis-a-vis growth less straightforward than those in
FI. In a situation where the pseudo-classical unemployment is the outcome
of FI, the wage level goes down in IX decreasing both measures of wage dualism
drastically. In cases where the Keynesian unemployment is the expected out-
come in FI, the rural-urban dualism increases in FI**,whereas it decreases
in IX. On the other hand, the magnitude of the changes in measures of size
distribution, especially those of the urban sectors, is rather limited in
most sensitivity analyses. This is naturally the result of the rigidities
of the full employment assumption.
*Although their "Cambridge" closure is IX, it is all the same in that
a neoclassical closure does notwork.
**The classical contraction involves the wage hike that narrows the gap
at least between rural income and traditional urban wages, but the Keynesian
contraction means less aggregate demand, resulting in deflation. All nominal
wages then go down increasing the rural-urban dualism.
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Adelman and Robinson (1978) and Lysy and Taylor (1980) also obtain simi-
lar results of stability in the size distribution measures. The assumption
of both models, i.e., full employment, may very well explain at least a part
of the stability. In IX, the functional distribution measure (the unskilled
labor share) moves fairly together with the real GDP growth rate, as it does
in NC. This is also counter to history. Given, however, the break down
of the similar relationship between real GDP and the size-distribution of
income towards the end of the 1960s, it may just be conjectured that the FI
framework of infinitely elastic labor supply ceases to work around that time,
and that the IX framework may take over. There is, of course, no readily
available statistical test for such a conjecture and we will have to depend
on future research and the further accumulation of real world as well as
academic experiences.
Finally, several words can be said about the wage dualism observed in
Japan. First, given a large enough labor force in the agricultural sector,
the only way the intra-urban wage dualism can be born is through increasing
the training-and-hiring costs of certain sectors (Shishido 1982a). In other
words, higher technical progress in some sectors compared to others can
definitely cause wage differentials even if the workers, before they are em-
ployed, are homogenous. Second, the close relationship between the agricul-
tural and traditional sectors'. female wages shows that these two labor mar-
kets, urban traditional and rural, were closely tied to each other until quite
recently. The use of NC or IX, which use endogenous urban wage levels that
effectively separate the two markets, cannot really trace the history of the
wage dualism. Thirdly, the use of FI also means that the very highly elastic
supply of nonagricultural labor is essential for the continued existence of
wage dualism, and the exhaustion of such surplus labor means that the wage
dualism at large has to disappear. All these corroborate with the findings
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of Yasuba (1976) and Tan (1980).
Naturally, it can be argued that the wage determination mechanism and
the FI closure have these properties built in. True. But the important
point is that the other closures fail to work or fail to replicate history
qualitatively. The wage determination mechanism and the existence of sur-
plus labor are among the essential differences of the three closures, and,
from the limited experiments performed, they matter.
-25 3-
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